DORAL HEALTH CENTER, P.A., A/A/O PEDRO SANCHEZ
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A plaintiff in a civil action may not invoke the Fifth Amendment to shield itself from discovery while seeking affirmative relief, and an adverse inference may be drawn against a party that invokes this privilege in civil litigation.
[1] A civil litigant seeking affirmative relief may not invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid discovery requests and simultaneously pursue their claims.
[2] A trial court may draw an adverse inference against a party in a civil action who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A civil litigant's fifth amendment right to avoid self-incrimination may be used as a shield but not a sword. This means that a plaintiff seeking affirmative relief in a civil action may not invoke the fifth amendment and refuse to comply with the defendant's discovery requests, thereby thwarting the defendant's defenses.”
Rollins Burdick Hunter of N.Y., Inc. v. Euroclassics Ltd., Inc., 502 So. 2d 959, 962 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
Doral Health Center and individuals Pedro and Nancy Sanchez brought claims against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The case involved d…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Vasquez v. State, 777 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“[T]he trial court may draw an adverse inference against a party in a civil action who invokes his privilege against self-incrimination.” (citing Baxter
v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976))); Rollins Burdick Hunter of N.Y., Inc. v. Euroclassics Ltd., Inc., 502 So. 2d 959, 962 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (“A civil litigant’s fifth amendment right to avoid self-incrimination may be used as a shield but not a sword. This means that a plaintiff seeking affirmative relief in a civil action may not invoke the fifth amendment and refuse to comply with the defendant’s discovery requests, thereby thwarting the defendant’s defenses.” (citing City of St. Petersburg v. Houghton, 362 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978))); see also Campbell v. Riggs, 310 So. 3d 68, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“[O]nce there is a motion for summary judgment that is supported by affidavit or other factual showing, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show by appropriate means that genuine and material issues do remain to be tried.” (quoting Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1966))); Raven v. Roosevelt REO US LLC, 278 So. 3d 245, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“Summary judgment is proper . . . where the moving party shows conclusively that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (citation omitted)).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1974)…oducts Co., supra, at 394. “Equally clearly, section 481 may be applied only to the petitioner [corporation] and not to make adjustments with respect to its predecessor [partnership].” Dearborn Gage Co., 48 T.C. 190, 198 (1967) citing E. Morris Cox, 43 T.C. 448 (1965); Ezo Products Co., supra. Judge Tannewald’s observations in Dearborn seem pertinent to our facts: “We recognize that, if petitioner [corporation] had never been formed, and the predecessor partnership had continued in büsiness, and the issue…
-
Md. Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. The United States, 409 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969)…s of liability and damage on which a settlement could be founded. In short, there is no indication that for tax or other extrameritorious reasons plaintiff attempted to influence or manipulate the timing of a settlement agreement. Cf. E. Morris Cox, 43 T.C. 448, 457, n. 3 (1965). The bar to earlier agreement was simply plaintiff’s persistence in asserting recovery rights under the higher-limit SRL policies — an approach that it initially adopted for sound business reasons7 and under which it finally prevai…
Authorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1976)
- Sterling Mirror Co., LLC v. THE Jordon Glass Corp. (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)
- City OF ST. Petersburg v. Houghton, 362 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Vasquez v. State, 777 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Rollins Burdick Hunter OF NEW York, Inc. v. Euroclassics Ltd., Inc., 502 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Raven v. Roosevelt Reo US LLC, 278 So. 3d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)