THE COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH, A BODY POLITIC, AND THE HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT, APPELLANTS,
v.
MILO PRICE, JR., AND MRS. MILO PRICE, JR., APPELLEES
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The County of Hillsborough appealed a trial court's injunction preventing destruction of the Prices' dog, which had bitten their son. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Chapter 61-2242's title—restricting the statute to "stray untagged vicious dogs"—limited its scope, and therefore the statute could not constitutionally authorize destruction of a properly tagged, non-stray dog, even if vicious.
The court held that the statute's title—"stray untagged vicious dogs"—expresses a narrower subject than the statute's operative provisions, and therefore the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to destroy a dog that is vicious but neither stray nor untagged. The three adjectives in the title collectively describe a specific class of dogs, and provisions in the statute affecting tagged dogs or non-stray vicious dogs exceed the scope of the title and are inoperative.
“The subject matter of the title to Senate Bill No. 637 is stray untagged vicious dogs. By the most liberal construction it cannot be held to cover dogs that are properly tagged and are not strays.”
Trial court's interpretation of the statute's title, adopted and affirmed by the appellate court, establishing that the title's scope is limited to dogs meeting all three conditions (stray, untagged, and vicious).
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Prices' three-year-old son was attacked and bitten by the family's dog on the family's premises. At the time of the attack, the dog was properly t…
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The defendant-appellants, Hillsborough County and the Hillsborough County Health Department, appeal from a Final Decree enjoining the destruction of a dog owned by the plaintiff-appellees, Mr. and Mrs. Price. The plaintiffs’ three-year-old son was 'attacked and bitten by the plaintiffs’ dog. The attack occurred on the premises of the plaintiffs and at the time the dog was properly tagged and wearing a current inoculation tag. The County Health Department impounded the dog; and after hearing before the Board of County Commissioners, they found the dog to be vicious and ordered that the dog be destroyed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 61-2242, Laws of Florida.
On final hearing, the parties stipulated that the dog was not, and is not a “stray” and that the dog was, and is properly “tagged,” wearing a current inoculation tag. Noting first the general requirements of constitutional law that the title of an act must give “reasonable notice” to the public of the subject matter thereof, the court, in its Final Decree, stated its findings as follows:
“ * * * The subject matter of the title to Senate Bill No. 637 is stray untagged vicious dogs. By the most liberal construction it cannot be held to cover dogs that are properly tagged and are not strays. The legislature and the public, including the owners of properly tagged dogs that are not strays, on reading the title to the Act involved, would be misled. They would not be put upon inquiry to determine whether or not properly tagged dogs that are not strays are affected by the body of the Act. * * * ”
Thereupon, the court vacated the order of the County Commissioners, permanently enjoined the County Health Department from destroying the dog, and ordered that the dog be released.
The defendant-County appealed to the Supreme Court for a review of the Final Decree. That Court entered an order to the effect that the issues involved appeared to be matters within the jurisdiction of this Court, and thus transferred this cause.
The effect of the Final Decree was that the subject of the Act1 in question, *914as embraced in the title, was “stray untagged vicious dogs” and that Article III, Section 162 of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. required the court to exclude from the force and effect of the Act this dog, which was found to be vicious, but which was neither a stray dog nor an untagged dog. The title of a legislative act is not a part of the basic act, the operative provisions of an act being those which follow the enacting clause; but the title of an act has an important function: to define the scope of the act. No valid provision can be embodied in an act if it is beyond the range of the subject, as expressed in the title, and matter properly connected therewith. In State ex rel. Flink v. Canova, Fla.1957, 94 So.2d 181, 184, the Supreme Court said that:
“ * * * [I] f a matter is germane to or reasonably connected with the expressed title of the act, it may be incorporated within the act without being in violation of Sec. 16 of art. Ill of our constitution. Provisions which are necessary incidents to, or tend to make effective or promote the object and purpose of the legislation included in the subject expressed in the title of the act may be regarded as matters properly connected with the subject thereof. Smith v. Chase, 1926, 91 Fla. 1044, 109 So. 94. * * * ”
The primary purpose of this constitutional requirement is to establish a means of adequately providing the public with notice as to the contents of the act. The requirement is met if the title clearly indicates the subject of the enactment so as to put interested persons on inquiry as to the exact scope of the indicated subject of the enactment. As stated by the Supreme Court in Mayo v. Polk Co., 1936, 124 Fla. 534, 537, 169 So. 41, 43:
“ * * * The test by which it may be determined whether the title of an act meets this requirement is met if its verbiage is sufficient to put one on notice and cause him to inquire into and ascertain the contents of the body of the act. If it does this, it is sufficient to correct the vice that section 16 of article 3 was designed to cure. State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; Ex parte Pricha, 70 Fla. 265, 70 So. 406.”
*915See also Paramount-Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. City of Pensacola, Fla.1951, 62 So.2d 431.
The Legislature has wide latitude in its enactments of law, and it must be a plain case of violating or ignoring the constitutional requirement as to titles before our courts will nullify statutes or portions thereof as not being within the scope of the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, and of matter properly connected therewith. Butler v. Perry, 1941, 67 Fla. 405, 66 So. 150; Smith v. Chase, supra. However, the constitutional requirements as to the title of a legislative act are mandatory, and it is the duty of the courts to adjudge any act, or portion thereof, invalid and void in cases where it is clear that the requirements of Article III, § 16, have been violated or ignored. Holton v. State, 1891, 28 Fla. 303, 9 So. 716; 30 Fla.Jur., Statutes, § 48.
With the above principles in mind, we now turn to the Act in question. What is the subject of Chapter 61-2242, Laws of Florida, which is expressed in the title thereof pursuant to the mandatory constitutional requirements of Section 16 of Article III? We concur with the finding of the trial court that this subject is “stray untagged vicious dogs.” We note by reference to the title that the words “stray untagged vicious dogs” are neither separated by commas, nor the conjunctive word “and”,, nor the disjunctive word “or”. We have-here a series of three adjectives preceding’ the noun “dogs”. Thus, the title of the act restricts the subject to the described class, of dogs: stray untagged vicious dogs.. Obviously, this subject is more limited and', restrictive than the general subject of vicious dogs. And yet the body of the Act. contains provisions dealing with any dog found to be vicious and affecting dogs that, are wearing tags. It follows that such, provisions beyond the subject of the Act, as. expressed in the title, are inoperative, since-the general public would not be put upon notice of the contents of the Act from a. reading of the title.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial' court correctly excluded from the force- and effect of the Act the dog in question,, which dog was found to be vicious but which'was not a “stray” and was not “untagged”.
The decree is affirmed.
SHANNON, C. J., and KANNKR, J.„ concur.
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Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975)…of the basic act, as the operative provisions are those which follow the enabling clause, but the title has the important function of defining the scope of the act. This principle was stated in Hillsborough County v. Price, Fla.App., DCA (2nd) 1963, 149 So. 2d 912. Titles to legislative acts must not be misleading or so constructed as to avert inquiry as to provisions contained in them. Roddenberry v. State, 152 Fla. 197, 11 So. 2d 582. The title to this act would indicate that nothing in the law would affect…
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King Kole, Inc. v. Farris Bryant, 178 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1965)…e enactment of laws, and the courts will strike down a title only when there is a plain case of violating or ignoring the constitutional requirement. Wright v. Board of Public Instruction, Fla., 48 So. 2d 912; Hillsborough County v. Price, Fla.App., 149 So. 2d 912. The title is sufficient if it fairly gives such notice as will reasonably lead to inquiry into the body thereof. Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Utility Board, Fla., 40 So. 2d 350; McCord v. Smith, Fla., 43 So. 2d 704. The title need not be an inde…
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Tormey v. Moore, 824 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2002)…e title because it purported to outlaw certain types of nets within a two-mile radius while title of act implied that it would outlaw such nets only within “inside waters” which had a definite and different meaning); County of Hillsborough v. Price, 149 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) (prohibiting the disposal of the Prices’ vicious dog because while the act authorized the county to dispose of stray untagged vicious dogs, the Prices’ dog was not stray or untagged). As both parties admit, the original bill cont…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293 (Fla. 1905)
- Ex parte Adolph Pricha, 70 Fla. 265 (Fla. 1915)
- Reed v. Arena B. Hahn, 91 Fla. 1044 (Fla. 1926)
- Butler v. J. W. Perry as Sheriff, 67 Fla. 405 (Fla. 1914)
- Mayo v. The Polk Co., 124 Fla. 534 (Fla. 1936)
- State v. Canova, 94 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1957)
- Holton v. State, 28 Fla. 303 (Fla. 1891)
- Paramount-Gulf Theatres, Inc. v. City of Pensacola, 62 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1951)