JUDITH H. RICHMAN AND DUR-RICH REALTY, INC.

v.

ROBERT S. CALZARETTA, DEBRA CALZARETTA, KELSMEG, LLC AND SEA & SUN REALTY, INC.

1 We acknowledge that Calzaretta’s reading of the statute might find some general support in the rules of grammar. However, given the lack of briefing, we decline to engage in a lengthy grammatical analysis here. Suffice it to say, we have considered various grammatical principles in reaching our decision, but we conclude any rules of grammar that arguably support Calzaretta’s reading are overridden by the context of the statute. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 141 (2012) (“The presumption of legislative literacy is a rebuttable one; like all the other canons, this one can be overcome by other textual indications of meaning.”); see also State v. McGary, 93 P. 3d 941, 945 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]e must also consider whether the grammatically correct construction of the statute makes sense within the statutory scheme as a whole.” (citation omitted)). As our supreme court recently explained, when interpreting a statute, Florida’s courts “follow the ‘supremacy-of-text principle’—namely, the principle that ‘[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means.’” Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). “[E]very word employed in [a legal text] is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.” State v. McKenzie, 331 So. 3d 666, 670 (Fla. 2021) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Importantly, “[c]ontext always matters because sound interpretation requires paying attention to the whole law, not homing in on isolated words or even isolated sections.” Id. at 671 (internal marks and citation omitted). When considering the entirety of the statute in context, we reject Calzaretta’s strained reading of section 607.1604(1). Instead, we believe the more reasonable reading is that the phrase, “enforce its rights under this section,” refers to the statute’s primary objective—a shareholder’s right to inspect and copy records. We do not read section 607.1604(1) to create a litigation roundabout, where collection proceedings on a fee judgment are followed by a new motion for fees and another fee judgment, only for the cycle to start all over yet again. In this case, Calzaretta was obviously not attempting, via the garnishment proceedings, to obtain an order for the inspection and copying of records, or even to enforce such an order. Instead, he was attempting to collect on a fee judgment. We therefore conclude that the plain language of section 607.1604(1) does not authorize an award of fees incurred during garnishment proceedings.2 As a result, we reverse the order on appeal and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. LAMBERT, C.J., and WALLIS, J., concur.

2 The motion at issue here, and the trial court’s order, relied on section 607.1604(1). We therefore do not consider whether Calzaretta might have been entitled to fees pursuant to some other statute.