TYRONE JORDAN
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA
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The defendant's incriminating statements were properly admitted into evidence because they were voluntarily offered after the defendant was informed of the serious charges against him, and his subsequent statements constituted a valid reinitiation of police communication that justified renewed interrogation following a proper Miranda waiver.
[1] Incriminating statements made by a defendant after invoking Miranda rights are admissible if volunteered and not in response to unauthorized police questioning.
[2] A defendant's voluntary statements, made after being informed of the seriousness of the charges, can constitute a self-initiation of communication with the police.
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Establishes that voluntary disclosure of serious charges justifies admission of defendant's remarks despite prior Miranda invocation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant initially invoked his Miranda rights. After being told of the serious nature of the charges against him, he made incriminating remarks. …
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge
(specially concurring).
The only arguable question on this appeal concerns the admissibility of two sets of incriminating statements made by the defendant after initially invoking his Miranda rights. I believe, however, that:
(a) The first remarks were not inadmissible as made in response to unauthorized police questioning; rather, they were volunteered by the defendant after he was told the serious nature of the charges against him, see Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1127, 118 S.Ct. 1076, 140 L.Ed.2d 134 (1998); State v. Nguyen, — So. 2d -, 1998 WL 472602 (Fla. 2d DCA Case no. 97-04796, opinion filed, August 12, 1998)[23 FLW D1904]; Montoya-Navia v. State, 691 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997);and
(b) those stateménts themselves constituted a self- “initiation” of “communication, exchanges or conversations with the police,” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981), which justified renewed interrogation after he signed an appropriate Miranda waiver, see Durocher v. State, 596 So. 2d 997 (Fla.1992); Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 922 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 929, 108 S.Ct. 1100, 99 L.Ed.2d 262 (1988); Craig v. State, 599 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 605 So. 2d 1263 (Fla.1992); William E. Ringel, 3 Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 28.2(a)(l)(2000), thus validating the second confession.
For these reasons, I agree that the statements were correctly introduced into evidence and therefore concur in affir-mance.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981)
- Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1997)
- Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1987)
- Williamson v. Florida, 485 U.S. 929 (U.S. 1988)
- Durocher v. State, 596 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1992)
- Craig v. State, 599 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
- Freddy Montoya-Navia v. State, 691 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Davis v. Florida, 522 U.S. 1127 (U.S. 1998)