LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY

v.

MINTZ TRUPPMAN, P.A., ETC.

SCALES, J.

This case comes to this Court on remand from the Florida Supreme

Court, with directions for us to adjudicate, in the first instance, the petitions for writ of certiorari filed by petitioners, the defendants below, Cozen

O’Conner, PLC and John Dickerson (together, “Cozen”) and Lexington

Insurance Company (“Lexington”). Mintz Truppman, P.A. v. Cozen

O’Connor, PLC, 47 Fla. L. Weekly S519, 2022 WL 3650714 (Fla. Aug. 25,

2022). (“Cozen II”). In Cozen II, the Florida Supreme Court quashed our opinion in Cozen O’Connor, PLC v. Mintz Truppman, P.A., 306 So. 3d 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“Cozen I”).

In Cozen I, we consolidated Cozen and Lexington’s certiorari and prohibition petitions for all purposes and, relying upon prior authority from this Court,¹ we granted Cozen and Lexington's petitions to the extent that their petitions sought to prohibit the trial court from continuing to adjudicate Mintz Truppman’s state court lawsuit. Cozen I, 306 So. 3d at 265.

Mintz Truppman’s state court lawsuit alleged that petitioners had violated Florida’s Mediation Confidentiality and Privilege Act (“the Act”).²

Truppman’s federal lawsuit, and (ii) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on a standing ground, as Mintz Truppman was not a “party” to the mediation. The trial court entered orders denying Cozen and Lexington’s motions to dismiss. Their petitions sought to quash these orders via both prohibition and certiorari.

In Cozen I, we held that, because the gravamen of Mintz Truppman's state court action was to obtain additional attorney’s fees in a fee claim that had been adjudicated to finality in federal court, Mintz Truppman was collaterally estopped from seeking such fees in its state court case; and therefore, the state court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate Mintz

Truppman’s claim. 306 So. 3d at 264-65. We granted Cozen and Lexington’s consolidated petitions for writ of prohibition and directed the trial court to dismiss Mintz Truppman’s second amended complaint. Id. at 265. Because we granted only that portion of Cozen and Lexington’s consolidated petitions seeking prohibition, we neither reached nor adjudicated the alternate violate the Act, breach of the Act’s confidentiality provision, bad faith/unfair claims practices, and fraud in the inducement.

In fact, we dismissed, as moot, the consolidated certiorari petitions. Id. As mentioned above, in quashing Cozen I, our Supreme Court directs that we now adjudicate the consolidated certiorari petitions. Cozen II, 2022 WL

3650714 at *4.

In their consolidated certiorari petitions, Cozen and Lexington argue that, in entering the challenged order, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law because: (i) Cozen and Lexington’s decision to include Mintz Truppman’s pre-mediation demand letter within Lexington’s response to Mintz Truppman’s client’s attorney’s fee motion in federal court is immunized by the litigation privilege; and (ii) Mintz Truppman lacks standing under the Act to pursue its claims for relief.

We lack certiorari jurisdiction, though, to decide the issue of whether a trial court has departed from the essential requirements of law, unless a certiorari petition first establishes that the challenged order results in irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on appeal. Citizens Prop. Ins.

Corp. v. San Perdido Ass’n, 104 So. 3d 344, 351 (Fla. 2012). Cozen and

Lexington fail to make the requisite showing that the trial court’s denials of their motions to dismiss caused irreparable harm. Damsky v. Univ. of Miami,

152 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“Under the high standard for

Cozen and Lexington are now free to plead their denials and defenses,

and ultimately might prevail in the lawsuit. We have held in the certiorari context, though, that having to defend against a lawsuit that a party believes lacks merit does not constitute the requisite irreparable harm. See Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 117 So. 3d 400, 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

We therefore conclude that we lack certiorari jurisdiction to review the challenged orders, and are compelled to dismiss Cozen and Lexington’s consolidated petitions seeking certiorari relief.

Consolidated certiorari petitions dismissed.

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