LAUTH INVESTIGATIONS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
v.
BONNIE MAE GOFORTH
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Lauth Investigations International appealed the denial of homestead status for the former residence of a deceased individual who relocated to a nursing facility before her death. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court erred by denying homestead protection without holding an evidentiary hearing when material facts regarding whether the property was abandoned were in dispute.
The court reversed and remanded the case, holding that because material facts regarding abandonment were in dispute and the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the homestead petition, the denial of homestead status was improper. A finding of abandonment requires a strong showing of intent not to return and constitutes a fact-intensive inquiry that cannot be resolved without hearing evidence.
[1] Determination of homestead abandonment is a fact-intensive inquiry requiring a strong showing of intent not to return, and a property owner who involuntarily ceases to re…
[2] An evidentiary hearing is required when material facts regarding homestead abandonment are disputed, and denial of homestead status without such a hearing constitutes den…
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[A] finding of abandonment requires a 'strong showing' of intent not to return to the homestead.”
Establishes the legal standard that abandonment of homestead protection requires more than mere cessation of residence; intent not to return is essential.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJoan Welch Rowan, the decedent, owned a personal residence in Sanford, Florida. Before her death, she relocated to West Altamonte Nursing and Rehabili…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
Case No. 5D2024-0979 LT Case No. 2023-CP-001499 _____________________________
LAUTH INVESTIGATIONS INTERNATIONAL, INC., as Owner and Holder of an Assignment of the Interest of Angie Kincaid and William Chesteen, Intestate Beneficiaries of the Estate of Joan Welch Rowan,
Appellant,
v.
BONNIE MAE GOFORTH,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County. John D. Galluzzo, Judge.
Justin T. Moonray, of Moonray Law, PLLC, Brandon, for Appellant Lauth Investigations International, Inc.
No Appearance for Appellee.
December 13, 2024
KILBANE, J.
Lauth Investigations International, Inc. (“Appellant”), appeals a final order denying homestead status for the former
personal residence of Joan Welch Rowan (“Decedent”).1 Appellant asserts the lower court erred in finding Decedent abandoned her property when she relocated to a nursing and rehabilitation facility. Because material facts were in dispute and the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing, we reverse.
Decedent died at West Altamonte Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, which was listed as her residence on her death certificate. Subsequently, her sister filed a petition for administration of the estate2 and a separate petition to determine the homestead status of Decedent’s personal residence in Sanford, Florida. Without a hearing, the court denied the homestead petition because Decedent did not reside at the Sanford property upon her death. Appellant timely appealed.
Article X, section 4, of the Florida Constitution provides homestead protection for “the residence of [Florida homeowners] or the owner’s family.” Once homestead is established, “it can be waived only by abandonment or by alienation in the manner provided by law.” Carbonell v. Glade, 394 So. 3d 679, (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (quoting Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Magwood, 145 So. 67, 68 (Fla. 1932)). Whether a homestead has been abandoned is determined on a case-by-case basis and “is necessarily a fact- intensive inquiry.” Yost-Rudge v. A to Z Props., Inc., 263 So. 3d 95, 97–98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citing Beensen v. Burgess, 218 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)). “[A] finding of abandonment requires a ‘strong showing’ of intent not to return to the homestead.” Id. at 97 (citing In re Herr, 197 B.R. 939, 941 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996)).
Here, the record is insufficient to determine whether Decedent intended to abandon her property or involuntarily ceased
to reside on it. See id. at 97–98 (“Florida courts have consistently held that a property is not abandoned for the purposes of homestead protection when the owner involuntarily ceases to reside on the property.” (citing In re Est. of Melisi, 440 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983))). Because the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the homestead petition,3 we reverse and remand for further proceedings. See Carbonell, 394 So. 3d at 683 (reversing and remanding to determine the validity of a homestead claim denied without an evidentiary hearing); see also Yost-Rudge, 263 So. 3d at 99 (reversing summary judgment where homestead abandonment, an issue of material fact, was in dispute); Hayes v. Norman Harris Servs., Inc., 198 So. 3d 716, 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“[I]t was a denial of due process for the trial court to refuse to hear argument that the property was protected from forced sale by the homestead exemption.” (citing Beltran v. Kalb, 982 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Coy v. Mango Bay Prop. and Invs., Inc., 963 So. 2d 873, 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007))).
REVERSED and REMANDED. LAMBERT and PRATT, JJ., concur.
_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
_____________________________
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- The Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Magwood, 107 Fla. 208 (Fla. 1932)
- Beensen v. Burgess, 218 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- COY v. Mango BAY Prop. & Invs., Inc., 963 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- In re Est. OF Samuel J. Melisi, 440 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Evaristo Beltran and Grisel Beltran v. Kalb, 982 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
- Caryn Hall Yost-Rudge v. A to Z Props., Inc., 263 So. 3d 95 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)
- Hayes v. Norman Harris Servs., Inc., 198 So. 3d 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)