EVARISTO BELTRAN AND GRISEL BELTRAN, APPELLANTS,
v.
STUART R. KALB, AND SUNSET HOME PARTNERS, INC., APPELLEES
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The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's denial of Evaristo and Grisel Beltran's motions to set aside a sheriff's sale of their homestead property. The court held that the trial court violated due process by failing to provide notice to Evaristo and by summarily denying the motions without a hearing on homestead and other defenses.
The court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in denying the motions because Evaristo was not given notice of the sale and proceedings, which denied him due process, and because the trial court summarily denied the motions without giving the appellants a reasonable opportunity to be heard on homestead and other defenses.
[1] A party is denied due process when a sheriff's sale of their property proceeds without actual or written notice to that party.
[2] A trial court errs by summarily denying motions without providing parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the defenses raised.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Evaristo Beltran was not given notice of the sale or of the proceedings against the house. In view of this oversight, denial of the motion to set aside the sale denied him due process.”
Establishes the core due process violation—lack of notice to the defendant regarding the sale proceedings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn January 1990, Evaristo and Carmen Beltran's marriage was dissolved; Carmen retained exclusive possession of their homestead at 3091 N.W. 97 Street.…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse the order denying the Bel-trans’ motion to set aside/vacate sale of property and motion to reopen/continue the case.
In January 1990, Evaristo and Carmen Beltran’s marriage was dissolved. Carmen retained exclusive possession of the marital home, the parties’ homestead, at 3091 N.W. 97 Street, pursuant to the marital settlement agreement incorporated into the dissolution judgment. The dissolution judgment was recorded. Evaristo did not deed the house to Carmen. Carmen continued to live in the house with the parties’ daughter, Grisel.
In May 1990, Top All Roofing & Building Products, Inc., obtained a final judgment for $10,502.83 against Evaristo to recover for a debt owed by Evaristo’s roofing company. The judgment was recorded in June. The lien on the judgment was rerecorded in January 2007.
In February 2007, Carmen passed away. She had lived in the house until her death. The daughter resides there still.
In March 2007, a Sheriffs Levy was recorded on the property. Evaristo did not receive (actual or written) notice of the sale — it was noticed solely by publication. On April 7, Evaristo quit-claim deeded the property to Grisel. In May, Sunset Home Partners Inc., purchased the home at sher-rif s sale for $36,000.
On June 8, Evaristo filed an emergency Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Sale. At the June hearing, counsel asked for a continuance to bring in Evaristo as a witness and requested permission to amend the motion. The court denied both requests. In July, a Motion to Reopen and Continue, and Notice of Appearance for Grisel were filed. The court denied the motions without hearing. Evaristo and Grisel appeal.
We reverse the orders, concluding that the court erred in denying the appellants’ various motions. Evaristo Bel-tran was not given notice of the sale or of the proceedings against the house. In view of this oversight, denial of the motion to set aside the sale denied him due process. See Quay Dev., Inc. v. Elegante Bldg. Corp., 392 So. 2d 901 (Fla.1981). Furthermore, the trial court denied the appellants due process when it summarily denied the motions without giving them a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the homestead and other defenses raised before entering the denials. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972)(holding that procedural due process guarantees right to be heard in a meaningful manner); McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926)(same); Hinton v. Gold, 813 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(same); Chuck v. City of Homestead Police Dept., 888 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(same). See also Coy v. Mango Bay Prop. & Invs., Inc., 963 So. 2d 873, 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)(“court’s refusal to decide the homestead issue is reversible error”). On the record before us, we must conclude that the trial court should hold a full hearing on these issues.
Reversed and remanded.
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Dobson v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 217 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…ing closing arguments. This was error. Inasmuch as the trial court’s refusal to allow the Dobsons to present evidence violated their due process rights, we are compelled to reverse the final judgment and remand for a new trial. See Beltran v. Kalb, 982 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (finding trial court denied appellants’ right to due process of law when it summarily denied motions without giving appellants reasonable opportunity to be heard (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2…
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Evaristo Beltran and Grisel Beltran v. Kalb, 63 So. 3d 783 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…at the trial court erred in denying the motion to set aside/vacate the sale. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to vacate the sale. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The parties were previously before this Court in Beltran v. Kalb, 982 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). As set forth in that opinion, in January of 1990, the marriage of Evaristo and Carmen Beltran (“Carmen”) 1 was dissolved by final judgment of [*785] dissolution of marriage. The final judgment of dissolution incorporated by refer…
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Klein v. Melania Flores Meza & Kendall Acres Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 4 So. 3d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…gful manner, and judicial findings based upon that evidence.”); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972) (holding that procedural due process guarantees right to be heard in a meaningful manner); Beltran v. Kalb, 982 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (same). The record is that at the time the balloon payment required under the contract for deed came due, the owner and seller of the property, Isserlis, had died. Meza was, therefore, obligated to Isserlis’ estate or to some…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (U.S. 1972)
- Nannie McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 (Fla. 1926)
- THE Florida BAR v. Singer, 392 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1981)
- Hinton v. Gold, 813 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- COY v. Mango BAY Prop. & Invs., Inc., 963 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
- Koch v. State, 888 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Chuck v. City OF Homestead Police Dep't & Vill. of Pinecrest, 888 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)