SAUL MISHKIN
v.
LESLIE MISHKIN
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Saul Mishkin appealed a non-final order from Miami-Dade Circuit Court suspending his timesharing rights with his child. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's emergency suspension of timesharing, holding that courts have discretion to temporarily modify parenting arrangements in true emergency situations.
The court affirmed the trial court's emergency suspension of timesharing. Courts have discretion to temporarily suspend or modify timesharing arrangements on an emergency basis where circumstances such as child endangerment, threat of harm, imminent removal from jurisdiction, or other true emergencies exist, without requiring the ordinary pleading procedures normally required for final modifications of custody orders.
[1] A trial court has discretion to temporarily suspend or modify timesharing on an emergency basis without full formal pleading procedures when there exists a true emergency…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe record indicates that a trial court issued an order suspending Saul Mishkin's timesharing rights in a family law matter. The suspension was grante…
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Opinion filed March 5, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________ No. 3D24-1516 Lower Tribunal No. 21-20268-FC-04 ________________
Saul Mishkin,
Appellant,
vs.
Leslie Mishkin,
Appellee.
An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Veronica Diaz, Judge. Rafool, PLLC, and Raymond J. Rafool, Patricia Montes De Oca, and Seth J. Rutman, for appellant. Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Hollywood), for appellee. Before EMAS, MILLER and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. Perez v. Dwyer, 271 So. 3d 1116, 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (trial court’s order suspending timesharing is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion); Gielchinsky v. Gielchinsky, 662 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (recognizing that the trial court is authorized to temporarily suspend timesharing “where there is a true emergency.”); Saenz v. Sanchez, 373 So. 3d 1211, 1213 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (recognizing trial court’s discretion to modify parenting plan in an emergency situation “such as child endangerment, threat of harm, or imminent removal from the court’s jurisdiction”); Braswell v. Braswell, 935 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“Courts have recognized that an emergency authorizes a court to act on a temporary basis and modify an existing custody judgment.”); Hunter v. Hunter, 540 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (noting that the trial court has the “discretion to restrict or deny visitation when necessary to protect the welfare of the children”); Scheer v. Scheer, 132 So. 2d 456, 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961) (“We do not wish to be understood as holding that in the event of an emergency the court cannot make such orders for temporary care, custody and for visitation as seem to be indicated, but we hold that when a parent or other person has by final decree been granted legal custody or visitation rights relating to the custody of children, the final decree should not be amended to take away such rights or any substantial change made therein except upon the usual and ordinary procedure of pleading including an allegation or statement of the basis of the claim for the change by the party seeking it and an opportunity to directly answer the same and raise issue thereon so that the parties may know that their evidence is being directed to or with reference to that issue, and in order that a record may be made for the benefit of a reviewing court if review should be sought.”) (emphasis added); see also Ryan v. Ryan, 257 So. 3d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (affirming trial court’s post-judgment order temporarily suspending timesharing on an emergency basis, even though the emergency relief was sought by motion (rather than petition), finding there was “no error in this procedure, as it provides a clear path toward reconsideration of the timesharing limitations if enumerated conditions are met.”).
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Cited By
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Mishkin v. Mishkin, 373 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025)…on appeal for an abuse of discretion); Gielchinsky v. Gielchinsky, 662 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (recognizing that the trial court is authorized to temporarily suspend timesharing “where there is a true emergency.”); Saenz v. Sanchez, 373 So. 3d 1211, 1213 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (recognizing trial court’s discretion to modify parenting plan in an emergency situation “such as child endangerment, threat of harm, or imminent removal from the court’s jurisdiction”); Braswell v. Braswell, 935 So.…
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Authorities Cited
- Hunter v. Hunter, 540 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Gielchinsky v. Gielchinsky, 662 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Scheer v. Scheer, 132 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- Braswell v. Braswell, 935 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)
- Ryan v. Ryan, 257 So. 3d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
- Mishkin v. Mishkin, 373 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025)
- Perez v. Dwyer, 271 So. 3d 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)