PAVILION AT HEALTHPARK, LLC D/B/A PARK ROYAL HOSPITAL
v.
S. M.
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Park Royal Hospital appeals a mandatory injunction requiring compliance with Florida's Baker Act and Administrative Code provisions for future unnamed patients. The trial court entered the broad injunction despite S.M.'s petition seeking only habeas corpus relief and correction of violations specific to his wife's commitment, without requesting injunctive relief applicable to future patients.
The trial court erred in entering the mandatory injunction because S.M.'s petition did not request such relief and Park Royal did not consent to it. Granting a form of relief not requested by the parties and not tried by consent violates due process and exceeds the trial court's jurisdiction.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant a form of relief not requested in the pleadings and not tried by consent, as doing so violates the defendant's right to procedur…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceS.M. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his wife's release from Park Royal and to obtain an order directing Park Royal to correct …
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Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Lee County.
James R. Shenko, Judge.
March 7, 2025 NARDELLA, J.
Pavilion at Healthpark, LLC d/b/a Park Royal Hospital (“Park Royal”) appeals the trial court’s entry of a mandatory injunction requiring that, as to future unnamed patients, it comply with various provisions of Florida’s Baker Act and Florida’s Administrative Code. Park Royal argues, among other things, that the trial court erred by entering the injunction because no such relief was properly requested 2 by S.M. when he brought an action against Park Royal challenging his wife’s involuntary commitment. On this dispositive ground we agree and reverse.1 S.M. filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus to secure his wife’s release from Park Royal and an order directing Park Royal to correct its alleged violations of his wife’s rights under Florida’s Baker Act and Florida’s Administrative Code. The petition, however, sought no injunctive relief that would apply to Park Royal’s future patients. Despite the lack of such a request, the trial court entered an injunction requiring Park Royal to comply with nine provisions of Florida’s Baker Act and four provisions of Florida’s Administrative Code with respect to all future patients. Park Royal argues, as it did below, that the trial court erred by entering the broad injunction because no such relief was requested in the petition. We review this issue de novo. Butler v. Brown, 338 So. 3d 392, 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing Jenkins v. M.F., 280 So. 3d 507, 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)).
“It is well-settled that where a particular form of relief is not requested by the parties and the matter is not tried by consent, the granting of such relief violates due process.” Schanck v. Gayhart, 245 So. 3d 970, 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Wachovia Mortg. Corp. v. Posti, 166 So. 3d 944, 945–46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)); see also Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Grp., LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244, 1252 (Fla. 1 We decline to address Park Royal’s other arguments challenging the injunction.
2008) (“‘Florida law clearly holds that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear and to determine matters which are not the subject of proper pleading and notice,’ and ‘[t]o allow a court to rule on a matter without proper pleadings and notice is violative of a party’s due process rights.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Carroll & Assocs., P.A. v. Galindo, 864 So. 2d 24, 28–29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003))).
Nevertheless, that is what happened here. S.M. did not request a mandatory injunction in his petition as to future unnamed patients, but rather waited until later in the proceeding to request such relief. As to consent, Park Royal never gave it.
Instead, after learning that S.M. was seeking such broad relief in his otherwise narrow action against Park Royal, it objected. Under this circumstance we must conclude that the trial court’s entry of the mandatory injunction violated Park Royal’s right to procedural due process because it received no notice through the petition that it could be subject to a mandatory injunction. See Cardinal Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Giles, 813 So. 2d 262, 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (reversing mandatory injunction requiring landlord to install new air conditioning system because pleadings did not request that type of injunctive relief); Bull Motors, L.L.C. v. Brown, 152 So. 3d 32, 36–37 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (reversing order granting mandatory injunction, in part, because the pleadings did not request the mandatory 4 injunction entered by the trial court). Therefore, the order imposing the mandatory injunction is reversed.
REVERSED. TRAVER, C.J., and WHITE, J., concur. Megan G. Colter, Thomas A. Valdez, Todd M. Smayda, and Kristin W. Elza, of Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Justin Seth Drach, of Thoele ǀ Drach, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
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Pavilion at Healthpark, LLC v. S. M., 280 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025)…tive Code with respect to all future patients. Park Royal argues, as it did below, that the trial court erred by entering the broad injunction because no such relief was requested in the petition. We review this issue de novo. Butler v. Brown, 338 So. 3d 392, 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing Jenkins v. M.F., 280 So. 3d 507, 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)). “It is well-settled that where a particular form of relief is not requested by the parties and the matter is not tried by consent, the granting of such…1 / 2
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Butler v. Clark F. Brown, JR. (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)…inal judgment to “run with the land” because no such relief was requested in the complaint, noticed for a hearing, or argued by the parties.1 This Court reviews a claim that one has been deprived procedural due process de novo. Jenkins v. M.F., 280 So. 3d 507, 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). “[C]ourts are not authorized to award relief not requested in the pleadings . . . [t]o grant unrequested relief is an abuse of discretion . . . and reversible error.” Abbott v. Abbott, 98 So. 3d 616, 617–18 (Fla. 2d 1…
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Garrison v. Williamson (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)…nd “a real opportunity to be heard and defend” before a court imposes judgment. State ex rel. Gore v. Chillingworth, 171 So. 649, 657 (Fla. 1936). Whether a party received procedural due process is a question that we review de novo. Jenkins v. M.F., 280 So. 3d 507, 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). To be fair, notice “must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.” Ferris v. Winn, 242 So. 3d 509, 510 (Fla. 2d…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pro-Art Dental LAB, Inc. v. V-Strategic Grp., LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2008)
- Carroll & Assocs., P.A. v. Galindo, 864 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Cardinal Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Giles, 813 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Wachovia Mortg. Corp. v. Posti, 166 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
- Bull Motors, LLC. v. Brown, 152 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
- Schanck v. Gayhart, 245 So. 3d 970 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
- Pavilion at Healthpark, LLC v. S. M., 280 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025)