PRISCILLA DARGIS, APPELLANT,
v.
CATHERINE MAGUIRE, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1963-10-22
No. 63-136
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HORTON and HENDRY, JJ.
156 So. 2d 897 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1963) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Landlord Dargis appealed a malicious prosecution judgment awarded to tenant Maguire after Dargis falsely charged Maguire with breaking and entering following a dispute over unpaid rent. The court affirmed the judgment, finding sufficient evidence of prosecution without probable cause and with malice, and held that Maguire could not challenge the remittitur she voluntarily accepted.


Holding

The court held that there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury's finding that Dargis instituted criminal proceedings without honest reasonable belief in Maguire's guilt and with vindictive motive. Additionally, the court held that Maguire, having elected to remit rather than seek a new trial, could not thereafter challenge the remittitur order she voluntarily accepted.


Key Quotes

“there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support their finding that the defendant instituted criminal proceedings against the plaintiff without honest reasonable belief in the plaintiff's guilt and with a vindictive motive”

Establishes the court's holding that evidence supported the malicious prosecution verdict

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Facts & Procedural History

Dargis rented an apartment to Maguire under a month-to-month oral lease starting February 7, 1960. When Maguire failed to pay the second month's rent …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

Appellee, Catherine Maguire, sued appellant, Priscilla Dargis, for malicious prosecution and was awarded $450.00 compensatory damages and $2,000.00 punitive damages by a jury. Appellant’s motion for a new trial was denied subject to a remittitur *898of $500.00 of the punitive damage award. Appellee agreed to the remittitur and the trial court entered an order stating that such compliance “shall not be deemed to be a waiver or estoppel on her part insofar as her right to cross assign as error (in any subsequent appeal) that portion of the order * * * which directed the plaintiff to enter the said remittitur”.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and the plaintiff cross assigns as error the order of re-mittitur.

Appellant, Priscilla Dargis, as landlord, rented an apartment to appellee, Catherine Maguire, under a month to month oral lease commencing February 7, 1960. Appellee paid the first month’s rent on February 7, 1960 and as of March 16, 1960 had failed to make the second rental payment, which was past due.

On March 6, 1960, appellant removed from the apartment the lamps and blankets which had been provided with the apartment. On March 16, 1960, while appellee was out of her apartment doing some shopping, appellant removed some of appellee’s personal belongings from the apartment and changed the lock on the door. Upon her return, appellee broke a jalousie slat and regained entrance to the apartment for herself and her aged mother.

Appellant immediately went to the Miami Beach Municipal Court and charged appel-lee, Maguire, with unlawfully breaking and entering appellant’s dwelling house without her permission and consent. At about 6:00 P.M.- on the same day, appellee was arrested, photographed, fingerprinted and released about four hours later. Appellee and her mother thereupon picked up their personal belongings and moved into a hotel.

Two days later appellee was tried in the Municipal Court on the breaking and entering charge and found not guilty. Appellee’s action for malicious prosecution followed.

We are not called upon to decide which of the parties had a right to possession of the premises and what civil remedies were available to each of them under the circumstances. The only issues before us are (1) whether there was substantial competent evidence from which a jury could find that the appellant instituted the criminal proceeding without probable cause and with malice1 and (2) whether the appellee can question the propriety of the trial judge’s order requiring a remittitur of $500.00.

With regard to the first issue, we hold that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support their finding that the defendant instituted criminal proceedings against the plaintiff without honest reasonable belief in the plaintiff’s guilt and with a vindictive motive. The record further reveals that while the defendant stated as a defense that she had acted upon the advice of legal counsel, her statement was unsupported and contradicted previous statements made by her under oath. It was also not clearly established that her attorney, if she had one, was given a full, complete and correct statement of the material facts.2 Thus, the trial judge correctly submitted the question to the jury.

As to the appellee’s cross claim, we hold that the appellee, by electing to remit as an alternative to the granting of a new trial, can not now complain of the action of the trial court in requiring the remittitur. Her acceptance of the remittitur could not be conditional and she was bound by that action.3 The trial judge could not confer upon her the right to appeal from the re-*899mittitur order which she voluntarily accepted.

Accordingly, the judgment appealed is affirmed.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • ST. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Coy A. Koontz, Jr., 908 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
    …that it do 1, 2 or 3. Once an appropriate and final order was entered, Appellant would have had the right to appeal. In electing to issue the permit instead, I think Appellant waived its right to challenge the court’s ruling. See Dargis v. Maguire, 156 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (compliance with court order waives right to appeal, even if compliance expressly conditioned on reservation of right to appeal).…
  • White Constr. Co. Inc. v. Dupont, 423 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
    …en a plaintiff “formally enters a remittitur damnum in compliance with the terms of the order, he is estopped to assert and assign error in the order.” 352 So. 2d at 54. That decision affirmed this court’s ruling, which noted that Dargis v. Maguire, 156 So. 2d 897 (Fla.3d DCA 1963), had held that even an express order of the trial court against waiver of appeal rights “could not confer upon the plaintiff the right to appeal from the remittitur order which he voluntarily accepted.” 352 So. 2d at 59. We do not,…
  • Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Omni-Vest, Inc., 352 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
    …n paid and nothing had been done by the appellee to work an estoppel. Thus, the effect of the Buckles decision was avoided. Other attempts to ameliorate the harsh effect of the Buckles decision have been thwarted. For example in Dargis v. Ma-guire, 156 So. 2d 897 (Fla.3d D.C.A.1963), the trial court ordered a remittitur, or in the alternative, a new trial, but stated in the order that compliance with the order would not be deemed to be a waiver or estoppel insofar as the right to cross-assign as error that p…

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