CLAYTON C. CLEMENTS, APPELLANT,
v.
LAURY EARL BANKS, APPELLEE
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An unmarried biological father appeals a decree granting adoption of his illegitimate child to the mother's new husband. The court affirmed the adoption, holding that under Florida law an illegitimate father has no statutory rights in his illegitimate child and that the child's welfare is the paramount consideration in adoption proceedings.
The court held that an illegitimate father has no statutory rights in his illegitimate child under Florida law, his consent is not required for adoption, and voluntary support of the child does not give him standing to contest adoption. The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in adoption proceedings.
“in all adoption proceedings the principal question and prime concern of a chancellor is the welfare of the child”
Establishes the governing standard in adoption cases, which is the child's welfare, not the rights of the biological father
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBillie Banks (also known as Billie Clements) bore an illegitimate child fathered by the appellant, Clayton Clements. At the time of the child's birth …
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This appeal brings for review a decree of adoption which permitted the appellee, Laury Earl Banks, to adopt the illegitimate *893child born of one Billie Banks, a/k/a Billie' Clements, and the appellant. The appellant has preserved for review basically two points on appeal: First, that the chancellor was prejudiced as to the appellant’s case and, second, that he committed error in awarding adoption to the appellee, Laury Earl Banks.
The appellant’s first point [that-the trial judge was prejudiced] will not be considered inasmuch as no effort was made to disqualify the chancellor. The question of prejudice has not been properly preserved. See: City of Coral Gables v. Brasher, Fla.App.1961, 132 So.2d 442. As to the second point, of course in all adoption proceedings the principal question and prime concern of a chancellor is the welfare of the child. See: Marshall v. Reams, 32 Fla. 499, 14 So. 95; Fielding v. Highsmith, 152 Fla. 837, 13 So.2d 208; Hamilton v. Rose, Fla.1957, 99 So.2d 234; 4 Fla.Jur., Bastards, § 6, page 271. In the instant case, it appears that the appellant at all times material hereto has been married to another woman, residing with her and their child, during which time he became the father of the illegitimate child whose mother [Billie Banks, a/k/a Billie Clements] subsequently married; and now the putative father seeks to prevent the adoption of the illegitimate child by the mother’s present husband. In this cause,- he has pointed to no statutes or decisions of this State which give him any rights in and to an illegitimate child. In fact, the statutes of this State indicate that an illegitimate father shall not have any rights to an illegitimate child, in that his consent is not necessary to an adoption, [see: § 72.14, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.], and for the purpose of determining matters within the juvenile court he is not considered as a parent. See: § 39.01(8), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.
The appellant contends that because he has been voluntarily supporting the child the equities were with him. However, this gives him no standing because such a voluntary undertaking to support the child was no more than compliance with his legal responsibilities. See: § 742.-031 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.
Therefore, no error having been demonstrated in the decree of adoption rendered by the chancellor, which would give this illegitimate child a proper name and place in society, it will not be interfered with by this court.
Affirmed.
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Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…the natural parents would be relieved of all duty and obligation due to the child; further holding that the future welfare and training of a child is a matter apart from its property and material rights. Also, in Clements v. Banks, Fla.App.3rd 1964, 159 So. 2d 892, our sister court of the Third - District held that the father of an illegitimate child has no rights to the child and that his consent to adoption of that child is not necessary, notwithstanding that he had voluntarily supported the child since its…
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Grady B. Morrison and Edna E. Morrison v. Smith, 257 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)…, were highly respected in their community, and had successfully raised three children of their own. The welfare of the child is the principal question and prime concern of the trial court in an adoption proceeding. Clements v. Banks, Fla.App.1964, 159 So. 2d 892. We recognize the great weight which must be given to the trial court’s determination in an adoption case. See Smith v. Lyst, Fla.App.1968, 212 So. 2d 921. However, where the court’s determinations are not supported by the evidence pertaining to the…
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LeBRUNO Aluminum Co., Inc. v. Lane, 436 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…to be fundamental. Nelson v. Selden Cypress Door Co., 78 Fla. 203, 83 So. 286 (1919). For example, a point assailing a trial judge’s alleged prejudice was deemed waived when no effort was made at the trial level to disqualify him. Clements v. Banks, 159 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). I am astounded that the majority would now consider such an improvidently raised issue. The result of its opinion is that although the claimant may, as the majority recognizes, be entitled to compensation, his benefits must be…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- IDE v. City OF ST. Cloud, 152 Fla. 837 (Fla. 1943)
- Marshall v. Reams, 32 Fla. 499 (Fla. 1893)
- City OF Coral Gables v. Brasher, 132 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)
- Mrs. Evelyn Smith Hamilton v. Rose, 99 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1957)