ROBERT L. DINGS, APPELLANT,
v.
GWLADYS H. DINGS, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1964-02-11
No. 63-373
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and TILLMAN PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.
161 So. 2d 227 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1964) Negative Treatment
Cited by 49 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this Florida divorce appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of divorce to the wife based on cruelty, rejecting the husband's challenges regarding corroboration and exclusion of children's testimony. However, the court reversed and remanded regarding the wife's claims for a share of joint savings and alimony, finding the trial court erred by failing to reserve jurisdiction for future alimony awards.


Holding

The court affirmed the grant of divorce, finding sufficient corroboration of cruelty and no reversible error in excluding the children's testimony. The court affirmed the denial of interest in the joint savings account, finding sufficient evidence supported the finding that the wife did not substantially contribute to it. The court reversed the failure to reserve jurisdiction for alimony, holding that the decree must be amended to permit future alimony applications if circumstances change.


Key Quotes

“Although the general rule requires that the plaintiff's testimony be corroborated in a divorce action, but where it seems clear that there is no collusion, as where the defendant vigorously contests the action in good faith, the courts will be satisfied with slighter corroboration than would otherwise be required.”

Establishes the standard for corroboration in contested divorce actions, allowing lesser corroboration when there is good faith contestation.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellee-wife filed for divorce against appellant-husband in Dade County Circuit Court, alleging cruelty. The husband contested the action. The trial …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

Appellee-wife was granted a divorce and other relief from appellant-husband in a suit in the Circuit Court for Dade County.

The husband has appealed from the final decree, and the wife has filed cross-assignments of error. The appellant-husband contends; (1) that the chancellor erred in granting the wife a divorce in that there was no corroboration of the plaintiff’s testimony as to the allegations of cruelty, and (2) that it was error for the chancellor to refuse defendant’s request to have the children testify in the divorce proceedings.

We have carefully considered the points raised by the appellant in the light of the record and applicable law; we find no reversible error.

The decision of the chancellor comes to this court with a presumption of correctness,1 and the appellant’s burden is to establish that the decree was clearly erroneous.2 The husband has failed to sustain his burden.

Although the general rule requires that the plaintiff’s testimony be corroborated in a divorce action,3 but where it seems *229clear that there is no collusion, as where the defendant vigorously contests the action in good faith, the courts will be satisfied with slighter corroboration than would otherwise be required.4 It is clear from the record that there was no collaboration between the parties, and the record contained sufficient corroboration of the husband’s cruelty towards his wife to justify the chancellor’s granting of the divorce.

The chancellor’s refusal to permit the children of the marriage to testify was not reversible error. The decision as to the propriety of such an act must rest with the chancellor, and this exercise of discretion will not be interfered with on appeal, unless a substantial error is demonstrated.5 No such error being discovered the chancellor’s action in this regard is affirmed.

Appellee-wife by cross assignments contends that the chancellor erred; (1) in failing to award her a one-half interest in and to the joint savings account of the parties and denying her any interest therein, and (2) in refusing to grant her any alimony.

In order for the chancellor to have concluded that the wife was not entitled to any share of the joint savings account, it was necessary for the chancellor to make a finding of fact that the wife did not substantially contribute to the fund which created the joint account. We will not disturb that finding of fact, inasmuch as, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support such finding.6

The chancellor committed error in failing to reserve jurisdiction to award alimony in the future if such should be applied for and properly allowable.7 It is well settled that the failure of a divorce decree to award alimony or to reserve jurisdiction bars the wife from subsequently applying for alimony pursuant to § 65.15, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.8 The chancellor’s order precluded the wife from, ever obtaining alimony in the event of a change in circumstances. The decree should be amended to provide for such a possibility.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (25 total)

  • Steinhauer v. Lossie S. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
    …Appeal opinion filed April 30, 1971, 249 So. 2d 772. We cannot categorically state as have our sister courts that it is error for the court not [*833] to reserve jurisdiction to award alimony to the wife in the future. Dings v. Dings, Fla.App.1964, 161 So. 2d 227; Steele v. Steele, Fla.App.1965, 177 So. 2d 873; Reed v. Reed, Fla.App.1971, 244 So. 2d 449. The reservation of jurisdiction, we feel, ought to be made to depend upon the particular facts. The facts in the case sub judice support the trial court’s r…
  • Beaty v. Beaty, 177 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
    …his province to determine the need for any such transcript. The decision of the chancellor comes to this court with a presumption of correctness and the appellant’s burden is to establish that the decree was clearly erroneous. Dings v. Dings, Fla., 161 So. 2d 227, and cases cited therein. The appellant has failed to sustain her burden. The final decree is affirmed. SHANNON, Acting C. J., and ANDREWS, J., concur.…
  • POE v. POE, 263 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
    …jurisdiction to award same, the court loses jurisdiction to modify the final judgment subsequently and award periodic alimony. Frohock v. Frohock, 117 Fla. 603, 158 So. 106; Kirby v. Kirby, Fla.App.1959, 111 So. 2d 299; Dings v. Dings, Fla.App.1964, 161 So. 2d 227; DuVernoy v. DuVernoy, Fla.App.1967, 202 So. 2d 620. There have been a number of cases wherein the appellate courts of this State have, upon examination of a record, determined that a trial court abused its discretion in failing to make such a reser…

Previewing 3 of 25 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw