F. EUGENE POE, APPELLANT,
v.
BEVERLY POE, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the trial court initially entered a final judgment without awarding or reserving jurisdiction for periodic alimony. After the former wife petitioned for rehearing, the trial court amended the judgment to reserve such jurisdiction. The appellate court held that while trial courts have discretion to reserve jurisdiction for future alimony awards, they are not required to do so as a matter of law, and reversed the amendment for reconsideration by the trial court.
A trial court is not required as a matter of law to reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony in a final divorce judgment. Rather, the reservation of such jurisdiction is a matter within the trial court's discretion, to be exercised based on the peculiar circumstances of each case.
[1] A trial court loses jurisdiction to award periodic alimony if it does not award it or reserve jurisdiction to do so in the final judgment of dissolution of marriage.
[2] A trial court is not required, as a matter of law, to reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony in the future.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if a trial court does not either award periodic alimony or reserve jurisdiction to award same, the court loses jurisdiction to modify the final judgment subsequently and award periodic alimony”
Establishes the core principle that failure to award or reserve jurisdiction for alimony divests the court of future jurisdiction over that issue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUpon entry of a final judgment dissolving the marriage, the trial court did not award periodic alimony or reserve jurisdiction to award it in the futu…
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Upon the entry of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the trial court not having awarded periodic alimony or reserved jurisdiction to award same, the former wife filed a petition for rehearing contending that such proviso was required in any such judgment. Thereupon, the trial court amended the final judgment of dissolution of marriage to reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony in the future. This appeal has been prosecuted from the final judgment, as amended, the appellant urging that the trial court erred as a matter of law in modifying the original final judgment.
It has long been the established law of this State that if a trial court does not either award periodic alimony or reserve jurisdiction to award same, the court loses jurisdiction to modify the final judgment subsequently and award periodic alimony. Frohock v. Frohock, 117 Fla. 603, 158 So. 106; Kirby v. Kirby, Fla.App.1959, 111 So.2d 299; Dings v. Dings, Fla.App.1964, 161 So.2d 227; DuVernoy v. DuVernoy, Fla.App.1967, 202 So.2d 620. There have been a number of cases wherein the appellate courts of this State have, upon examination of a record, determined that a trial court abused its discretion in failing to make such a reservation. Schiff v. Schiff, Fla.App.1960, 123 So.2d 295; Dings v. Dings, supra; Steele v. Steele, Fla.App.1965, 177 So.2d 873; Barfield v. Barfield, Fla.App.1969, 226 So.2d 132; Carmody v. Carmody, Fla.App.1970, 230 So.2d 40; Reed v. Reed, Fla.App.1971, 244 So.2d 449; Melton v. Melton, Fla.App.1971, 251 So.2d 705; Greene v. Greene, Fla.App.1972, 256 So.2d 258; but see: Pendleton v. Pendleton, Fla.App.1966, 189 So.2d 499; Steinhau v. Steinhauer, Fla.App.1971, 252 So.2d 825. It is noted that these cases turn on a question of discretion exercised by the trial court under the peculiar circumstances of the cases then before him, and in none of these authorities was it held as a matter of law that it was error not to reserve jurisdiction.
With these principles in mind, we find that the trial court was not required, as a matter of law, to reserve jurisdiction to award periodic alimony in the future and, therefore, we reverse the order modfying the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and return the matter to the trial court for a determination by him, in the exercise of his discretion, as to whether or not make such a reservation in light of the record presented to him.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Turner v. Evabel M. Turner, 383 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…rovision for alimony in a judgment of dissolution and no reservation of jurisdiction is made for that purpose, no jurisdiction exists for subsequently entertaining a petition for alimony. Brown v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 916 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); Poe v. Poe, 263 So. 2d 644 (Fla.3d DCA 1972). In Hostler v. Hostler, 151 So. 2d 672 (Fla.1st DCA 1963), the court determined that a provision of a separation agreement which released husband from “any and all costs, charges, and expenses as well as alimony, either temporary o…
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Price v. Price, 389 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…jurisdiction is permitted, Canakaris v. Canakaris, supra; Hyatt v. Hyatt, 315 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Langston v. Langston, 251 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), it is not required. Elkins v. Elkins, 287 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Poe v. Poe, 263 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Cf. Greene v. Greene, 256 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) (where alimony provisions would probably terminate at a time when the wife had no other income). We do find error, however, in the trial court’s failure to credit the wife…
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Brown v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…alimony. Weiss v. Weiss, 118 So. 2d 833 (Fla.3d DCA 1960). On the other hand, even if the final judgment does not contain a provision for alimony, jurisdiction may properly be reserved to consider a petition for alimony at a later date. Poe v. Poe, 263 So. 2d 644 (Fla.3d DCA 1972). Where permanent alimony is awarded, the court is always open to hear a petition for modification. Kosch v. Kosch, 113 So. 2d 547 (Fla.1959). However, if alimony is provided for a terminable period, as in the case of rehabilitative…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (15 total)
- Emil Rossodivita v. The King's Surf Ltd., 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Steinhauer v. Lossie S. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Dings v. Gwladys H. Dings, 161 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Frohock v. Frohock, 117 Fla. 603 (Fla. 1934)
- Kirby v. Kirby, 111 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Schiff v. Schiff, 123 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Melton v. Melton, 251 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Greene v. Greene, 256 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Pendleton v. Pendleton, 189 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)
- Steele v. Wilford Lee Steele, 177 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)