ROBERT ELWOOD YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Young appeals his conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting Young's arguments that the state failed to prove corpus delicti and that insufficient evidence supported a finding of specific intent given his alleged intoxication.
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the owner's testimony constituted sufficient prima facie evidence of ownership, and that Young's specific intent to commit the crime could be inferred from the circumstances of his apprehension and his demonstrated ability to accurately recall events surrounding the incident.
“the state presented evidence from a person that she was the owner of the building broken into at the time and date of the breaking. This was sufficient to constitute prima facie evidence of ownership.”
Establishes that direct testimony from the building owner satisfied the corpus delicti requirement regarding ownership.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoung was found inside a building after closing hours wearing surgical gloves, in possession of a flashlight, with a crowbar nearby, and standing on a…
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Appellant, a defendant in the Criminal Court of Record in and for Dade County, Florida, appeals a conviction and sentence on the charge of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor.
The principal points relied upon by the appellant for reversal were: (1) Failure to prove the corpus delicti, to wit: ownership of the building allegedly broken into; therefore the trial judge erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. (2) That the trial judge, hearing the cause non-jury, erred in entering an adjudication of guilt when the evidence was not sufficient to show specific intent to commit the crime charged.
As to the first point, the state presented evidence from a person that she was the owner of the building broken into at the time and date of the breaking. This was sufficient to constitute prima facie evidence of ownership. See: Collingsworth v. State, 93 Fla. 1110, 113 So. 561; Green v. State, 113 Fla. 237, 151 So. 898. As to the second point, the defendant contended that he was too intoxicated to have the capacity to form a specific intent to commit a misdemeanor, if in fact he did break into the premises. From the facts adduced in the record, the trial judge concluded this adverse to the defendant.
No error is found in this determination, when the record reveals that the defendant *298had a most accurate knowledge and recollection of all events immediately preceding his being found in the premises involved after closing hours and immediately after his arrest. At the time he was apprehended, he was wearing surgical gloves, there was a crowbar in the immediate vicinity, he had a flashlight in his possession, and he was standing on a loaded revolver which was registered in his name. The circumstances surrounding his apprehension and his ability to recollect all events except the actual breaking, support the finding of guilt in .accordance with the following authorities: Davis v. State, Fla.1956, 87 So.2d 416; 5 Fla.Jur., Burglary and Housebreaking, § 25.
Therefore, the conviction, adjudication of guilt and sentencing is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Rubin James Mauldin v. State, 382 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…uldn’t be obtained, he took a gun from under his shirt and shot Bell several times. This evidence, and the appellant’s recollection of events immediately preced [*846] ing the shooting and afterwards, supports the jury’s verdict. See Young v. State, 162 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1964); Shaw v. State, 228 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1969); Allen v. State, 264 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). Concerning appellant’s contention that his counsel should have had him see a psychiatrist (and presumably call the psychiatr…
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Sifford v. State, 202 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)…So. 2d 512. It is true that an allegation of ownership may be sufficiently established by proof of care, use, possession, or occupancy at the time of the alleged crime. Green v. State, 113 Fla. 237, 151 So. 898 (1933); Young v. State, Fla.App.1964, 162 So. 2d 297. The controlling question on this appeal is whether the State established that the railroad car appellant attempted to enter was in the custody of Seaboard Airline Railroad Company. There is no evidence which proves or tends to prove that Seaboard…
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Olin D. Shaw v. State, 228 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)…er appropriate instructions by the Court, including the italicized language omitted from the opinion in Britts. Also, under the evidence in the case, it was not reversible error to decline to give the requested charge. Young v. State, Fla.App.1964, 162 So. 2d 297, was a 3rd District Court case involving a conviction upon the same criminal charge as here, breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a misdemeanor. In that case, as here, “the defendant contended that he was too intoxicated to have th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Collingsworth v. State, 93 Fla. 1110 (Fla. 1927)
- Green v. State, 113 Fla. 237 (Fla. 1933)
- Davis v. State, 87 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1956)