PAUL E. SIFFORD, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Paul Sifford was convicted of attempted breaking and entering of a railroad car. The Florida appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the state failed to sufficiently prove that the specific railroad car Sifford attempted to enter was in the custody of Seaboard Airline Railroad Company, as alleged in the charging information.
The court held that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of the railroad car's identity and Seaboard's custody. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding that the state must prove ownership or custody of the specific property that was the subject of the alleged breaking and entering offense.
“It has been frequently held that the ownership of a building alleged to have been entered is material and must be proved as laid.”
Establishes that ownership of property subject to a breaking and entering charge is a material element that must be proven as stated in the charging instrument.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSifford was charged with attempting to break and enter a railroad car located at 3400 N.W. 31st Street in Dade County, Florida, allegedly owned by Sea…
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The appellant was convicted in the Criminal Court of Record of attempted breaking and.entering a railroad car. /The information charged that the appellant attempted to break and enter a railroad car located at 3400 N.W. 31st Street, Dade County, Florida. It was alleged that the railroad car was the property of Seaboard Airline Railroad Company, as custodian.
The only point presented on this appeal questions the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the identity of the railroad car. It is admitted that the state proved that the appellant did attempt to break and enter a railroad car. The appellant contends, however, that the State did not prove that the railroad car the defendant attempted to break and enter was the railroad car which was proved to have been in the custody of Seaboard Airline Railroad Company. The State contends that the cumulative effect of the testimony sufficiently established custody of the railroad car which appellant attempted to enter.
The only evidence concerning the identity of the railroad car was offered by Mr. R. Granger, the supervisor of property protection for the railroad. He testified that the Seaboard Airline Railroad Company had a railroad car located at 3400 N.W. 31st Street on the Westinghouse siding. Other witnesses for the State testified concerning the commission of the crime but no further evidence was offered concerning the identity of the railroad car. The testimony presented by the State established that .there were several railroad cars located at the Westinghouse siding.
It has been frequently held that-the ownership of a building alleged to have been entered is material and must be proved as laid. Smith v. State, 96 Fla. 30, 117 So. 377 (1928); Harper v. State, Fla.App.1964, 169 So.2d 512. It is true that an allegation of ownership may be sufficiently established by proof of care, use, possession, or occupancy at the time of the alleged crime. Green v. State, 113 Fla. 237, 151 So. 898 (1933); Young v. State, Fla.App.1964, 162 So.2d 297. The controlling question on this appeal is whether the State established that the railroad car appellant attempted to enter was in the custody of Seaboard Airline Railroad Company.
There is no evidence which proves or tends to prove that Seaboard had custody of all of the railroad cars at the particular siding. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the State to prove that the railroad car which was the subject of the attempted breaking and entering belonged to or was in the custody of Seaboard.1
There are two reasons for requiring ownership or custody to be proved: (1) to show that the building (or in this case, the car) was not the property of the accused, and (2) to so identify the offense in order to protect the accused from a second prosecution for the same offense. Davis v. State, 51 Fla. 37, 40 So. 179 (1906); Harper v. State, Fla.App.1964, 169 So.2d 512.
We can find no evidence which sufficiently identifies the car appellant is charged with attempting to enter as being in the custody of Seaboard Railroad. The requirement of the law is not satisfied so long as any of the facts material and necessary to the defendant’s guilt are left to implication or inference. We must reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
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I. v. Anderson, 356 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…v. State, 95 Fla. 737, 116 So. 629 (1928); Davis v. State, 51 Fla. 37, 40 So. 179 (1906); Pells v. State, 20 Fla. 774 (1884); State v. Ward, 354 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Mitchell v. State, 317 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Sifford v. State, 202 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Haines v. State, 113 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959). It is said that requiring such allegation and proof as thus particularized not only is essential to establishing the element of “ownership,” but also protects the defendant from…
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Llano v. State, 271 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…r lessee and that it was not fatal for the State to fail to establish the corporate structure of Air Canada, a Crown Corporation. The premises were fully identified so that there is no possibility of double jeopardy. Sifford v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 202 So. 2d 14. In addition, it was proved that appellant placed a bomb in the office located at 6988 Collins Avenue, [*36] Miami Beach, which was the city ticket office of Air Canada. We hold that the charge was proved as to the identity of the property bombed.…
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State v. Ward, 354 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…ished law is that the ownership of the building alleged to have been burglarized is one of the material and substantive elements which must be proved to sustain a burglary conviction. Smith v. State, 96 Fla. 30, 117 So. 377 (1928); Sifford v. State, 202 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Mitchell v. State, 317 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). [*126] There is no evidence in the record which proved or tended to prove that the burglarized structure was owned by Eagle Family Discount Stores, Inc. or that it had any po…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Roy Smith alias Tom Green v. State, 96 Fla. 30 (Fla. 1928)
- Davis v. State, 51 Fla. 37 (Fla. 1906)
- Green v. State, 113 Fla. 237 (Fla. 1933)
- Harper v. State, 169 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Young v. State, 162 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)