HENRY MASON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Henry Mason challenged his 1962 25-year sentence for armed robbery via collateral motion, claiming he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel when he entered his guilty plea. The Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that Mason's prior guilty plea and sentencing experience, combined with the trial court's finding that he explicitly stated he did not desire counsel, constituted sufficient evidence of a valid waiver.
The court held that a guilty plea does not per se constitute an implied waiver of the right to counsel, but when the trial record shows explicit statements that the defendant waived counsel, the defendant collaterally attacking the judgment must allege facts beyond simple denial to overcome the waiver. Mason's allegations were rebutted by the record, particularly his prior guilty plea experience and the trial court's documented finding that he stated he did not desire counsel.
“The rule is clearly established that a plea of guilty does not per se constitute an implied waiver of an indigent prisoner's right to counsel, and where the only evidence of such a waiver is a plea of guilty, it will not be presumed the accused knowingly and intelligently waived the right.”
Establishes the general principle that guilty pleas cannot be assumed to waive counsel rights
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMason pleaded guilty to armed robbery in 1955 and received a 10-year sentence. In 1962, he pleaded guilty to seven counts of armed robbery and was sen…
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Appellant Henry Mason entered his plea of guilty in the Court of Record in Escambia County, Florida, on August 29, 1955 in Case No. 2556-B, and on November 16, 1955 was sentenced to a term of ten years. The record does not reveal what occurred with reference to Mason serving this sentence. On June 22, 1962 in Case No. 62-583 Mason entered his plea of guilty to seven counts of an information charging him with armed robbery. Again he was adjudged guilty by the Court of Record in Escambia County, Florida and was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years.
On September 4, 1963 Mason filed his motion to vacate the sentence imposed in *6191955 which motion was denied by the trial court on September 9, 1963. No appeal was taken. On the 7th day of April, 1964 Mason filed the instant motion to vacate the sentence imposed in Case No. 62-583 which motion the trial court denied upon the grounds that “ * * * defendant knowingly, understandingly and intelligently plead guilty to the offenses for which he was adjudged guilty and sentenced and, therefore, by voluntarily pleading in such manner, waived his right, if any, to appointment of counsel * *
The rule is clearly established that a plea of guilty does not per se constitute an implied waiver of an indigent prisoner’s right to counsel, and where the only evidence of such a waiver is a plea of guilty, it will not be presumed the accused knowingly and intelligently waived the right.1 So, the reasons given by the trial judge for rejecting a hearing are erroneous. However, if the record, before the trial court reflects that the movant waived counsel, the burden then falls upon the movant to set forth facts which are adequate to impeach said waiver.
An examination of the record in this cause reveals the following finding by the trial court at the time it sentenced Mason in the instant cause, viz.:
“ * * * and upon inquiry by the Court to each defendant as to whether they had counsel or desired counsel each defendant announced that he was without counsel and did not desire same.”
We held in Dykes v. State 2 that the above cited language when appearing in the record was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of waiver of counsel by an indigent and that upon being confronted with such language, one collaterally attacking an ensuing judgment of conviction must allege facts beyond the simple allegation of, “I didn’t waive counsel”. Here, the substance of Mason’s allegations is ':
1. He did not realize the consequences of his act in pleading guilty to seven counts of an information charging him with armed robbery. The record before us reveals that Mason pleaded guilty to a single' offense of robbery in 1955 and was sentenced to ten years. This prior experience refutes the allegation that he didn’t know the consequences of his plea to a subsequent information.
2. His conviction was founded upon an illegal search of his home by officers and brutality on their part at the time of his arrest. Such allegations are proper subjects for an appeal from a judgment of conviction but may not be reviewed in a collateral proceeding attacking the regularity of the initial judgment. This is especially true in the instant cause since proof of guilt is not required where a plea of guilty is entered.3
We conclude that the material facts alleged by movant in this cause are rebutted by the record and that the trial judge properly rejected movant’s petition without requiring that further evidence be adduced at the hearing. We are not unmindful of our sister courts’ decisions 4 which are in direct conflict with the conclusion reached herein. We are still of the opinion as expressed in Dykes v. State, supra, and decline to recede therefrom.
Affirmed.
STURGIS, C. J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.
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Crusoe v. State, 183 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)…r Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1. Harper v. State, Fla.App.1964, 168 So. 2d 325; Piehl v. State, Fla.App.1965, 173 So. 2d 723; Wilcox v. State, Fla.App.1965, 171 So. 2d 427; Taylor v. State, Fla.App.1965, 171 So. 2d 402; Mason v. State, Fla.App.1964, 167 So. 2d 618; Harris v. State, Fla.App.1964, 167 So. 2d 312; Mitchell v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 167 So. 2d 27. As to that quoted portion of the motion dealing with Court proceedings on June 5, 1964, such allegations either have no factual basis or are refuted by…
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Mason v. State, 176 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1965)…THORNAL, Justice. By a petition for a writ of certiorari we have for review a decision of the Court of Appeal, First District, which passes upon a question certified by that court as being one of great public interest. Mason v. State, Fla.App., 167 So. 2d 618. We are concerned primarily with a claimed right to counsel in a felony prosecution and an alleged waiver of the right [*78] On June 22, 1962, the petitioner Mason, without counsel, pleaded guilty to seven counts of armed robbery. He was adjudged g…
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Echols v. State, 201 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…to the first felonious possession of firearms charge. We have not overlooked these facets of defendant’s motion and argument, but these are not matters to be considered under a Rule 1 Petition, which we deem defendant’s motion to be. Mason v. State, 167 So. 2d 618; Williams v. State, supra; Hines v. State, Fla.App.1967, 195 So. 2d 605. Finding no error, the judgment and conviction are affirmed. PIERCE, Acting C. J., and HOBSON', J., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dykes v. State, 162 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Kirkland v. State, 165 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Phillips v. State, 164 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Archer v. State, 166 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Dortch v. State, 165 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)