RAYMOND
v.
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY

U.S. | 1917-03-06
No. 636
243 U.S. 43 Supreme Court of the United States (1917) Caution
Also reported at: 61 L. Ed. 583 · 37 S. Ct. 268 · 1917 U.S. LEXIS 2091 · SCDB 1916-153
Cited by 65 cases

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Synopsis

Raymond sued the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company for injuries sustained while working in a tunnel under construction in Washington, claiming negligence in leaving dynamite at the work site. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment for the defendant, holding that because the tunnel was not yet operational as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, the plaintiff could not recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and any common law claim was barred by Washington's Workmen's Compensation Act, which the Court upheld as constitutional.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Chief Justice White

Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.

Raymond, the plaintiff in error, sued the Railway Company, a foreign corporation doing business in Washington, to recover damages resulting from injuries sustained by him while in its employ. The petition alleged that the defendant operated an interstate commerce railroad between Chicago and Seattle and that for the purpose of shortening its main line and making more efficient and expeditious its freight and passenger service, was engaged in cutting a tunnel through the mountain between Horrick’s Spur and Rockdale in Washington. It was averred that plaintiff was employed by the defendant in the tunnel as a laborer and that while he was at work his pick struck a charge of dynamite which through the defendant’s negligence had not been removed and that from the explosion which followed he has sustained serious injuries.

The defendant’s answer contained a general denial and alleged that at the time and place of the accident the railroad and Raymond were not engaged in interstate commerce, since the tunnel was only partially bored and hence not in use as an instrumentality of interstate commerce. It was further alleged that the court was without jurisdiction to hear the cause because of the provisions of the Washington Workmen’s Compensation Act (Chapter 74, Laws of 1911) with whose requirements the defendant had fully complied. The reply of the plaintiff admitted the facts alleged in the answer but denied that they constituted defenses to the action.

The trial court entered a judgment for the defendant on the pleadings, and this writ of error is prosecuted to a judgment of the court below affirming such action. 233 Fed. Rep. 239.

Considering the suit as based upon the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, it is certain under recent decisions of this court, whatever doubt may have existed in the minds of some at the time the judgment below was rendered, that under the facts as alleged Raymond and the Railway Company were not engaged in interstate commerce at the time the injuries were suffered, and consequently no cause of action was alleged under the act. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Nash, 242 U. S. 619.

It is also certain that if the petition be treated as alleging a cause of action under the common law, the court below was without authority to afford relief, as that result could only be attained under the local law in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Workmen’s Compensation Act, which has this day been decided to be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Mountain Timber Company v. Washington, post, 219. And this result is controlling even although it be conceded that the railroad company was in a general sense engaged in interstate commerce, since it has been also this day decided that that fact does not prevent the operation of a state workmen’s compensation act. New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, post, 188.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By (18 total)

  • Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., Inc., 349 U.S. 427 (U.S. 1955)
    …amages to any employee engaged in such commerce who suffers injury resulting from the negligence of the carrier. If the employee was not himself engaged in commerce, there can be no recovery under the Act. In Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 243 U. S. 43, the company was engaged in the operation of a railroad between Chicago and Seattle. Its existing route went around the mountains, and the railroad sought to tunnel through the mountains. While constructing this tunnel, Raymond was injured and sued…
    1 / 2
  • N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (U.S. 1917)
    …urkonis, 238 U. S. 439; Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177; Erie R. R. Co. v. Welsh, 242 U. S. 303; Raymond v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 243 U. S. 43. The number of cases on the October 1915 term of this court was 1069. Of these 93 involved one or more questions arising under the Federal Employe^’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908. Of these 93 cases, 37 presented the question whether or not the em…
  • Clyde v. Broderick, 144 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1944)
    …utside the State could not be engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, although the plant or factory when finally completed would be used in the production of goods for commerce, citing Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 243 U.S. 43, 37 S.Ct. 268, 61 L.Ed. 583; Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 33 S.Ct. 648, 57 L.Ed. 1125, Ann.Cas.1914C, 153; New York Cent. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L.Ed. 667, L.R.A.1917D, 1, Ann. Cas.1917D, 629; Bamber…

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