ARTHUR G. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
LOUISE WILLIAMS, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1965-08-10
No. 65-75
Before HENDRY, C. J., and CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.
177 So. 2d 865 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1965) Positive Treatment
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

In this 1965 Florida divorce case, the husband appealed a final decree awarding the wife an interest in jointly held and husband-owned property, $100/week alimony, and attorney's fees, while holding the wife equally responsible for a $6,000 loan incurred during litigation. The appellate court affirmed the decree, finding sufficient evidentiary support for the chancellor's divisions and awards.


Holding

The court affirmed all aspects of the final decree. The property division was supported by the wife's contribution to the husband's home-based business and her interest in property acquired from the sale of the jointly held home residence. The $100/week alimony was reasonable given the wife's demonstrated need and the husband's ability to pay over $14,000 annually. The failure to explicitly account for the $3,200 withdrawal was not error, as the chancellor implicitly considered it by holding the wife equally responsible for the $6,000 loan. The attorney's fees award was supported by evidence in the record.


Key Quotes

“The mere fact that a wife has been a dutiful wife is not grounds for awarding her a special equity in her husband's estate.”

Establishes the legal principle that marital fidelity alone does not justify property awards; other factors are necessary.

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Facts & Procedural History

Arthur and Louise Williams had been married for 38 years. The husband held property individually and jointly with the wife, some of which was acquired…

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Opinion of the Court
BARKDULL, Judge.

BARKDULL, Judge.

By this appeal, the appellant-husband [defendant in the trial court], seeks review of a final decree of divorce rendered in favor of the appellee-wife dissolving a marriage of 38 years’ duration. He has preserved four points for review: (1) The equal division of the property held by the parties j ointly and that held by the husband individually. (2) An award of $100.00 a week as alimony. (3) Alleged failure of the chancellor to take into account a withdrawal of $3,200.00 by the wife from the joint account in adjusting the equities between the parties. (4) The award of attorney’s fees. The wife has cross-assigned as error that portion of the final decree wherein the chancellor held her equally responsible for a debt incurred by the husband during the progress of the litigation. We do not find any of the points urged as *867error to be well taken, and affilm the final decree.

The mere fact that a wife has been a dutiful wife is not grounds for awarding her a special equity in her husband’s estate. See: Welsh v. Welsh, 160 Fla. 380, 35 So.2d 6; Roberts v. Roberts. Fla. 380, 35 So.2d 6; Roberts v. Roberts, Divorce, § 209. However, the instant case supports an award to the wife of an interest in her husband’s property on one or both of two theories: (1) That the properties were acquired from funds received in the sale of a home residence which was originally in the name of both parties. (2) As a special equity, because the husband had his office at home and it was undisputed that the wife assisted him in his business endeavors and was, in fact, his “right arm”. The evidence before the chancellor was not of the greatest magnitude on these issues, but was sufficient to support his finding and division of the assets. Giving such evidence as there was all reasonable inference, which we are required to do in examining a record on appeal [see: Jurney v. Jurney, Fla.App. 1959, 110 So.2d 49; Bordacs v. Kimmel, Fla.App.1962, 139 So.2d 506], we find no error in this regard. It was certainly no error to divide the property which was held in their joint names.

As to the alimony, clearly the wife had a need of at least $100.00 a week and the husband had the ability to pay, his average earnings over the past several years being in excess of $14,000.00 a year. See: Platt v. Platt, Fla.App.1958, 103 So.2d 253; Arrington v. Arrington, Fla.App. 1963, 150 So.2d 473. Furthermore, it appears that the husband conceded [in the record] that the wife needed at least $100.00 a week in the form of alimony.

As to the contention that the chancellor did not take into account the withdrawal of the money from the joint fund by the wife, it does not appear that this alleged error was specifically called to the attention of the chancellor. Not only does the creation of a joint bank account by a husband with his wife create a presumption of a gift,1 but [from the record] it is certainly reasonable to assume that he did take this matter into account because he held her equally responsible for a $6,000.00 loan made by the husband during the progress of the cause. This is the same loan which the wife has assigned as error, in requiring her to share equally in the payment of said loan. The wife has also contended that there is no fixed time for the payment of this obligation which will, upon its satisfaction, release certain stock to her. It occurs that without any express conditions to the contrary, the final decree means what it says and the loan should be satisfied within the time fixed for payment by its terms when the final decree was entered.

It is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of a chancellor in the awarding of attorney’s fees. There was evidence in the record to support the award given. The husband failed to tender any evidence as to the reasonableness of the fees. The award of fees being supported in the record by sufficient evidence, it will be approved. See: Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, Fla.App.1961, 127 So.2d 137; Raynes v. Raynes, Fla.App. 1961, 128 So.2d 417.

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the final decree here under review is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Chastain, 251 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
    …l judge in considering the matter and, therefore, we will not disturb it. Raynes v. Raynes, Fla.App.1961, 128 So. 2d 417; Levenson v. Motor Union (Aviation) Orion Insurance Co., Ltd., Fla.App.1965, 176 So. 2d 125; Williams v. Williams, Fla.App.1965, 177 So. 2d 865. On the cross-appeal, the appellee strenuously contends that because the attorney’s fees she was obligated to pay were the subject of a contingent fee agreement that the trial court should have taken this into consideration in fixing a fee which wo…
  • Hinkle v. State, 355 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
    …Chase Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Sullivan, 127 So. 2d 112 (Fla.1960); Spark v. Canny, 88 So. 2d 307 (Fla.1956); North Shore Bank v. Shea, 148 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); Maier v. Bean, 189 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Williams v. Williams, 177 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); McGillen v. Gumpman, 171 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); Demps v. Graham, 157 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); Josephson v. Kuhner, 139 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962); Durden v. Durden, 137 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).…
    1 / 3
  • Hall v. Hall, 200 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
    …tation of the property rights of the wife? It would seem to me that in this case the determination of this question would best be left to the trial judge. This certainly is in accordance with the general rule. See Williams v. Williams, Fla.App.1965, 177 So. 2d 865. In the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion the rule should be followed. The second point, “(2) the sum was more than the amount awarded to the wife as alimony”, seems to reflect an idea inherent in contingent fees. I would reject it entire…

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