HUNTER, WARDEN,
v.
MARTIN
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A federal sentence deferred to begin after a state sentence is considered to commence when the prisoner is delivered to federal authorities, even if on parole from the state sentence.
Petitioner pleaded guilty to federal charges and was sentenced to ten years, to run concurrently with a state sentence, beginning after the state sent…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Commencement Of Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is held prisoner in the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. He pleaded guilty to charges of forging and uttering United States Treasury checks. He was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years on each count, to run concurrently, and the judgment provided that sentence should “begin to run at the expiration of the sentence now being served in the Missouri State Penitentiary.” Petitioner was returned to the Missouri authorities to resume the service of a state sentence of three years for automobile theft. On May 13, 1947, before expiration of such period, he was paroled by the State and delivered to the federal authorities, by whom he has since been held. He contends that the federal sentence does not begin until the full term of the State sentence has expired and that, for the period of parole, he is entitled to freedom. The issue as to whether such wording of a federal sentence entitles the prisoner under such circumstances to temporary freedom is one on which Circuit Courts of Appeals are in conflict. Compare United States ex rel. Lombardo v. McDonnell, 153 F. 2d 919; Johnston v. Wright, 137 F. 2d 914; Kirk v. Squier, 150 F. 2d 3; Martin v. Hunter, 165 F. 2d 215. We brought the case here on certiorari, 333 U. S. 854, to resolve the conflict.
We think it clear that the purpose of the clause deferring commencement of service of the federal sentence was to prevent conflict between the State and Federal Governments. The present federal imprisonment avoids such conflict and achieves that purpose. Missouri authorities have released petitioner from their custody and surrendered him for the apparent purpose of serving his federal sentence and have reserved control over him as a parolee only in event he is not kept in prison during the period of the federal sentence. For all practical purposes contemplated by the judgment, the State sentence has expired — at least insofar as it was an obstacle to service of the federal sentence.
To hold otherwise would mean that a man already finally adjudged guilty of a serious federal crime and sentenced to ten years imprisonment would be left at large and free of all restraint for an interlude between release from the state prison and commencement of the federal term. We do not think such a result is required or intended under the statute, 18 U. S. C. § 709a,1 or under the terms of the sentence as imposed.
The District Court, after full hearing, dismissed the writ of habeas corpus and remanded petitioner to custody to serve his sentence. We think this was á correct disposition of the matter. The Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary is error. Judgment reversed.
The Act of June 29,1932, c. 310, § 1,47 Stat. 381.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
United States v. West, 826 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1987)…s the maximum terms into a single sentence. 28 C.F.R. § 2.5 (1986). Because the Bureau of Prisons will compute West’s parole eligibility based on his aggregate sentence, the order in which he serves the sentences is irrelevant. Cf. Hunter v. Martin, 334 U.S. 302, 68 S.Ct. 1030, 92 L.Ed. 1401 (1974).3 AFFIRMED. . The first sentence of 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) provides: Any person who— (1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or…
-
Montgomery v. United States, 196 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1952)…ord and briefs, oral argument being waived. On consideration whereof, it is ordered that the judgment of the District Court denying appellant’s motion to vacate sentence be, and it hereby is affirmed upon the authority of Hunter, Warden v. Martin, 334 U.S. 302, 68 S.Ct. 1030, 92 L.Ed. 1401.…
-
Domer v. Smith, 412 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1969)…tled to his freedom because of the uncertainty of the start of a federal sentence imposed upon him which was conditioned “to begin after defendant’s release from the sentence imposed by the State of Ohio.” We affirm on authority of Hunter v. Martin, 334 U.S. 302, 68 S.Ct. 1030, 92 L.Ed. 1401 (1948). In April, 1966, petitioner on a plea of guilty to an Ohio offense was given an indeterminate sentence of two to forty years and was committed to the custody of an Ohio sheriff. He was immediately taken into cu…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Johnston v. Wright, 137 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1943)
- United States ex rel. Lombardo v. McDONNELL, 153 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1946)
- Kirk v. Siquier, 150 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1945)
- Hunter v. Martin, 333 U.S. 854 (U.S. 1948)
- Black v. Roland Elec. Co., 333 U.S. 854 (U.S. 1948)
- Lukenbill v. Hunter, 165 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1948)
- Lily Ho Quon and Albert T. Quon v. Commissioner OF Internal Revenue, 165 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1948)