JOE MUSKIN, APPELLANT,
v.
RENAE IRENE MUSKIN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this interlocutory appeal from a family law order, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's awards of temporary alimony and suit money but reversed the award of attorney's fees pendente lite, finding that $5,000 was excessive and unsupported by the record. The court reduced the fee to $1,500 and remanded for entry of an amended order.
The court held that expert testimony is not required in every case to set temporary attorney's fees pendente lite, but the record did not support an award of $5,000. The maximum fee allowable on the record presented was $1,500, and the case was remanded with directions to enter an amended order reflecting this reduction.
“We are not convinced that, in every case, these principles require expert testimony for an initial award of attorney's fees pendente lite, nor do we think that it can be said that such a holding is necessary to protect the litigants from excessive pendente lite fees.”
The court rejected the argument that expert testimony is universally required to set temporary attorney's fees, establishing that discretion remains with the trial court.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJoe Muskin appealed an interlocutory order in his divorce case that awarded his wife Renae temporary alimony, suit money, and attorney's fees pendente…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Alimony Pendente Lite cases and more on FLexlaw
This interlocutory appeal is brought to review an order making allowances pen-dente lite of alimony, suit money and attorney’s fees. No abuse of discretion has been shown as to the allowances of temporary alimony and suit money. See Landy v. Landy, Fla.1953, 62 So.2d 707; Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, Fla.App.1959, 113 So.2d 565.
The appellant, defendant, urges that the law set forth in Thoni v. Thoni, Fla. App.1965, 179 So.2d 420, requires expert testimony for the setting of the amount of temporary attorney’s fees. We are not convinced that, in every case, these principles require expert testimony for an initial award of attorney’s fees pendente lite, nor do we think that it can be said that such a holding is necessary to protect the litigants from excessive pendente lite fees.
We find that the record wholly fails to support an award of $5,000 attorney’s fees pendente lite for the wife at this time. Viewed in its best possible light, the record shows an expenditure of 108 hours by attorney for the plaintiff and no difficulties which would make the case unusual. A large portion of the work already performed by plaintiff’s attorney consists of taking depositions relative to financial matters. Only the subsequent progress of this case will determine how much of this work was essential to a protection of the rights of the plaintiff, wife.
The plaintiff estimates her husband’s worth at $700,000, and the record contains evidence that the appellant, husband, admits to a net worth of $400,000. It is therefore apparent that there are sufficient funds to fully compensate the wife for any reasonable attorney’s fee she may incur. It is possible that it may become necessary, in order to establish some of the issues in this cause, to make a more exact estimate of the husband’s worth, but at the present time the exact amount of appellant’s holdings does not appear to be essential to the progress of the cause. Ordinarily, where a husband admits to sufficient worth to take care of all necessary alimony, charges and fees, it is not essential to establish his exact financial worth. Jacobs v. Jacobs, Fla.1951, 50 So.2d 169. Cf., Garfield v. Garfield, Fla.1952, 58 So.2d 166.
We therefore hold that the record does not support the fee allowed and that the maximum fee allowable on the record presented to us is $1500. The cause is therefore remanded with directions to enter an amended order on the application for at*925torney’s fees pendente lite allowing $1500 at this time. In this connection it should he noted that if the case before the chancellor develops in a direction or degree not within the contemplation of the last hearing before the chancellor, then a further allowance of attorney’s fee pendente lite may be made as the record may justify.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hall v. Hall, 200 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)…00.00 allowance as attorneys’ fees for the wife’s attorneys in a divorce action was reduced to $3,000.00, which sum the court found ample for the services which the record disclosed were performed by the attorneys.) ; Muskin v. Muskin, Fla.App.1966, 184 So. 2d 923. ($5,-000.00 temporary attorney’s fees reduced to $1,500.00, which the court found to be a maximum fee which should be allowed, notwithstanding the financial circumstances of the husband). Therefore, the order here under review is reversed, with di…
-
Nudelman v. Waltraud Nudelman, 542 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…t of fees for services which have already been rendered, it necessarily has no application to temporary fees awardable under section 61.071, Florida Statutes (1987) for representation during the future course of the litigation. Cf. Muskin v. Muskin, 184 So. 2d 923, 924 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (rule requiring expert testimony for setting attorney’s fees not applicable “in every case” to award of fees pendente lite). Furthermore, the husband has failed to establish error in the amount of temporary fees assessed. See…
-
Rokicki v. Ewa Rokicki, 660 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…rt testimony was not required to support an award for interim fees for services yet to be performed. Nudelman v. Nudelman, 542 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see also Martin v. Martin, 561 So. 2d 1266, 1266 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Muskin v. Muskin, 184 So. 2d 923, 924 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). The husband argues alternatively that because neither the wife nor her counsel [*364] testified as to their fee arrangement, the amount awarded was unsupported by substantial competent evidence. However, the husband made no…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1951)
- Famous Brands Distribs., Inc. v. Hoke, 179 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Thoni v. Marine Parrish Thoni, 179 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Garfield v. Garfield, 58 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1952)
- Burton Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 113 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Landy v. Landy, 62 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 1953)