LANDY
v.
LANDY

Fla. | 1953-01-20
HOBSON, C. J., and ROBERTS and MATHEWS, JJ., concur., THOMAS, J., dissents., DREW, J., not participating. ■
62 So. 2d 707 Florida Supreme Court (1953) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

In a divorce case, the Florida Supreme Court upheld most of the trial court's orders including temporary alimony and child support awards, but quashed an order restraining the husband from leaving the state or transferring assets, conditioning the quashing on an inventory of his assets and requiring him to provide security for the alimony and child support obligations.


Holding

The court upheld all orders except the injunction against leaving the state and transferring assets, which was quashed on the condition that the trial court inventory the husband's assets and require him to provide ample security or protection for the wife's alimony and child support obligations.


Key Quotes

“We find ample support in the record for all of them except the order enjoining petitioner from leaving the state or transferring any of his assets therefrom.”

Establishes that while most orders were proper, the blanket restraint on leaving the state was not supported.

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Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner (husband) was a New York resident who moved to Florida and brought considerable liquid assets with him after respondent (wife) obtained a N…

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Opinion of the Court
TERRELL, Justice.

TERRELL, Justice.

In a divorce controversy -between the parties to this cause, the following orders were entered: (1) Amendment to answer and counterclaim of respondent whereby the latter was permitted to seek separate maintenance. and support for their two minor children instead of divorce without separate maintenance as first prayed for. (2) Order enjoining petitioner from leaving •the state or transferring any of his assets therefrom. (3) Order denying petitioner’s motion to vacate orders previously made, amending respondent’s answer and counterclaim. (4) Order granting temporary alimony of $100.00 per week to respondent and $350.00 per week for the two minor children. On certiorari we are urged to review and quash said orders.

We find ample support in the record’ for all of them except the order enjoining petitioner from leaving the state or transferring any of his assets therefrom. As to this order, we think the judgment below should be quashed on condition that petitioner’s assets be inquired into and inventoried, if the chancellor deems proper, and when their status is determined, the petitioner be required to make ample protection for respondent’s alimony, the support of the minor children, including any other equity she may be shown to have in said assets.

The record discloses that petitioner is possessed of a considerable estate, the major portion of which is in liquid assets; that he was, until recently, a citizen of the State of New York, where respondent secured an order from the appropriate court of that State, requiring him to pay her temporary alimony and support for the minor children, same as was required in the order under review; that as soon as the New York order was made, he moved to Florida, established his domicile and brought his assets with him. It is further disclosed that he has not complied with the order of the State of New York, or that of the State of Florida, but is in arrears on his payments as to them.

It is well settled that the matter of allowing temporary alimony and support for minor children, is within the sound discretion of the chancellor and there is no showing here that his discretion was abused. Where one shows a disposition to flee the jurisdiction of the state without making provision to meet such payment, it is within the sound discretion of the chancellor to secure them, or require security for their payment, when defendant exhibits a disposition to take up residence in another climate without doing so.

It results that the petition for certiorari is denied in part and granted as to that part of the order discussed in this opinion on the conditions stated.

It is so ordered.

HOBSON, C. J., and ROBERTS and MATHEWS, JJ., concur. THOMAS, J., dissents.

DREW, J., not participating.

Dissent
THOMAS, Justice

THOMAS, Justice

(dissenting).

I dissent from the opinion except so far as it holds invalid the order preventing the petitioner from leaving the state.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Dworkis v. Dworkis, 111 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
    …ability of the father to pay, and no reason is disclosed why he should not more adequately provide for the child’s support. See Riesner v. Riesner, supra, 136 Fla. 129, 186 So. 669; Lee v. Lee, 157 Fla. 439, 26 So. 2d 177; Landy v. Landy, Fla.1953, 62 So. 2d 707. The decree should be modified to provide for payment by the appellee of $30 a week child support during the periods when appellant holds custody, in place of the $15 a week originally provided for. It is so ordered. CARROLL, CHAS., C. J., and HO…
  • Bruno O. Weinschel v. Weinschel, 379 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …relief is affirmed [save for paragraph 7 thereof] upon a holding that the order, although extremely extensive, was within the discretion of the trial court to enter as it is supported by substantial competent evidence in this record. Landy v. Landy, 62 So. 2d 707 (Fla.1953); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 105 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); Annot, 1 A.L.R.3d 280 (1965). Paragraph 7 of the order under review is reversed in its entirety, however, upon a holding that the trial court in a marriage dissolution action has no…
  • Muskin v. Renae Irene Muskin, 184 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
    …rlocutory appeal is brought to review an order making allowances pen-dente lite of alimony, suit money and attorney’s fees. No abuse of discretion has been shown as to the allowances of temporary alimony and suit money. See Landy v. Landy, Fla.1953, 62 So. 2d 707; Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, Fla.App.1959, 113 So. 2d 565. The appellant, defendant, urges that the law set forth in Thoni v. Thoni, Fla. App.1965, 179 So. 2d 420, requires expert testimony for the setting of the amount of temporary attorney’s fees. We a…

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