WALTER J. WILLIAMS AND TOBORG E. WILLIAMS, HIS WIFE, PETITIONERS,
v.
EDWARD F. CROUCH AND ELCY L. CROUCH, HIS WIFE, RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court held that a vendee (buyer) in default under an executory contract for real property is not entitled to recover money paid in part performance, absent exceptional circumstances. The Court quashed the District Court's decision that had required the vendor to prove actual damages before retaining payments.
A purchaser in default is not entitled to recover from a vendor monies paid in part performance of an executory contract. This is the general rule, subject only to narrow exceptions for exceptional circumstances not present here. The vendor need not prove actual damages to retain payments from a defaulting vendee.
“a purchaser in default is not entitled to recover from a vendor monies paid in part performance of an executory contract”
Statement of the controlling legal principle reaffirmed from prior precedent
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams and his wife entered into an executory contract to purchase real property from Crouch and his wife. The vendees instituted an action for resc…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Rescission cases and more on FLexlaw
We granted certiorari in this case for the purpose of reviewing the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Crouch v. Williams, reported in 179 So.2d 117, because of its alleged conflict with, among other decisions of this Court, Beatty v. Flannery1 and Goldfarb v. Robertson,2 holding that a vendee in default is not entitled to recover from the vendor money paid in part performance of an executory contract.
The facts are accurately delineated in the opinion of the District Court of Ap-t peal. In such decision, that court relied principally upon Taylor v. Rawlins3 and Stenor, Inc. v. Lester.4 Such cases are inapposite. Here the vendees instituted an action for rescission of an executory contract to purchase real property alleging certain specified reasons therefor, all of which were determined by the trial judge adversely to the vendees. To put it another way, the trial judge found that the vendors were without fault and that the ven-dees were in default and had no basis for rescission. It dismissed the complaint and reinvested the vendors with possession of the premises.5
The District Court, in relying on Taylor v. Rawlins, supra, a case not controlling in the present factual situation, concluded that the vendors by their counterclaim sought the aid of equity and, in doing so, they must do equity by proving the actual loss or damage they sustained by reason of the contract. It reversed the judgment in part and remanded the case for the purpose of determining what portions of the sums paid should be retained by the vendors. In reaching such conclusion, the *493decision of the District Court conflicted head-on with the Goldfarb case, supra, Nogueira v. Helker6 and other cases. Goldfarb reaffirmed a previous decision of this Court, Beatty v. Flannery, supra, where we unequivocally held that “a purchaser in default is not entitled to recover from a vendor monies paid in part performance of an executory contract.” This is the great weight of authority.7
There are exceptions to this rule but they need not concern us here for inherent in the decision of the trial judge is the finding that no exceptional circumstances exist which would take this case out of the general rule.
Taylor v. Rawlins, relied upon by the District Court, was a suit by a vendor to have an executory contract cancelled of record in order to clear his title. In that case, as shown in the opinion, it clearly appeared that the vendee had derived no financial benefit from the property and the vendor had not sustained any loss or damage by reason of the contract. Under such circumstances, the vendor having invoked equity was required to do equity. The factual situation was wholly different from that presented here.
Stenor, Inc. v. Lester, supra, cited by the District Court, involved liquidated damages under a lease and was not pertinent to the determination of the proposition before the District Court.
The questioned decision of the District Court is quashed with directions to reinstate the decision of the trial judge.
It is so ordered.
THORNAL, C. J., CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., and DURDEN, Circuit Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1968)…rs, the last one of which awarded compensation and was entered December 31, 1964. This order was reviewed and affirmed by the full Commission by its order of August 19, 1965, which order was reviewed by us on certiorari and affirmed on May, 4, 1966, 186 So. 2d 491. Incident to the determination of the compensation award in Claimant’s favor, the Deputy in his order of December 31, 1964 also allowed Claimant $2500 for attorney’s fees. In the order of the full Commission of August 19, 1965 affirming the Deputy’s…
-
H & L Land Co., Inc. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)…t consider that the issue here is controlled by those cases in which a defaulting buyer did not seek to pay the amounts owed to a non-defaulting seller but on the contrary sought to get back amounts already paid. E. G., Williams v. Crouch, Fla.1966, 186 So. 2d 491. Nor do we consider that our decision in Stoneman v. Peninsula Land Company, Fla. App.l960, 124 So. 2d 760, is controlling here. In Stoneman, the buyer sought specific performance but had not performed and did not tender performance of material req…
-
White v. T.H. Brousseau, 566 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…stallments over a period of years, and thus has all the characteristics of an agreement for deed. This type of arrangement has been traditionally treated as a security device and readily distinguishes this case from cases such as Williams v. Crouch, 186 So. 2d 491 (Fla.1966), Goldfarb v. Robertson, 82 So. 2d 504 (Fla.1955) and Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So. 2d 81 (Fla.1950).…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Taylor v. Rawlins, 90 Fla. 621 (Fla. 1925)
- Stenor, Inc. v. Lester, 58 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1951)
- Goldfarb v. Robertson, 82 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1955)
- Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1950)
- Taylor v. Rawlins, 86 Fla. 279 (Fla. 1923)
- Nogueira v. Helker, 139 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Bowman Transp. Co. v. Osborn, 179 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Crouch v. Williams, 179 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)