MARGARET L. REESE, PETITIONER,
v.
HOMER A. REESE, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a district court decision holding that a bigamous marriage terminated the petitioner's right to alimony from a prior divorce decree. The Court held that a void bigamous marriage cannot alter the legal rights of the parties and therefore cannot terminate pre-existing alimony obligations.
A bigamous marriage is void under Florida law and therefore ineffective to alter the legal rights of the parties involved. The mere possibility of acquiring support rights under a void marriage cannot terminate provisions of a prior alimony decree, particularly where the consent to the bigamous marriage was obtained through fraud.
“On the merits of the issue involved, we are unable to see how the speculative possibility of an alimony or support claim arising out of a void marriage contract could terminate the provisions of a prior decree, either by operation of law or otherwise.”
Establishes the Court's core holding that a void marriage cannot terminate prior alimony rights
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMargaret L. Reese was divorced from Homer A. Reese and entitled to alimony under the divorce decree. She subsequently entered into a bigamous marriage…
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The third district court’s decision in this case, that petitioner’s bigamous marriage ceremony was effective to terminate her right to alimony due under a decree of divorce from her former husband, is expressly predicated on her acceptance of the right to support from the second putative husband, whose death followed immediately after the alleged marriage. The subsidiary point of law was determined as follows:
“This right of support, which is designated alimony, is therefore an incident of a valid marriage or, in some instances, of an invalid marriage if the presumed •wife is the victim of a presumed husband’s wrong” Reese v. Reese, Fla.App. 1965, 178 So.2d 913, 916.
The decision on this point of law appears to us to be in direct conflict with that of the District Court, First District, in Dawson v. Dawson, Fla.App.1964, 164 So.2d 536, 539, holding that alimony or support money unconnected with divorce was “not available because at the time suit was filed the parties did not bear the marital relation.” (E.S.) This decision reversing an award of alimony was based squarely on the absence of a valid marriage. Although reference was made to bad faith on the part of both parties in resorting to a Mexican divorce, the court in its opinion found that the putative husband “led her to believe that such was accomplished” before the “mar*2riage”, and the decision reversing the award of alimony was based not upon fraud but simply on the absence of a valid marriage. This, in our opinion, collides with the holding in the case at bar that the victimized putative wife acquired a right to support under our law and for that reason must be deemed to have relinquished any rights under the existing alimony decree.
The court in the opinion now under consideration did cite persuasive dicta from other opinions of this Court.1 We find, however, as noted by the district court in Dawson, supra, no previous decision in this state awarding permanent alimony or support to one in petitioner’s legal situation following a bigamous marriage. In any event, the opinions relied on do not eliminate the conflict with Dawson above noted.
On the merits of the issue involved, we are unable to see how the speculative possibility of an alimony or support claim arising out of a void marriage contract could terminate the provisions of a prior decree, either by operation of law or otherwise. Petitioner’s consent to the putative marriage, concededly obtained by fraud, would not under ordinary contract principles be characterized a voluntary relinquishment, being based on the assumption of full marital rights which are denied to her by law.
Illustrative of the problems inherent in the decision below, depending as it does on the principle that only an “innocent” wife acquired support rights against a bigamous marital partner, is the fact that on such reasoning prior alimony would not be terminated if petitioner had been fully aware of her partner’s incapacity because she would then acquire no support rights under the cited rule. The theory, then, favors the guilty over the unwary.
The situation, in our opinion, should be governed by the simpler and well established principle that a bigamous marriage under our law is void2 and therefore ineffective to alter the legal rights of the parties involved in this controversy.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
ROBERTS, O’CONNELL and ERVIN. JJ., concur.
THORNAL, C. J., and THOMAS and CALDWELL, JJ., dissent
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Frye v. Frye, 385 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…to his former wife for her subsistence, [and it] derives from the legal duty to support her which he assumed when they married.” Friedman v. Schneider, supra, at 421; Reese v. Reese, 178 So. 2d 913, 915-16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), rev’d on other grounds, 192 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1966). That definition was supported by Section 61.08, Florida Statutes (1969), and its predecessor statutes, which provided for alimony to the wife only. That concept was abandoned by the legislature in 1971 when it amended Section 61.08 to p…
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Evans v. Evans, 212 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)…defendant. However, it was ordered that defendant pay $500 per month as child support for the parties’ one remaining minor child. Subsequent to the trial court’s order, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Reese v. Reese, Fla.1966, 192 So. 2d 1. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration based upon the Reese decision on December 22, 1966, which motion was considered an untimely petition for rehearing by the trial court and was denied. [*108] Plaintiff appeals, urging that her alimony be…1 / 2
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Louria B. Bailey Dandy v. Alphonso Dandy, Jr., 234 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)…ber of occasions during the period of time they lived together and cohabited as man and wife, plaintiff agreed with defendant that he would “remarry” her at a later date, which later date never came. The parties have no children. In Reese v. Reese, 192 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1966), Mr. Justice Drew, speaking for the Supreme Court, held flatly: " * * * that a bigamous marriage under our law is void and therefore ineffective to alter the legal rights of the parties involved * * This rule of law is most applicable to…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jones v. Augusta Jones, 119 Fla. 824 (Fla. 1935)
- Kuehmsted v. Turnwall, 103 Fla. 1180 (Fla. 1932)
- Lisolette Burger v. Burger, 166 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1964)
- Young v. Young, 97 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1957)
- Reese v. Reese, 178 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Edge v. State, 164 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)