ROBERT MICHAEL MARLIN, APPELLANT,
v.
JUDITH ELLEN MARLIN, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed a divorce decree's attorney's fee award because the appellant failed to provide a complete record of the evidence presented to the lower court regarding his financial ability to pay.
No, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion because the appellant failed to provide a complete record of the evidence regarding his financial standing.
“The appellant has presented us with a record which does not contain any of the evidence taken before the chancellor at the time the fee was allowed, nor does it contain all of the evidence presented during the proceedings relative to the financial standing of the appellant.”
This quote explains the critical deficiency in the appellate record that prevented the court from reviewing the husband's challenge to the attorney's fee.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a divorce proceeding, the husband appealed the final decree, specifically challenging the amount of the attorney's fee awarded to the wife. The hus…
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The defendant in a divorce proceeding appeals from the final decree and assigns as error the amount of the attorney’s fee allowed to the wife. There is no contention that the amount of the fee is unreasonable except as it relates to the earning power and financial ability of the defendant, husband, to respond. The appellant does not challenge the testimony upon the time expended or the value of that time.
Under these contentions it is necessary for us to determine whether the amount of the fee allowed was an abuse of the chancellor’s discretion. The appellant has presented us with a record which does not contain any of the evidence taken before the chancellor at the time the fee was allowed, nor does it contain all of the evidence *779presented during the proceedings relative to the financial standing of the appellant. We must therefore affirm the decree as to the attorney’s fee. See Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, Fla.App.1965, 178 So.2d 878.
Affirmed.
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Cited By
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Keller v. Keller, 302 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…d. However, a hearing was held on this question, and appellant has not provided this court with a transcript of the hearing. Therefore, we cannot determine whether or not the trial court has abused his discretion. See Marlin v. Marlin, Fla.App.1967, 192 So. 2d 778. For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed is affirmed. Affirmed.…
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Marlin v. Marlin, 201 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1967)…Certiorari denied without opinion. 192 So. 2d 778.…
Authorities Cited
- Lauderhill Dev. Corp. v. Lowery, 178 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)