RALPH G. ORTIZ, APPELLANT,
v.
IRIS MUNOZ ORTIZ, THE BRAZIL CORPORATION, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a divorce action, the husband appeals from discovery orders requiring disclosure of his assets and income for 1962–1966. The Third District Court of Appeal holds that while the husband's bare assertion of financial ability to pay is insufficient to bar discovery, tax returns predating the marriage need not be produced, affirming in part and reversing in part.
A husband's mere deposition statement that he is 'ready, willing and able' to pay is insufficient to bar discovery under the Jacobs rule; the husband must make a comparable, formal demonstration of financial ability. However, discovery need not extend to tax returns for years prior to the marriage.
“The mere statement during deposition that 'I am ready, willing and able to answer any reasonable order for costs, fees or other allowances' is not sufficient.”
Establishes that a vague oral assertion of financial ability does not bar discovery in divorce cases.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRalph Ortiz filed for divorce, alleging his wife had no special equity in his estate or assets. The wife denied this and counterclaimed for separate m…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Separate Maintenance cases and more on FLexlaw
The plaintiff-husband in a divorce action appeals from interlocutory orders which granted the defendant-wife certain rights of discovery concerning his assets and income for 1962 through 1966.
The husband’s original divorce complaint alleged that the wife had no special equity in his estate or assets. She denied this allegation in her answer and counterclaimed for separate maintenance. The husband’s pleadings did not set forth his financial worth, or ability to pay, although he did state, during deposition, that he was "ready, willing and able to answer any reasonable order for costs, fees or other allowances.”
The husband takes the position that discovery concerning his assets and income is barred under the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Jacobs v. Jacobs, Fla.1951, 50 So.2d 169, where such discovery was not allowed. He argues that by admitting his ability to respond for reasonable support and other allowances, under oath, at deposition, he falls within the Jacobs rule.
We note, however, that the Jacobs rule was expressly considered and distinguished by the Fourth District Court of Appeal1 on the grounds that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure had been amended since that pronouncement. The Fourth District held that discovery under the old rules (a la Jacobs) was limited to matters relevant to the issues made by the pleadings and under the new rules (a la Parker) the scope of discovery is related to the suifs subject matter without limitation of the paper issues made by the pleadings.
Closer analysis, however, brings us to the conclusion that neither case is controlling. In Jacobs, supra, the plaintiff-husband had been separated from his wife for some eleven years at the time he instituted his action, and he had already made substantial allowances for her support and maintenance. These allowances included the creation of a $1,000,000 irrevocable trust from which the wife was to receive the. entire income for the duration of her life, as well as gifts to her in excess of $200,000, and a $500,000 home. In concluding that the discovery sought was not material, relevant or pertinent to the issues raised by the pleadings, the Supreme Court noted that the husband had (1) admitted to having assets in excess of two million dollars, and (2) admitted to being financially able and willing to pay such alimony, attorney’s fees and costs as the court should decree. There was no issue before the court relating to any possible special equity the wife might have had in the husband’s property.
In Parker, supra, discovery was allowed despite the fact that the husband’s pleadings admitted his financial ability to pay reasonable amounts for the wife’s needs, and that he made a further admission, in the form of a “Written Admission and Stipulation of Fact” that he had a net worth in excess of five million dollars.
Before we would have to decide between Jacobs and Parker, we would have to find that the husband had made a comparable attempt to properly demonstrate to the court his ability and willingness to pay such amounts as might reasonably be decreed. The mere statement during deposition that “I am ready, willing and able to answer *40any reasonable order for costs, fees or other allowances” is not sufficient.
< We do find, however, that no valid purpose would be served in requiring the husband to produce tax returns for years prior to his marriage. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse only as to the production of the husband’s returns for 1962 and 1963.
It is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Zakoor v. Zakoor, 240 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)…extent of her knowledge of her husband’s property she could have made informal inquiries of the husband, through her attorney, or resorted to the ample discovery procedures provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ortiz v. Ortiz, Fla.App.1967, 194 So. 2d 38. Furthermore, it affirmatively appears from the testimony that the husband and wife were married for approximately thirteen years at the time the property settlement agreement was executed. Under these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that s…
-
Alterman v. Alterman, 361 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…ure of the details of his financial holdings.” In our opinion, based on the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the order appealed; therefore, it is affirmed. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.280(c). See also Ortiz v. Ortiz, 194 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). Affirmed.…
-
Medel v. Republic Nat'l Bank OF Miami, 388 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…claim, and in the absence of demonstrated good cause for a protective order, the trial court abused its discretion by its denial of petitioner’s Motion to Compel. Sun Bank of Miami v. Johnson, 380 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). See, Ortiz v. Ortiz, 194 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Parker v. Parker, 182 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), quoted approvingly in Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 199 So. 2d 97 (Fla.1967). Gf. Gruman v. Bankers Trust Co., 379 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Alterman v. Alterman, 361 So. 2d 773…
Authorities Cited
- Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1951)
- Parker v. Parker, 182 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)