CROSSROADS LOUNGE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND B. E. AND R. CORP., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,

v.

THE CITY OF MIAMI ET AL. APPELLEES

PEARSON, Judge.

This appeal questions the yalidity of a zoning variance which was granted to a lessee of premises located less than 500 feet from another liquor establishment. The lessee (J & R Restaurant Corp.) had entered into an agreement to rent space, in a new building if it could secure a designated type of liquor license and secure a zoning variance. Thereafter, the lessee entered into an agreement to purchase the liquor license of a person whose property had been taken by eminent domain. The later agreement was also conditioned upon the lessee obtaining a variance.1 The City Commission adopted a resolution which granted the variance.2 The owners of the establishment which was located within 500 feet of the lessee brought suit in the circuit court to nullify the resolution. The circuit court found that the lessee had no hardship, but did not declare the resolution invalid because it felt that to do so would deprive the person who sold the license of his right to sell a valuable property. The final decree states:

“From the testimony adduced before me the Court is satisfied that the defendant, J & R RESTAURANT CORP., a Florida corporation, in and of itself does not satisfy the requirements of the Charter of the City of Miami as to hardship. However, it is the Court’s opinion that the hardship of the original licensee, Victor Scarpelli, is sufficient to justify the action taken by the Commission of the City of Miami.

*234“It is further the Court’s opinion that in cases of this type the chancellor is not to second guess the legislative body of the municipality, but is only to determine whether facts exist upon which a legislative decision, agreeing with the chancellor’s view or not, could have been made. Since the licensee, Scarpelli, presented a bona fide hardship (taking of his property by eminent domain) a denial to him of the right to contract for the sale of his license would, in the Court’s opinion, compound the hardship.

“ * * * To deprive the licensee in this case of the opportunity to contract for the sale of his license, contingent on the procuring of a variance would, in the Court’s opinion, be pushing a man who was already about to fall.”

The main thrust of appellant’s attack upon the final decree is presented by its first point as follows: “Is the transferee of a liquor license entitled to a zoning variance by reason of the hardship of his trans-feror?”

An “exceptional and unique hardship to the individual landowner, unique to that parcel of property and not shared by property owners in the area, is an essential prerequisite to the granting of a ‘hardship’ zoning variance.” City of Miami v. Franklin Leslie, Inc., Fla.App.1965, 179 So.2d 622, 624. See also Elwyn v. City of Miami, Fla. App.1959, 113 So.2d 849. We have held a variance from a zoning ordinance on the ground of hardship to be invalid where the hardship was self-created because the owner knew of the restricted zoning ordinance prior to the acquisition of a beverage license. See Green v. City of Miami, Fla. App.1958, 107 So.2d 390.

The chancellor’s determination that J & R Restaurant Corp. did not show a hardship is supported by the record;3 therefore, the variance is invalid. See City *235of Miami v. Franklin Leslie, Inc., Fla.App. 1965, 179 So.2d 622.

We do not discuss appellees’ point urging that a competitor does not have the standing to commence litigation attacking a resolution of the City Commission. This point appears to have been settled adversely to the appellees in Keating v. State, Fla.1965, 173 So.2d 673, and City of Miami v. Franklin Leslie, Inc., supra.

The final decree is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the view expressed herein.

Reversed.

CARROLL, Judge

(concurring specially).

I concur in the judgment of reversal and in the opinion of the court. The restaurant operated by J & R Restaurant Corp. (hereinafter referred to as the appellee restaurant operator) is in a location where issuance of a regular liquor bar license is prohibited by law, because of proximity to another licensed bar.

It was made to appear, however, that the restaurant has floor area and customer seating capacity required to qualify for a special or exception liquor license, available to such restaurants without reference to population quota or to spacing or distance restriction; and is in an area in which the zoning permits the granting of such special licenses to qualified restaurants. The application for the variance was clearly without merit, but denial of the requested variance (to permit operation under a regular liquor license) does not prevent the appellee restaurant operator from obtaining a special or exception restaurant liquor license. It is obvious the variance was sought to gain the advantage of a regular liquor license over the restaurant exception license to which the ap-pellee restaurant operator was entitled, since under the former it is permitted to sell intoxicating beverages at a bar, whereas under the latter the sale of intoxicating liquor to persons at tables is permitted but sale thereof at a bar is not.

Therefore, to grant the appellee restaurant operator a regular liquor bar license to which it was not entitled by law rather than the more limited special restaurant ex*236ception liquor license to which it was restricted and relegated by its location, would be to act in direct violation of the law applicable to restaurants so situated.

WILLIAMS, GENE, Associate Judge

(dissenting).

In my opinion it has not been shown that the chancellor in his rulings on questions of fact and equitable principles was in error. Historically, zoning ordinances, based on police power, are exceptions to the oldest basic rights of the individual, rights of property and the uses thereof, and can only be maintained for the protection of public health, safety or welfare. Restraints of competition or trade cannot be the basis for the maintenance of a zoning ordinance or variance thereof. Unfortunately, these basic premises have sometimes become clouded in the rapid development of the comparatively new segment of law dealing with zoning. I am cognizant of the case of Keating v. State ex rel. Bernard Ausebel, Fla.App., 167 So.2d 46, that seems to indicate that in Florida a competitor has some sort of right in a zoning ordinance which can be adjudicated and enforced by the courts. That case is such a departure from heretofore established principles of property rights that I would only apply the holding of that case to the particular circumstances cited therein.

Victor Scarpelli, original owner of the beverage license, was put out of business by eminent domain proceedings, and it is un-contradicted that there was no place in the City of Miami that he could take his license without obtaining a zoning variance. These facts would entitle him to a zoning variance at some place otherwise approved by the Zoning Board or City Commissioners of Miami. Dade County v. Pepper, Fla.App., 168 So.2d 198. His beverage license was a valuable assignable property. Rosamond v. Mann, Fla., 80 So.2d 317, 49 A.L.R.2d 476. Scarpelli assigned his license to appellee, J & R Restaurant Corp., who applied for a variance in its own name. On the basis of the foregoing cases, if Scarpelli had acquired a leasehold or other interest in the property in question, he could have been granted a variance by the City of Miami. The chancellor, in the first part of his order, found that J & R Restaurant Corp., did not have a hardship, however, in the remainder of the order he obviously found for ap-pellees on the basis of Scarpelli’s hardship and that it was immaterial whether the application was made in the name of assignor Scarpelli or assignee J & R Restaurant Corp. Where evidence reasonably supports findings of chancellor, his conclusions will not be disturbed. I see no error in the holding of the chancellor and must respectfully dissent.