BUYER FINANCE CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
J. W. OLIVEROS, APPELLEE, VENETIAN RAMBLER, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, GARNISHEE
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision regarding attorney's fees and costs but reversed the order because no final judgment had been rendered in the underlying garnishment proceeding. The court held that attorney's fees and costs for a garnishee are only allowable upon the rendering of a final judgment.
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the attorney's fees and deposition costs. However, the order awarding attorney's fees and costs is invalid because it was entered before a final judgment was rendered in the garnishment proceeding.
“It is appellant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by granting excessive attorney’s fees, and by taxing as cost the expense of a deposition.”
States the appellant's main arguments on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant, a garnishor, appealed a judgment for attorney's fees and costs awarded to the garnishee. The appellant argued that the attorney's fees …
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The appellant, garnishor, appeals a judgment for attorney’s fees and costs to the garnishee. It is appellant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by granting excessive attorney’s fees, and by taxing as cost the expense of a deposition.
The question of attorney’s fees was presented to the court by stipulation of counsel, to be set within the judge’s discretion. The judge considered the testimony of garnishee’s counsel, a detailed motion to assess attorney’s fees, and two affidavits from practicing attorneys which suggested sums in excess of the actual award. The fee allowed by the court was supported by the record, and was neither excessive nor an abuse of discretion. See Esch v. Forster, 123 Fla. 905, 168 So. 229 (1936).
Appellant also challenges the taxing of $23.50 as costs for the expenses of a deposition. The deposition was used for the purpose of securing an order granting a summary judgment. See Section 58.13 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.
The courts are also committed to the proposition that the proper administration of justice requires that costs of litigation be kept within reasonable bounds. Emigh v. Tinter, Fla.App.1959, 108 So.2d 913; Travis v. Blackmon, Fla.App.1963, 155 So.2d 698. The fundamental question involved when taxing costs for the expense of depositions is whether the deposition served a useful purpose in the trial of the cause. Wilson v. Rooney, Fla.App.1958, 101 So.2d 892. Considering the cost of the deposition and the purpose served, we find no abuse of discretion. See Lockwood v. Test, Fla.App.1964, 160 So.2d 142.
Upon this Court’s own motion it has been noted that this record does not reflect a final judgment in the garnishment proceeding. Therefore, the order appealed must be reversed. Section 77.28, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. provides for the allowance by the court of an attorney’s fee and cost to the garnishee only “[u]pon the rendering of a final judgment in any such proceeding in which a writ of garnishment shall be issued * * *”
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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Cnty. OF ST. Lucie & Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Browning, 358 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…riginals and copies. They refer only to “costs of deposition” and hold that such costs are taxable if they serve a useful purpose. See Cohn v. Florida National Bank at Orlando, 223 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4 DCA 1969); Buyer Finance Corporation v. Oliveros, 196 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3 DCA 1967); Lockwood v. Test, 160 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2 DCA 1964). It is not at all clear that the Supreme Court in Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, supra, intended that under no circumstances may costs of deposition copies be taxed against a…
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Fatolitis v. Fatolitis, 271 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)…ion of the trial Court. Costs of depositions have been held to be taxable if they serve a useful purpose, even though not introduced into evidence, Lockwood v. Test, Fla.App.1964, 160 So. 2d 142; Buyer Finance Corporation v. Oliveros, Fla.App.1967, 196 So. 2d 451; Cohn v. Florida National Bank at Orlando, Fla.App.1969, 223 So. 2d 767. For the reasons set forth, that part of the order granting appellee $1,000.00 for services rendered in the appeal taken by appellant in 1970 is reversed, and the order is affi…
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Lewin v. U. S. Indus., Inc., 272 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)…lliams v. Faile, Fla.App.1960, 118 So. 2d 599; Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Inc., Fla.App.1965, 173 So. 2d 492; Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Fla.1966, 190 So. 2d 777; Buyer Finance Corporation v. Oliveros, Fla.App.1967, 196 So. 2d 451; Summerfield v. Sullivan, N.Y.S.Ct.1908, 113 N.Y.S. 552; McGovern v. Madame Elize, Inc., 137 Misc. 599, 244 N.Y.S. 169; Vol. 3, Williston on Contracts, 3rd Ed., § 533A, page 808.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Esch v. Davis Forster, 123 Fla. 905 (Fla. 1936)
- Wilson v. Rooney, 101 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Emigh v. Tinter, 108 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Reather Marie Travis and Wesley Travis v. Blackmon, 155 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Lockwood v. Test, 160 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)