RICHARD A. INMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND RICHARD E. GERSTEIN, STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1967-04-04
No. 66-551
Before PEARSON, CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.
197 So. 2d 50 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1967) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Richard Inman challenged a Miami city ordinance that prohibited liquor licensees from knowingly employing homosexuals or serving them alcoholic beverages. The Florida appellate court upheld the ordinance as constitutional, finding it rationally related to public health, morals, safety, and general welfare.


Holding

The ordinance is constitutional and rationally related to public health, morals, safety, and general welfare. A generalized attack on an ordinance as a whole must be denied unless the ordinance is void on its face, and courts must construe ordinances to be legal if possible and to give reasonable effect to their provisions.


Key Quotes

“When a court construes the validity of an ordinance, it must construe it to be legal if it is possible to do so. It must also strive to construe it as to give reasonable effect to its provisions.”

Establishes the standard of review for ordinance constitutionality—courts must interpret ordinances to be valid when possible.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Inman, claiming to be a homosexual, challenged a Miami ordinance that prohibited liquor licensees from knowingly employing homosexual person…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PEARSON, Judge.

PEARSON, Judge.

This appeal is from a final decree in a. declaratory action. The trial court held’, an ordinance of the City of Miami constitutional as against the attacks of the appellant. Appellant’s complaint alleged that he is a homosexual, and that by the ordinance he is denied the right to “visit and' enjoy by himself or with his friends who are similarly situated the public places of amusement within the City of Miami.”' The ordinance prohibits liquor licensees; from knowingly employing a homosexual', person, or knowingly sell to, serve, or allow-a homosexual person to consume alcoholic-beverages, or to knowingly allow two or-more homosexual persons to congregate or-remain in his place of business. Appellant did not attack a particular section or provision of the ordinance but confines himself to a prayer: “ * * * that this court take jurisdiction of this matter and find; section 4 — 13 of the Code of the City off Miami to be unconstitutional and that it issue its order enjoining the respondents., from enforcing the provisions of said ordinance.”

The final decree appealed holds that this.section of the code of the City of Miami “has a rational relation to public health,, morals, safety and general welfare.” We-agree.

It may be that the ordinance is. inartfully drawn and that enforcement of one or more provisions may prove difficult or even impossible. Nevertheless, the question here presented is whether it is void as. *52a whole. When a court construes the validity of an ordinance, it must construe it to be legal if it is possible to do so. It must also strive to construe it as to give reasonable effect to its provisions. City of Miami v. Kayfetz, Fla.1957, 92 So.2d 798. If reasonable argument exists on the question of whether an ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable, the legislative will must prevail. State ex rel. Skillman v. City of Miami, 101 Fla. 585, 134 So. 541. (1931).

The business of the distribution of liquor is one which is particularly burdened with a public concern and which may be limited and regulated by the State as a privilege. It follows that the legislative authority may limit its distribution to conditions under which liquor will be distributed with the least possible harm to the public. City of Miami v. Kayfetz, Fla.1957, 92 So.2d 798; City of Miami v. Jiminez, Fla.App.1961, 130 So.2d 109. The object of the ordinance as a whole is to prevent the congregation at liquor establishments of persons likely to prey upon the public by attempting to recruit other persons for acts which have been declared illegal by the Legislature of the State of Florida. See Sections 800.01, 800.02 Fla. Stat., F.S.A.

It therefore follows that appellant’s generalized attack upon the ordinance as a whole was properly denied.

The City by cross assignment contends that the court should have granted its motion to strike the complaint under Rule 1.14 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1965 Revision, 30 F.S.A., because there was unre-futed evidence showing that appellant was not a homosexual at the time the proceeding was instituted. In view of our conclusion upon the appeal, it is unnecessary to consider the exercise of the trial court’s discretion in this particular.

The decree is affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • City OF Miami Springs v. J.J.T., Inc., 437 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …e, then, it is well recognized in the area of liquor legislation, as elsewhere, that if any “reasonable argument exists on the question of whether an ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable, the legislative will must prevail,” Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 895 (Fla.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048, 88 S.Ct. 769, 19 L.Ed.2d 841 (1968), no matter what a court’s view may be of the wisdom of the legislation. Nelson v. State ex rel. Gross, 26 So. 2d at 61 (“The…
  • Stein v. City OF Miami Beach, 250 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
    …bruary 1, 1967.” Upon this appeal, the appellants contend that the above portions of the Code are vague and ambiguous and therefore void. We do not agree. See: City of Miami v. Kayfetz, Fla.1957, 92 So. 2d 798; Inman v. City of Miami, Fla.App.1967, 197 So. 2d 50; Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, Fla.1969, 224 So. 2d 693; 23 Fla.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 105. It is clear to us from reading the above portions of the Code in their entirety that although bills for waste services or…
  • Miller v. State, 411 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
    …charge that the ordinance, as applied, was unconstitutional. . The business of distribution of liquor is one which is particularly burdened with public concern, which may be limited and regulated by the State as a privilege. Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). In enacting such regulation, the State is not considering ordinary trades, businesses, occupations or professions. State v. Vocelle, 159 Fla. 88, 31 So. 2d 52 (1947).…

Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw