ROBERT LEE BANNERMAN, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
NANCY LEE BANNERMAN, APPELLEE
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This case concerns whether venue for a divorce action was properly laid in Dade County, Florida, when some alleged acts of cruelty occurred there, even though the parties primarily resided in Leon County. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that venue is proper where the cause of action accrued, even if other counties might also be proper venues.
No, venue was properly laid in Dade County because Florida Statute § 46.01 allows suits to be brought in the county where the cause of action accrued, and some alleged acts occurred in Dade County.
“It is urged that venue was improperly laid in Dade County when the parties had resided in Leon County from 1951 until June of 1966, and the allegations of the complaint affirmatively show that most of the acts alleged as grounds for divorce occurred in Leon County.”
This quote outlines the appellant's argument regarding improper venue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant/appellant sought to transfer a divorce action from Dade County to Leon County, arguing that the parties resided in Leon County and most …
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Upon this interlocutory appeal the defendant, appellant, urges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to transfer a divorce action to Leon County. It is urged that venue was improperly laid in Dade County when the parties had resided in Leon County from 1951 until June of 1966, and the allegations of the complaint affirmatively show that most of the acts alleged as grounds for divorce occurred in Leon County. The complaint alleges extreme cruelty by virtue of certain acts, some of which allegedly took place in Dade County, Florida.
The trial judge correctly ruled that § 46.01 Fla.Stat.,1 F.S.A. provides that suit may be brought in the county where the cause of action accrued and that this provision is complied with when some of the acts complained of occurred in Dade County. We do not think that it is proper to require the trial judge to weigh the allegations in order to determine that the venue lies only in the county where the defendant resides or the county where the more substantial evidentiary facts occurred.
Appellant relies upon Copeland v. Copeland, Fla.1951, 53 So.2d 637. Wé do not find this decision controlling, inasmuch as it is apparent that in Copeland the cause of *235action accrued entirely in the county where the defendant resided.
Affirmed.
(dissents).
I respectfully dissent. See Copeland v. Copeland, Fla.1951, 53 So.2d 637.
SWANN, Judge
(dissents).
I respectfully dissent. See Copeland v. Copeland, Fla.1951, 53 So. 2d 637.
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Carroll v. Vernell Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…t it did not follow from Copeland that a spouse seeking refuge or new surroundings was invariably required to litigate in the inhospitable territory where the marriage was suffered and the other party remained. It was held in Bannerman v. Bannerman, 204 So. 2d 234 (Fla.App. 3rd, 1967), cert. dism. 210 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1968) that a woman who left marital home and husband in Leon County could file for divorce in Dade because at least some of the acts of extreme cruelty, asserted as grounds for divorce, occurred…
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In re The Marriage of Hopie Arnold v. Arnold, 273 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)…hreatened to do it again. It was after these visits that she filed her petition. It therefore appears that the cause of action arose in Hillsborough County, and the trial judge erred in transferring venue to Polk County. See, Bannerman v. Bannerman, 204 So. 2d 234 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1967), cert. dismissed 210 So. 2d 220 (Fla.1968). Reversed and remanded for action consistent with this opinion. , MANN, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.…
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Bannerman v. Bannerman, 210 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1968)…Certiorari dismissed without opinion. 204 So. 2d 234.…
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