IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF HOPIE ARNOLD, APPELLANT,
v.
HOLLY ADDISON ARNOLD, APPELLEE
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The place where a marriage is alleged to have become irretrievably broken can constitute the locus of the cause of action for venue purposes.
A wife filed for dissolution of marriage in Hillsborough County. The husband, residing in Polk County, successfully moved for a change of venue to Pol…
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Appellant Hopie Arnold petitioned the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County for dissolution of marriage. The trial judge granted appellee Holly Arnold’s motion for a change of venue to Polk County the place of his residence. Mrs. Arnold takes this interlocutory appeal.
Florida Statutes § 47.011, F.S.A. provides that actions may be brought where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. There is no property to be litigated.
Does the place where the marriage is alleged to have become irretrievably broken constitute the locus of the cause of action under the venue statute? This question has not heretofore been decided since the amendment of Chapter 61, Fla. Stat. (1971), providing for the dissolution of marriage. However, we hold that the place of the cause of action alleged by the petitioner is sufficient; and, where contested, the locus of the cause of action must be decided by the judge consistent with Fla.Stat. § 47.011.
Since the facts are not in dispute in this appeal, we have only the question of where the marriage became irretrievably broken, thereby creating a cause of action under the venue statute.
Petitioner alleged that her husband came to her place of employment in Hillsbor-ough County, after she had removed herself from the marital residence in Polk County, and caused her undue embarrassment and threatened to do it again. It was after these visits that she filed her petition. It therefore appears that the cause of action arose in Hillsborough County, and the trial judge erred in transferring venue to Polk County. See, Bannerman v. Bannerman, 204 So.2d 234 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1967), cert. dismissed 210 So.2d 220 (Fla.1968).
Reversed and remanded for action consistent with this opinion. ,
MANN, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Carroll v. Vernell Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…justified minimizing that decision as precedent in a dissolution proceeding,3 the District Court of Appeal, [*55] Second District, carried the Bannerman principle root and branch into marriage dissolution proceedings when deciding Arnold v. Arnold, 273 So. 2d 405 (Fla.App. 2nd, 1973). That decision of first impression was that the petitioning spouse may select a forum other than that of the marital home and the respondent’s residence if the events which finally and irretrievably broke the marriage took place…1 / 2
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Vernell Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1977)…e. This is a petition for writ of certiorari seeking reversal of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal reported at 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). As acknowledged by the First District, that decision conflicts with Arnold v. Arnold, 273 So. 2d 405 (Fla.2d DCA 1973). We have jurisdiction.1 This case involves a dispute over venue in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. On April 8, 1972, respondent and petitioner travelled to Alabama to be united in marriage as husband and wife. They returned…
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Hoskins v. Hoskins, 363 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…the breach was postponed; there the cause of action for dissolution arose, within the meaning and application of § 47.011. ...” 322 So. 2d at 57. The Carroll decision specifically rejected a prior opinion of the Second District in Arnold v. Arnold, 273 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), which held that venue may lie in the county where the events took place which finally rendered the marriage irretrievably broken. In Carroll, for instance, the wife alleged that those events took place in Oka-loosa County where s…
Authorities Cited
- Bannerman v. Bannerman, 204 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Huggins v. State, 210 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1968)
- Bannerman v. Bannerman, 210 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1968)