ALLAN G. GORANSON, APPELLANT,
v.
MAXIMO MOORINGS MARINE CENTER, INC., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case involves an appeal from a summary final judgment concerning a guaranty agreement. The appellate court reversed the judgment, finding that the trial court erred in applying the rule against splitting causes of action.
No, the trial court erred in entering the summary final judgment. The appellant's suit did not violate the rule against splitting causes of action because a statute prohibited joining the replevin action against the buyer with the action on the guaranty agreement against the guarantor.
“The trial court, on motion of appellee, entered the judgment here appealed on the ground that appellant's suit violated the rule against splitting causes of action.”
Describes the basis for the trial court's decision.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant sold a yacht to R. W. Smith via a conditional sales contract, with Appellee executing a guaranty agreement. Smith defaulted, and Appellant s…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Rule Against Splitting Causes Of Action cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant brings this appeal from a summary final judgment entered against him in his suit against appellee on a guaranty agreement.
The alleged guaranty agreement was executed by appellee in conjunction with a conditional sales contract whereby appellant agreed to sell his yacht to one R. W. Smith. Smith defaulted, and appellant filed a complaint against him for replevin of the vessel. Appellant then filed the suit below. The trial court, on motion of appellee, entered the judgment here appealed on the ground that appellant’s suit violated the rule against splitting causes of action.
Fla.Stat., Sec. 46.08 (1965), F.S.A., which permits the joining of causes of action, also provides that “replevin and ejectment shall not be joined together nor with other causes of action.” Thus, appellant was proscribed by statute from joining his cause of action against Smith and his cause of action against appellee.
Accordingly, the summary final judgment here appealed is reversed and the cause remanded to the court below.
Reversed and remanded.
LILES, C. J., and PIERCE, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Masciarelli v. Maco Supply Corp., 224 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1969)…470 (1st Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1965), and Avant v. Hammond Jones, Inc., 79 So. 2d 423 (Fla.1955). . Fla.Stat. § 46.08 (1965); Seven Seas Frozen Products v. Fast Frozen Foods, 43 So. 2d 181 (Fla.1949); and Goranson v. Maximo Moorings Marine Center, Inc., 204 So. 2d 745 (2d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1967). . Southside Atlantic Bank v. Lewis, 174 So. 2d 470 (1st Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1965), and Avant v. Hammond Jones, Inc., 79 So. 2d 423 (Fla.1955).…
-
Maco Supply Corp. v. Masciarelli, 213 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)…under the aforesaid principles. This claim for reversal is without merit. See Fla.Stat. § 46.08 (1965), F.S.A.; Seven Seas Frozen Products v. Fast Frozen Foods, Fla.1949, 43 So. 2d 181; Goranson v. Maximo Moorings Marine Center, Inc., Fla.App.1967, 204 So. 2d 745; and R.C.P. 1.010, 30 F.S.A. Turning next to the question of punitive damages, we note that an award of punitive damages for a breach of contract is generally not permitted in Florida unless the breach amounts to an independent, wilful tort. See 9…