ANTHONY J. MASCIARELLI, PETITIONER,
v.
MACO SUPPLY CORP., A GEORGIA CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
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In this contract dispute, the Florida Supreme Court held that a defendant who defaulted in a replevin action cannot later relitigate the underlying contract terms through a separate action. The Court reversed the trial court's award of compensatory damages based on estoppel by judgment, while affirming the reversal of punitive damages because the plaintiff failed to allege a separate, independent tort.
A party who defaults in a replevin action and fails to defend on any available ground is estopped by judgment from relitigating the contract terms in a subsequent action. The plaintiff failed to allege a separate, independent tort required to support punitive damages for breach of contract, so punitive damages were properly reversed.
“The right of possession was determined by the replevin action and the doctrine of estoppel by judgment negates re-litigation of that issue.”
Establishes the core holding that estoppel by judgment bars relitigation of contract terms after default in replevin
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn May 18, 1964, Masciarelli and Maco Supply Corp. executed a conditional sales contract for pool and billiard equipment. In January 1966, Maco brough…
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This cause is here on petition and cross-petition for writ of certiorari to the District *330Court of Appeal, Third District, 213 So.2d 265.1
On May 18, 1964, the parties executed a conditional sales contract for the purchase of various pool and billiard equipment. In January, 1966, Maco Supply Corp. brought replevin against Masciarelli alleging petitioner failed to make his installment payments as required by the contract. Personal service was had and, when Masciarel-li failed to answer or counterclaim, respondent was on default judgment awarded possession of the equipment.
In August, 1966, petitioner Masciarelli brought the instant action. His amended complaint contained three counts. Count I alleged respondent Maco breached implied and express warranties of fitness for a specific purpose and failed to repair or replace deteriorated equipment; Count II alleged the parties subsequent to the signing of the conditional sales contract reached an oral agreement that respondent Maco would repair or replace the equipment and that petitioner Masciarelli would not be required to make the monthly installment payments until said repairs were accomplished; Count III alleged respondent’s actions were malicious and done solely to harass petitioner and, as a result, Mascia-relli was forced out of business and lost his life savings. Petitioner sought compensatory damages on all counts and punitive damages on Count III. Respondent denied each allegation and moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground all issues had been settled in the replevin action and the doctrine of estoppel by judgment or res judicata applied. The trial judge denied respondent’s motions and the case went to trial. The jury verdict and final judgment were for petitioner in the sum of $13,000 compensatory and $23,000 punitive damages.
Respondent appealed both awards. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the award of compensatory damages and held neither res judicata nor estoppel by judgment applied.2 With this conclusion we disagree. The right of possession was determined by the replevin action and the doctrine of estoppel by judgment negates re-litigation of that issue.3 Having failed to defend upon whatever ground was then available and having permitted replevin by default, petitioner may not now be heard on his proffer of an oral agreement in Count II to vary the terms of the written contract. In this respect, the decision of the District Court is quashed.
We agree with the District Court that Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., supra, defined the area within which punitive damages may be recovered and, further, that in Count III petitioner failed to allege a willful, independent tort, separate and apart from the breach of contract. We affirm the decision of the District Court reversing the judgment for punitive damages.
Accordingly, that portion of the decision of the District Court of Appeal reversing the award of punitive damages is approved and affirmed, and the part of their decision which allowed compensatory damages to stand is quashed and the cause remanded to that Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, DREW and CARLTON, JJ., concur.
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Lewis v. Barnett Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1982)…t 858. See also Grossman Holdings, Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037 (Fla.1982); Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co., 339 So. 2d 175 (Fla.1976); American International Land Corp. v. Hanna, 323 So. 2d 567 (Fla.1975); Masciarelli v. Maco Supply Corp., 224 So. 2d 329 (Fla.1969); Saltmarsh v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 344 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Country Club of Miami Corp. v. McDaniel, 310 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Associated Heavy Equipment Schools, Inc. v. Masiello, 219 So. 2d 465…
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Ferguson Transp., Inc. v. Ferguson Transp., Inc., 687 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1996)…436 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1983); Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 222 (Fla.1982); Grossman Holdings Ltd. v. Hourihan, 414 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla.1982); Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co., 339 So. 2d 175 at 177-78 (Fla.1976); Masciarelli v. Maco Supply Corp., 224 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla.1969). We do so again here. Accordingly, we approve the district court’s decision. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. . We note that the district court certified the questi…
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 340 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…pleadings and from a reading of the applicable decisions that respondent has failed to demonstrate, as is required, the existence of a willful and independent tort separate and distinct from the breach of contract. Masciarelli v. Maco Supply Corp., 224 So. 2d 329 (Fla.1969); Henry Morrison Flagler Museum v. Lee, 268 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); see World Insurance Company v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). An insuror’s bad faith refusal to settle a claim of its insured is not per se a willful…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Griffith v. Shamrock Vill., Inc., 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957)
- Seven Seas Frozen Prods. v. Fast Frozen Foods, 43 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1949)
- Avant v. Hammond Jones, Inc., 79 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1955)
- Maco Supply Corp. v. Masciarelli, 213 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Southside Atl. Bank v. Lewis, 174 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Goranson v. Maximo Moorings Marine Ctr., Inc., 204 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)