HELEN HAGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, G. T. GREEN AND P. J. BENEDETTO, APPELLEES
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This case involves an appeal from a directed verdict and an order striking a count of the plaintiff's complaint. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no error in the proceedings.
The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in striking Count II or in directing a verdict for the defendants on Count I.
“By this appeal, the appellant [plaintiff in the trial court] seeks review of an adverse final judgment entered on a directed verdict and a previous order striking a count of her amended complaint.”
This quote establishes the procedural posture of the case and what the appellant is seeking review of.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff sued the City of Miami and its police officers, alleging negligence in the operation of a vehicle and improper arrest while intoxicated.…
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By this appeal, the appellant [plaintiff in the trial court] seeks review of an adverse final judgment entered on a directed verdict and a previous order striking a count of her amended complaint.
The record reveals the following: The appellant filed an amended complaint against the appellee City and certain of its police officers, alleging in Count I thereof that the employees of the municipality negligently operated a motor vehicle while the appellant was an occupant thereof and, in Count II thereof, alleging that the employees of the municipality had arrested the appellant while she was under the influence of alcohol, *286obviously intoxicated and with impaired faculties; that she was placed in a “paddy wagon” and the appellees were liable to her for injuries sustained because of a failure to have a custodian in the rear of the “paddy wagon” and/or they failed to secure her to the seat therein. The trial judge struck Count II, and the cause came on for trial upon the allegations in Count I as to negligence.
The only evidence tendered by the appellant as to the negligent operation of the vehicle was that it made a “rough turn”. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendants. Subsequently, a final judgment was entered thereon and this appeal ensued. We affirm. See: Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, Fla.1950, 46 So.2d 173; Blackman v. Miami Transit Co., Fla.App. 1960, 125 So.2d 128; Jacksonville Coach Company v. Rivers, Fla.1962, 144 So.2d 308; 17 A.L.R.2d 1085, 1095.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Blackman v. Miami Transit Co., 125 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Jacksonville Coach Co. v. Rivers, 144 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1962)
- Swilley v. Econ. Cab Co. of Jacksonville, 46 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1950)