CHARLES EDWARDS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1968-08-13
No. 67-1085
Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and SWANN, JJ.
213 So. 2d 274 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1968) Positive Treatment
Cited by 27 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the evidence was sufficient to infer the requisite intent for petit larceny, supporting the conviction.


Facts & Procedural History

Charles Edwards was charged with breaking and entering a building with intent to commit grand larceny. The trial court reduced the charge to breaking …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Charles Edwards was charged by information with the crime of breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a felony therein, to-wit, grand larceny. He was tried by the court without a jury. At the close of the state’s case, the court granted a directed verdict reducing the charge against Edwards to breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, to-wit, petit larceny. This appeal is from his judgment of conviction on the reduced charge.

On appeal, appellant concedes that the state offered sufficient proof that he broke into and entered the building in question, and that he was properly and sufficiently identified as the individual who committed the breaking and entering.

He contends, however, that there was insufficient proof that he broke and entered the building with the intent to commit a specific crime and, therefore, his conviction must be reversed, or reduced to the lesser included crime of trespassing and remanded for a proper sentence. He relies on Fla. Stat. § 924.34, F.S.A.

In breaking and entering with the intent to commit petit larceny, there must be a proper showing by the state that the breaking and entering was with the intent to take personal property of some value. See Jones v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 285; Scott v. State, Fla.App.1962, 137 So.2d 625; and Channell v. State, Fla.App.1958, 107 So.2d 284.

Intent, being a state of mind, is not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from circumstances. Scott v. State, supra. Under the rationale of the above cited cases there was sufficient for the trier of facts to find the requisite intent to commit petit larceny.

Affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • Booker v. State, 397 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1981)
    …v. State, 44 Fla. 466, 32 So. 954 (1902). See also Guerrero v. State, 289 So. 2d 396 (Fla.1974); conformed to 291 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Intent, being a state of mind, must in most cases be inferred from the circumstances. Edwards v. State, 213 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 221 So. 2d 746 (Fla.1968). The circumstances in the case sub judice are open to only one reasonable interpretation, i.e., that the defendant entered the structure with intent to commit a larceny therein. The jury so conc…
  • State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
    …ntial element of the offense charged. It is not usually the subject of direct proof. It is inferred from the acts of the parties and from the surrounding circumstances. Williams v. State, Fla.App.1970, 239 So. 2d 127; Edwards v. State, Fla.App.1968, 213 So. 2d 274; Groneau v. State, Fla.App.1967, 201 So. 2d 599; Jones v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So. 2d 285; Scott v. State, Fla.App.1962, 137 So. 2d 625. Being a state of mind, intent is usually a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. The trie…
  • Williams v. State, 239 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
    …the ambit of Everett’s authorization. Appellant’s second point is his contention that the state failed to prove felonious intent. Intent, being a state of mind, must in most cases be inferred from the circumstances, Edwards v. State, Fla.App.1968, 213 So. 2d 274. We find sufficient competent evidence in this case to support the finding of felonious intent implicit in the jury’s verdict. The judgment and sentence appealed from are affirmed. WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur. . In this case the state proceeded…

Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw