STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GERALD L. WEST, APPELLEE
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The State appeals from a trial court's dismissal of a charge for possessing counterfeit currency under Florida law. The court reversed the dismissal, holding that intent is a factual question for the jury to determine and that summary judgment was improper because the undisputed facts did not eliminate the need for fact-finding on the defendant's intent.
The court held that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment because intent is an essential element of the statutory offense that must be proven, and intent is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine based on witness credibility and demeanor, not for the trial court to resolve in a summary judgment proceeding.
[1] The intent of the accused is an essential element of the offense of bringing forged bills into the state.
[2] Intent, as an element of a crime, is typically inferred from the acts of the parties and surrounding circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A reading of this statute reveals that the act prohibited must be accomplished with intent. The intent of the accused is an essential element of the offense charged.”
Establishes that intent is a required statutory element that must be proven for conviction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGerald L. West was charged with possession of a false, forged, or counterfeit note in violation of Florida Statute § 831.11. The parties stipulated th…
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The State of Florida appeals from an order of dismissal entered by the trial court pursuant to Rule 1.190(c) (4), Fla. R.Crim.P., 33 F.S.A. That order was entered on motion of appellee that there were no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt. Appellee was charged with possession of a false, forged or counterfeit note in violation of Florida Statute § 831.-11, F.S.A., which provides:
“Bringing into the state forged hank bills. Whoever brings into this state or has in his possession a false, forged or counterfeit bill or note in the similitude of the bills or notes payable to the bearer thereof or to the order of any person issued by or for any bank or banking company established in this state, or within the United States, or any foreign province, state or government, with intent to utter and pass the same or to render the same current as true, knowing the same to be false, forged or counterfeit, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years, or in the county jail not exceeding twelve months, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.” (Emphasis added.)
It was agreed by the attorneys for each party for the purposes of the motion that a single, counterfeit ten-dollar-bill was passed by Gerald L. West to an undercover agent. It was further agreed that the counterfeit bill was known by the agent to be a counterfeit bill and that it was stated by West to be a sample and that he could *458get several thousand dollars in such counterfeit money.
A reading of this statute reveals that the act prohibited must be accomplished with intent. The intent of the accused is an essential element of the offense charged. It is not usually the subject of direct proof. It is inferred from the acts of the parties and from the surrounding circumstances. Williams v. State, Fla.App.1970, 239 So.2d 127; Edwards v. State, Fla.App.1968, 213 So.2d 274; Groneau v. State, Fla.App.1967, 201 So.2d 599; Jones v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 285; Scott v. State, Fla.App.1962, 137 So.2d 625.
Being a state of mind, intent is usually a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. The trier of fact has the opportunity to observe the witnesses. From that observation, the trier of fact may determine the believability of that witness and the weight to be given his testimony. The demeanor of the witness, his frankness, or lack of frankness, his intelligence, his interest in the outcome of the case, and the reasonableness of the testimony presented, in the light of all the evidence in the case, are but a few of those factors which may play a part in making that determination.
The summary judgment procedure provided for by Rule 1.190(c) (4), Fla.R.Crim.P., is not as frequently encountered as a summary judgment proceeding in civil litigation. It has been held, and it is generally accepted, that summary judgments should be entered with caution. Champion Map Corporation v. Chamco, Incorporated, Fla.App.1970, 235 So.2d 50; Meigs v. Lear, Fla.App.1968, 210 So.2d 479.
The trial court may not try or determine factual issues in a summary judgment proceeding; nor consider either the weight of the conflicting evidence or the credibility of the witnesses in determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material facts; nor substitute itself for the trier of the fact and determine controverted issues of fact. Coquina Ridge Properties v. East West Company, Fla.App.1971, 255 So.2d 279; Strode v. Southern Steel Construction Company, Fla.App.1966, 188 So.2d 690; Baskin v. Griffith, Fla.App.1961, 127 So.2d 467; Willard Homes, Inc. v. Sanders, Fla.App.1961, 127 So.2d 696; Humphrys v. Jarrell, Fla.App.1958, 104 So.2d 404; Jones v. Stoutenburgh, Fla.1956, 91 So.2d 299.
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the trial court should not have entered the order of dismissal. The matter should be disposed of by appropriate proceedings before the trier of the fact.
Therefore, the order of dismissal is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
WALDEN, J., concurs.
CROSS, J., concurs in conclusion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (33 total)
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State v. J. T. S. and G. R. W., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…nt is usually inferred from the acts of the parties ánd the surrounding circumstances; being a state of mind, intent is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact, who has the opportunity to observe all of the witnesses. State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). A proceeding under Rule 3.190(c)(4) is the equivalent of a civil summary judgment proceeding, and as stated in State v. West, supra at 458: The trial court may not try or determine factual issues in a summary judgment proceedi…
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State v. Hunwick, 446 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…)(4) motions should be granted rarely, for in most cases there are factual disputes that are properly to be resolved by the jury. State v. Carroll, 404 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Jones v. State, 392 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). On a motion to dismiss, the state is entitled to a construction most favorable to it; all inferences are resolved against the defendant. State v. Green, 400 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.…1 / 2
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State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…nsidering a “(c)(4)” motion, the trial judge may not try or determine factual issues nor consider the weight of conflicting evidence or the credibility of witnesses in determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). If material factual allegations of a (c)(4) motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, denial of the motion to dismiss is mandatory. Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.190(d); State v. Cook, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); cert. dismissed, 35…
Previewing 3 of 33 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Humphrys v. Jarrell, 104 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956)
- Esaw Jones v. State, 192 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Groneau v. State, 201 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- Norris F. Baskin and Ola G. Baskin v. Griffith, 127 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Coquina Ridge Props. v. E. W. Co., 255 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Williams v. State, 239 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Scott v. State, 137 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Edwards v. State, 213 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Willard Homes, Inc. v. Ola Sanders, Jr., 127 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)