WHITE
v.
MARYLAND
Justice Marshall,
with whom Justice Brennan joins,
dissenting.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence imposed here.
The petitioner was sentenced pursuant to a statute that requires that a death sentence be imposed whenever the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 413(h) (1982). The statute leaves no room for the jury to consider whether death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. For the reasons I stated earlier this Term in Stebbing v. Maryland, 469 U. S. 900 (1984) (dissenting from denial of certiorari), I believe that such a statute is unconstitutional. The question presented here, which is also presented by other state statutes, is clearly worthy of this Court’s attention. See, e. g., Maxwell v. Pennsylvania, 469 U. S. 971 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U. S. 1056 (1982) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). I therefore dissent from the Court’s refusal to hear this case.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
-
United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1986)…ements complained of were false, defendants must have known them to be false and they must have intended to defraud in order to be found guilty. Id. at 76-77 (citation omitted). In United States v. Stull, 743 F. 2d 439 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 84 L.Ed.2d 838 (1985), we expressly held that the following jury instruction defining false or fraudulent statements “conformed to the prevailing legal standard”: A statement or representation is false or fraudulent if the maker of…
-
United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114 (8th Cir. 1990)…es, knowledge of the essential nature of the alleged fraud is a component of the intent to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Sedovic, 679 F. 2d 1233, 1238-39 (8th Cir.1982); United States v. Stull, 743 F. 2d 439, 442 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 84 L.Ed.2d 838 (1985); United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F. 2d 531, 537 (3d Cir.1978). The only decision directly addressing the meaning of § 333(a)(2)’s intent requirement adheres to this basic principle. See United States v., Indus…
-
United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1987)…l contention is that he was denied a fair trial because of his joinder with the other codefendants. As a general rule, persons jointly indicted should be tried together. See United States v. Stull, 743 F. 2d 439, 446-47 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 84 L.Ed.2d 838 (1985). When a defendant seeks severance, he has a heavy burden of showing specific and compelling prejudice, and denial of severance will be overruled on appeal only for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (U.S. 1976)
- Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1972)
- Price v. Pittsburgh Terminal Corp., 459 U.S. 1056 (U.S. 1982)
- Double H Plastics, Inc. v. Sonoco Prods. Co., 469 U.S. 900 (U.S. 1984)
- Maxwell v. Pennsylvania, 469 U.S. 971 (U.S. 1984)