NATIONAL WESTERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION, AND ROBERT L. MOODY, APPELLANTS,
v.
DAVID W. WALTERS, EDWARD N. MOORE, AND SARINO R. COSTANZO, CO-PARTNERS, D/B/A WALTERS, MOORE & COSTANZO, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1968-12-10
No. 68-528
Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.
216 So. 2d 485 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1968) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

National Western Life Insurance and Robert Moody appealed an order granting a new trial in a quantum meruit action for attorneys' fees. The trial court erroneously believed that merely invoking attorney-client privilege established an attorney-client relationship warranting fee recovery, but Florida law recognizes that privilege may exist without an enforceable fee obligation.


Holding

The invocation of attorney-client privilege does not automatically establish an attorney-client relationship warranting fee recovery. While privilege may attach to communications when a person consults an attorney with a view to employing him professionally, the existence of privilege does not necessarily create a contractual relationship obligating fee payment.


Key Quotes

“Not every contact with an attorney by a prospective client will result in an attorney-client relationship, warranting the recovery of the fee, although the relationship may be such as to permit the client to invoke the privilege of attorney-client to prevent the attorney from disclosing what has been revealed to him.”

Establishes the distinction between privilege and fee obligation; privilege can exist without a compensable attorney-client relationship.

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Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiffs (appellees) brought suit seeking recovery of attorneys' fees on a quantum meruit basis. The case proceeded to jury trial, which resulted in…

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Opinion of the Court
BARKDULL, Judge.

BARKDULL, Judge.

Appellees [plaintiffs] brought a suit in the trial court seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees, alleging a quantum meruit cause of action. The cause proceeded to a jury trial and resulted in a verdict for the defendants. Thereafter, the trial judge granted a new trial upon one ground, as follows:

* * *
“ * * * that it erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability after the defendants stipulated that they had used the attorney-client privilege to prevent the testimony of one of the plaintiffs in another cause, thereby admitting that the plaintiffs were their attorneys, * * *”
The appellants, who had prevailed in the jury verdict, appeal this order and urge error in its entry. -

Ordinarily, a trial judge is given a very broad discretion in granting a new trial. Cloud v. Fallis, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d 669; Spearman Distributing Company v. Boyette, Fla.App.1968, 205 So.2d 690; Volk v. Goetz, Fla.App.1967, 206 So.2d 250. And, it takes a stronger showing to upset an order granting a new trial than it does an order denying a new trial. Pyms v. Meranda, Fla.1957, 98 So.2d 341; Pemberton v. Keel, Fla.App.1967, 195 So.2d 632; Miles v. Ware, Fla.App.1967, 204 So.2d 524, 525. However, when it is apparent from the ground stated in granting a new trial1 that the trial judge is acting under an erroneous legal assumption, then it is not a question of discretion but a question of the legal sufficiency of the ground or reason given. Ewing v. Miller, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 889; Nabelski v. Turner, Fla.App.1965, 173 So.2d 729; Boutwell v. Bishop, Fla.App.1967, 194 So.2d 3; Florida Power Corporation v. Smith, Fla.App.1967, 202 So.2d 872.

It is apparent from the order and the record that the trial judge was of the view that the mere invoking of an attorney-client privilege established the right of an attorney to recover a fee. This is not the law. Not every contact with an attorney by a prospective client will result in an attorney-client relationship, warranting the recovery of the fee, although the relationship may be such as to permit the client to invoke the privilege of attorney-client to prevent the attorney from disclosing what has been revealed to him. Keir v. State, 152 Fla. 389, 11 So.2d 886; In Re Dupont’s Estate, 60 Cal.App.2d 276, 140 P.2d 866; Taylor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892; Evans v. State, 5 Okl.Cr.R. 643, 115 P. 809, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 577; 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3 Ed.), 587, § 2304. The following is found in the opinion In Re Dupont’s Estate, supra:

“It is the almost universal rule in common-law jurisdictions that Where a person consults an attorney with a view to employing him professionally, any information acquired by the attorney in the course of interviews or negotiations looking toward such employment is privileged and cannot be disclosed, even though no actual employment of the attorney as such follows, and notwithstanding the attorney may be afterward employed by the adversary of the person who made such communication.’ 70 C.J. 406; 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd *487Ed. (1940) sec. 2304, pp. 587, 588; 5 Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence (1916) sec. 3682, p. 5266; cases collected in notes in 21 Ann.Cas. 217; Ann.Cas. 1913A, 30; and 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 578, 579.”

Therefore, for the reasons stated the order here under review be and the same is hereby reversed, with directions to enter a final judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the appellants [defendants in the trial court].

Reversed and remanded with directions.


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Citator

Cited By

  • City OF Hollywood v. Jarkesy, 343 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
    …n granting a new trial that the trial judge is acting under an erroneous legal assumption, then it is not a question of discretion but a question of the legal sufficiency of the ground or reason given. National Western Life Insurance Co. v. Walters, 216 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). There are a number of grounds on which a trial court may grant a new trial. However, a new trial should only be granted after an examination of the entire case and it being made to appear that there has been a misdirection of th…
  • Bishop v. Watson, 367 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …he propriety of the granting of the new trial is one of law, and relates to the legal sufficiency of the ground or reason for granting the new trial. Boutwell v. Bishop, 194 So. 2d 3, 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); National Western Life Ins. Co. v. Watters, 216 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); City of Hollywood v. Jarkesy, 343 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). This case was decided by a jury on conflicting evidence, and there is no contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The statements of d…
  • LA Reina Pharmacy, Inc. v. Lopez, 453 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …ist Hospital of Miami, Inc., 454 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); cf., e.g., Bishop v. Watson, 367 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (new trial order based on legally insufficient or incorrect grounds reversed); National Western Life Ins. Co. v. Walters, 216 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (same).5 And we find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s conclusion, which he is uniquely qualified to render as the judicial officer on the scene that the effect of that inflammatory influence was so great that a new tria…

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