TAMORA G. NOYES, APPELLANT,
v.
WALTER L. COOPER, APPELLEE
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Noyes appealed an order denying her attempt to garnish her former husband Cooper's salary to enforce a judgment for past-due alimony. The court held that a final judgment reducing past-due sums to judgment does not qualify as an order for alimony or support under the special garnishment statute, and therefore the former wife must proceed under general garnishment law.
The court held that a final judgment for past-due sums does not come within the character of an order to enforce alimony, suit money, or support under the statute, and therefore the former wife cannot garnish under the special statute and must instead proceed under general garnishment law, which may be subject to the head-of-family exemption.
“This statute is designed to afford a procedure for the enforcement of orders for alimony, suit money or support or other orders in actions for divorce or alimony; and it eliminates the statutory exemption that may be claimed when the money is due the head of a family residing in Florida for his personal labor or service.”
Establishes the purpose and scope of the special garnishment statute for divorce-related orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCooper owed his former wife, Noyes, past-due sums pursuant to a divorce decree. After a final judgment was entered reducing these past-due amounts to …
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In this case, the Circuit Court rendered a “final decree” which, inter alia, reduced to judgment certain past-due sums which the former husband, Cooper, owed his former wife, Noyes. Cf. Howell v. Howell, Fla.App.1968, 207 So.2d 507.
After final judgment, Noyes sought to garnish her former husband’s salary. The garnishment affidavit filed by her is entitled “Garnishment After Judgment.” See Fla.Stat. Chapter 77, F.S.A. Later, however, she filed a motion claiming generally that she was attempting to proceed under the authority of Fla.Stat. § 65.13 (1965), now Fla.Stat. § 61.12 (1967), F.S.A. The former husband claimed exemption as head of a family residing in Florida. See Fla.Stat. § 222.11, F.S.A. The trial judge entered an order providing that the former wife could not garnish her former husband’s salary under Fla.Stat. § 65.13.
The former wife, Noyes, has appealed from that order.
Fla.Stat. § 61.12 (1967), F.S.A., which is substantially the same as Fla.Stat. § 65.13 (1965) in this regard, provides in pertinent part as follows:
“So much as the court orders of the money or other things due to1 any person or public officer, state or county, whether the head of a family residing in this state or not when the money or other thing is due for the personal labor or service of the person or otherwise, is subject to attachment or garnishment to enforce the orders of the courts of this state for alimony, suit money or support, or other orders in actions for divorce or alimony, * * * ” [Emphasis added.]
* 5fi ifc 5j< ‡
This statute is designed to afford a procedure for the enforcement of orders for alimony, suit money or support or other orders in actions for divorce or alimony; and it eliminates the statutory exemption that may be claimed when the money is due the head of a family residing in Florida for his personal labor or service. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 113 Fla. 361, 152 So. 200 (1933), 10 Fla.Jur. Divorce § 224.
We are not convinced that the final judgment obtained by the former wife comes within the character of an order to enforce the decree of a court of this state for alimony, suit money or support, or other orders or decrees made by a Florida Court in a suit for divorce or alimony.
The former wife cannot prevail under the provisions of Fla.Stat. § 65.13 (now § 61.12), F.S.A.; and is governed by the general law relative to garnishment after judgment. See Robinson v. Robinson, 154 Fla. 464, 18 So.2d 29 (1944), 3 Fla.Jur. Attachment and Garnishment § 23.
*801There may also be equitable reasons which justify a court in refusing to issue process to enforce payment of arrears. Haas v. Haas, Fla.1952, 59 So.2d 640; Van Loon v. Van Loon, 132 Fla. 535, 182 So. 205 (1938).
Accordingly, the final order herein appealed is
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hall v. AIR Force Fin. Ctr., 344 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)…dure to follow in attempting to enforce dissolution of marriage judgments. Some have refused to allow a writ of garnishment to issue unless an order had first been entered to enforce a previously entered judgment of dissolution. In Noyes v. Cooper, 216 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1968) a “final decree” was entered reducing to judgment certain past due sums owed to the former wife from the husband under a divorce decree previously entered. The wife first brought an action to garnish the husband’s wages, then fil…
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Clemons v. Morris, 350 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…judgments. We like the First District Court of Appeal in Hall, supra, hold that Section 61.12, Florida Statutes (1975), applies to judgments for alimony, suit money and child support, as well as orders for the same. Appellant cites Noyes v. Cooper, 216 So. 2d 799 (Fla.3d DCA 1968), as authority but we have considered De Castro v. De Castro, 334 So. 2d 834 (Fla.3rd DCA 1976), as limiting that holding because the court somehow determined Noyes v. Cooper, supra, had to do with sums due under a property settleme…
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Gertrude R. Healey v. Toolan, 227 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)…due to any person who is the head of a family residing in this state, when the money or other thing is due for the personal labor or services of such person. . Reynolds v. Reynolds, 1933, 113 Fla. 361, 152 So. 200. . Noyes v. Cooper, Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 799; cf. Howell v. Howell, Fla.App. 1968, 207 So. 2d 507.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Van Loon v. Van Loon, 132 Fla. 535 (Fla. 1938)
- Howell v. Howell, 207 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Robinson v. Robinson, 154 Fla. 464 (Fla. 1944)
- Reynolds v. Cassie C. Reynolds, 113 Fla. 361 (Fla. 1933)