JACK D. BAILEY AND PATRICIA JEAN BAILEY, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Bailey appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their fire insurance claim against Allstate. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order lacked the requisite language to constitute a final, appealable judgment on the substantive issues.
The court held that the trial court's order was not a final, appealable judgment on the substantive issues because it lacked the traditional language required for such a judgment (e.g., that plaintiffs 'take nothing by their suit'). The award of costs, while potentially final, is ancillary to the substantive claims and does not render the order appealable.
“the words, " * * * defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted", and " * * * plaintiffs' action be and the same is hereby dismissed * * * " (though without prejudice to commence a timely action based on unmatured issues) are not the equivalent of the required traditional words that the plaintiffs " * * * take nothing by [their] suit and that the defendant go hence without day."”
Establishes that non-traditional judgment language is insufficient for appealability
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJack and Patricia Bailey brought suit on a fire insurance policy issued by Allstate for their dwelling. The defendant moved for summary judgment, and …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Final Appealable Order cases and more on FLexlaw
Plaintiffs-appellants brought suit on a fire insurance policy issued on their dwelling by appellee. Several issues were joined by the pleadings, and defendant moved for a summary judgment. After argument the trial court entered an order, designated “Summary Judgment”, in which he made certain prefatory findings clearly adverse to plaintiffs-appellants on several issues, and further found, as to the remaining issues, that plaintiffs’ action was premature. He concluded his order as follows:
“ * * * It is therefore,
Ordered and Adjudged as follows:
1.That defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted.
2. That plaintiffs’ action be and the same is hereby dismissed, without prejudice, however, to plaintiffs’ right to commence an action timely [on the unma-tured issues] as they may desire.
3. That' defendant have judgment of and from plaintiffs for its costs in this behalf expended for which let execution issue.”
Appellee has not raised the question as to whether the foregoing order is an appealable final order or judgment. We have held, however, that we must raise it suci sponte. 1
The words, “ * * * defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted”, and “ * * * plaintiffs’ action be and the same is hereby dismissed * * * ” (though without prejudice to commence a timely action based on unmatured issues) are not the equivalent of the required traditional words that the plaintiffs “ * * * take nothing by [their] suit and that the defendant go hence without day.”, or words of like import.2
Appellant suggested on oral argument, when queried by the Court as to the appeal-ability of the “Summary Judgment” in question, that the last sentence therein, i. e. “That defendant have judgment’ of and from plaintiffs for its costs in this behalf expended for which let execution ‘issue.’’, makes the “Judgment” a final one. Whatever validity this argument has, it bears solely on the taxation of costs, which is ancillary to the substantive issues of the law suit.3 Orders or judgments taxing costs are reviewable only in limited situations, none of which apply here.4
*763In any event, regardless of the finality of the defendant’s judgment for costs, we hold that there is no appealable final judgment in favor of defendant on the substantive issues raised by plaintiffs’ complaint. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
PIERCE, Acting C. J., and MANN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
McCREADY v. The Villas Apts., 379 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…An order simply granting a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not an order that can be appealed. Pompano Paint Co. v. Pompano Beach Bank and Trust Co., 208 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Bailey v. Allstate Insurance Company, 218 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1969); Renard v. Kirkeby Hotels, Inc., 99 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1958); Haddad, Partial ‘Final’ Judgments, 53 Fla.B.J. 204 (Oct.1979). Thus we must dismiss this appeal. APPEAL DISMISSED, sua sponte. CROSS, J., and McDONALD, PARKER…
-
Newmeyer v. Se. Mortg. Co., 546 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…PER CURIAM. As the order under review is an order granting summary judgment, but does not constitute a final judgment, the appeal is dismissed. Shupack v. Allstate Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Bailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); Renard v. Kirkeby Hotels, 99 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); Fla.R.Civ.P. Form 1.994; see also McCready v. Villas Apartments, 379 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).…
-
Palardy v. Vladimar Igrec, 388 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…udgment but fails to contain the traditional words of a final judgment or their equivalent is a non-final order not subject to interlocutory appeal. McCready v. Villas Apartments, 379 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Bailey v. Allstate Insurance Co., 218 So. 2d 761 (Fla.2d DCA 1969); Pompano Paint Co. v. Pompano Beach Bank and Trust Co., 208 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Williams v. Maddren, 147 So. 2d 572 (Fla.2d DCA 1962). We find further support for this conclusion in the language of the order itself. Its…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- The State of Fla. ex rel. Royal Ins. Co. v. Burton Barrs, 87 Fla. 168 (Fla. 1924)
- Emory Catchings v. Florida-McCracken Concrete Pipe Co., 101 Fla. 792 (Fla. 1931)
- Renard v. Kirkeby Hotels, Inc., 99 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Craft v. Marcel Clarembeaux, 162 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Holland H. Chastain v. Embry, 118 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Goldfarb v. Bronston, 154 Fla. 180 (Fla. 1944)
- Junior Boggs v. State, 154 Fla. 180 (Fla. 1944)
- Peaslee v. Michalski, 167 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Strazzulla v. Hinson, 113 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)