BEN PARKER, PETITIONER,
v.
RINKER MATERIALS CORPORATION, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

Fla. | 1969-04-23
No. 37963
ERVIN, C. J., ROBERTS, DREW and CARLTON, JJ., and RAWLS, District Judge, concur.
222 So. 2d 203 Florida Supreme Court (1969)

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court reversed a District Court of Appeal decision that dismissed Parker's appeal for failure to pay costs before appealing. The Court held that when an appellant assigns costs as error, he need not pay them before appealing if he posts a supersedeas bond or pays all costs once they are finally settled.


Holding

An appellant who assigns cost taxation as error need not pay costs before appealing. Instead, the appellant has 110 days from filing the notice of appeal to post a supersedeas bond, or alternatively, may pay all costs within ten days after they are finally settled. Here, Parker paid all costs within three days after the final cost assessment, satisfying the rule.


Key Quotes

“Petitioner assigned as error the taxation of costs. We held in Nolan, supra, that appellant had 110 days from the filing of the notice of appeal to post super-sedeas; and here, instead of posting super-sedeas, he paid the costs within said period of time.”

Establishes the holding that an appellant who challenges cost taxation has 110 days to either post supersedeas or pay costs, and may satisfy the requirement by paying costs within that period.

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Facts & Procedural History

Parker sued Vassalotti, Rinker Materials, and Haynes Painting & Decorating, Inc. Final judgments were entered against Parker with costs assessed on Ap…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

By petition for writ of certiorari, Parker contends that an order of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, rendered September 30, 1968, (petition for rehearing denied October 17, 1968) dismissing his appeal for failure to pay costs, conflicts with the decisions of this Court in. Nolan v. Eshleman1 and Johanson v. Insua.2 We agree.

The question presented involves construction of Florida Appellate Rule 3.2, subd. f., 1967, 32 F.S.A.,3 which has since *204been substantially changed; therefore, no useful purpose will be served by rendering an extensive opinion. Parker instituted this action against one Vassalotti, Rinker Materials, and Haynes Painting & Decorating, Inc. Subsequently the following material events transpired: 1

April 9, 1968: Final judgment in favor of Rinker was rendered with costs being taxed against petitioner-plaintiff in the sum of $35.00.
April 15, 1968: Final judgment in favor of Vassalotti was entered with recitation that: “Costs to be assessed upon appropriate motion in the future.”
April 22, 1968: Final judgment in favor of Haynes Painting & Decorating, Inc. was entered with costs being assessed against petitioner-plaintiff in the sum of $35.00.
May 29, 1968: Motion for new trial was denied.
July 29, 1968: Petitioner filed Notice of Appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, and assigned as error the taxation of costs.
September 3, 1968: Costs against petitioner-plaintiff were assessed in favor of Vassalotti in the sum of $263.22.
September 6, 1968: Petitioner paid all costs assessed.

Apparently the District Court of Appeal concluded that failure to pay the first two cost judgments precluded maintenance of the appeal. Such conclusion is erroneous. Petitioner assigned as error the taxation of costs. We held in Nolan, supra, that appellant had 110 days from the filing of the notice of appeal to post super-sedeas ; and here, instead of posting super-sedeas, he paid the costs within said period of time. Further, that portion of the rule pertaining to settlement of costs refers to all costs assessed, and as set out in the foregoing list of events, petitioner paid all the costs within three days after the total costs were settled.

The order of the District Court is quashed, with directions to reinstate the appeal.

ERVIN, C. J., ROBERTS, DREW and CARLTON, JJ., and RAWLS, District Judge, concur.


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