CLAUDE R. KIRK, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, PETITIONER,

v.

PAUL BAKER, JUDGE OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF RECORD OF DADE COUNTY, AND JAMES LAWRENCE KING, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENTS

PER CURIAM:

We consider an original proceeding in which Governor Kirk seeks a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition or “such other relief as may be available” against the respondents.

We are confronted by problems related to our own jurisdiction, as well as a contest between executive and judicial authority in the circumstances which we relate.

Out of the welter of confusion generated by charges and counter-charges, often unsupported by any record here, certain acceptable facts emerge.

Honorable Claude R. Kirk, Jr., is Governor of Florida. Honorable Paul Baker is the elected Judge of the Dade County Criminal Court of Record. Honorable James *312Lawrence King is one of the twenty-two elected Judges of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. Honorable Richard E. Gerstein is the elected State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.

There was pending before Judge Baker, Criminal Case No. 69-1580, in which one Max Diamond was charged with perjury for giving false testimony before a grand jury to the effect that State Attorney Ger-stein participated in a meeting involving a fifteen hundred ($1500.00) dollar bribe. On February 17, 1969, Diamond’s attorney filed a motion in the case asking Judge Baker to disqualify Mr. Gerstein and all of his assistants in the prosecution of Diamond. He also asked the Judge to join in a request to Governor Kirk to order an exchange of state attorneys with another circuit so that someone other than Gerstein would be there to prosecute the man accused of the perjury against Gerstein.

On February 25, 1969, Judge Baker entered an order holding Mr. Gerstein disqualified in the Diamond prosecution but expressing the view that he should not attempt to influence the Chief Executive by joining in a request to him as suggested by the defense attorney. Instead, Judge Baker, acting on his own motion and under Fla.Stat. § 32.17 (1967), F.S.A.1 appointed Honorable Hilton R. Carr, Jr., a member of the Miami Bar, as an acting State Attorney to prosecute Diamond.2

*313Then, on March 4, 1969, Governor Kirk, acting under Fla.Stat. § 27.14 (1967), F.S. A.,3 transferred Honorable Gordon G. Old-ham, State Attorney for the Fifth Circuit to the Eleventh Circuit “to discharge all the duties of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit including but not limited to the prosecution of the aforementioned [Diamond] cases and the presentation of matters before the Grand Jury * * The Governor at the same time transferred Mr. Gerstein to the Fifth Circuit “to discharge all of the duties of the State Attorney * * * until the aforesaid cases mentioned [Diamond] are entirely disposed of * * *.”4 (e. s.) In *314other words, the two State Attorneys, elected by their separate circuits, were exchanged for an indefinite period depending on the exigencies of the total disposition *315of stated criminal cases. They were not transferred merely to enable Mr. Oldham to handle those cases. They were exchanged for an indefinite period contingent upon the ultimate duration of those cases. The Governor stated that the transfer was made to accomplish the orderly disposition of the cases mentioned and “for other good and sufficient reasons made known to me,” adding, “I think the ends of justice would best be subserved by exchanging the attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, until the aforementioned cases are entirely disposed of. * * * ”

On March 4, 1969, the same day the Governor entered the above Executive Order, Judge Baker entered another order5 *316purporting to declare the Governor’s order “void as a matter of law.”

To add further complications, on March 5, 1969, Honorable Earl Faircloth, as Attorney General of Florida, filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Dade County to determine the proper State Attorney to prosecute cases in that Court and to advise the grand jury. Alternatively, he asked for a Declaratory Judgment under Fla.Stat. ch. 86, F.S.A. Defendants named were Governor Kirk, Mr. Gerstein and Mr. Old-ham. The case was assigned to respondent, Honorable James Lawrence King, one of the judges of said Circuit Court. On March 5, 1969, Judge King entered a constitutional writ to remain effective until further order. Judge King enjoined the Governor from suspending or removing Gerstein for failure to obey the transfer order of March 4, 1969, and enjoined all parties from doing any act which would impair the court’s jurisdiction over the parties.

On March 7, 1969, Governor Kirk filed the proceeding now before us. His prayer is that we prohibit Judge Baker from exercising any jurisdiction to enforce his own order of March 4, 1969, invalidating the Governor’s transfer order; that a writ of mandamus be issued requiring Judge Baker to vacate his said order of March 4, 1969; that Judge King be prohibited from proceeding further in the suit filed by the Attorney General and that Judge King be required to vacate the constitutional stay writ.

As to Judge Paul Baker

(a) Prohibition.

We take jurisdiction of the petition for prohibition against Judge Baker, pursuant to the provisions of Art. V, Section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution which vests jurisdiction here to issue writs of this nature in all cases where “questions are involved upon which a direct appeal to the supreme court is allowed * * Under the same article, appeals may be prosecuted to this Court from final judgments “construing a controlling provision of the Florida * * * constitution.”

The decision of Judge Baker, under our decisions, constitutes a construction of Article II, Section 3, and Article IV, Section 1(a). Harrell’s Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So.2d 439 (Fla.1959). Judge Baker asserts that under Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 106 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1958), the judgment did not undertake “to explain, define or otherwise eliminate existing doubts arising from the language or terms of the constitutional provision,” and that therefore we were without jurisdiction. So far as the quoted language from Armstrong is concerned, in a later case, Board of County Commissioners v. Boswell, 167 So.2d 866 (Fla.1964), we said in footnote 3:

“The review by appeal in Dade County, et al., v. Mercury Radio Service, Inc., Fla.1961, 134 So.2d 791, appears to be ample authority on the jurisdictional issue. In that case, as in this, the conclusion of the trial court (that the ordinance was invalid) rested simply upon a reference to that provision of the home rule amendment which preserves the superiority of state statutes. This and other decisions have to that extent qualified the earlier requirement in Armstrong v. City of Tampa, Fla.1958, 106 So.2d 407, that the decree undertake to explain or define the constitutional language.”

In an opinion since Boswell, we referred to Armstrong as authority on this question *317[Callendar v. State, 181 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1966)]. But insofar as this particular point is concerned, Armstrong is no longer controlling.

The Governor is vested with Supreme Executive power under the Constitution — Article IV, Section 1(a). It is his duty under this article to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” The statute, Fla.Stat. § 27.14 (1967), F.S.A., implements this power and is clearly within the power of the Legislature to enact— Stone v. State, 71 Fla. 514, 71 So. 634 (1916); also see Johns v. State, 144 Fla. 256, 197 So. 791 (1940); and Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939). The exercise of the power and the performance of the duty under the Constitution and this statute is clearly essential to the orderly conduct of government and the execution of the laws of this State. The essential portions of the order of transfer of March 4th are clearly within the provisions of the statute and constitute a lawful exercise of the Supreme Executive power of this State by the Governor. Such executive order insofar as it orders the transfer of States Attorney Oldham to the 11th Circuit and orders States Attorney Gerstein to the Fifth Circuit for the periods therein mentioned is beyond question by the Court. State ex rel. Bisbee v. Drew, 17 Fla. 67 (1879). In this case we held that such an order is exclusively within the orbit of authority of the Chief Executive when exercised within t.he bounds of the statute. That portion of such executive order with reference to the competency of Daniel S. Pearson, and that portion of such executive order purporting to authorize States Attorney Oldham to prosecute cases involved in the order of Judge Baker of February 25th (Cf. In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 213 So.2d 716 (Fla.1968) is clearly beyond any authority given the Governor under the statute and is void. The order exchanging Oldham for Gerstein in nowise vitiates the order of Judge Baker appointing Hilton Carr, who has exclusive authority to prosecute the cases involved.

We conclude, therefore, that subject to the reservations above, the executive order of transfer of March 4 of Governor Kirk is valid, and that such executive order supersedes and renders nugatory and of no effect the previous executive order of January 13, 1969, assigning Russell B. Clarke to said eleventh judicial circuit in connection with a special investigation and the previous executive order of February 24, 1969, assigning Zell Davis, Jr., States Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit and Joel T. Daves, III, Assistant States Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, to investigate organized crime and the conduct of public officials which may constitute a violation of the criminal laws of this State, and vests exclusively in Oldham all the powers of the States Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida for the period of time named in such executive order; that the order of Judge Baker of March 4th constitutes an exercise of authority not possessed by him and that such order is hereby held null and void, frustrate and of no effect. In view of this holding we deem it unnecessary at this time to enter any coercive order relating to the same. Moreover, in view of this disposition of this question, we find no useful purpose to be served by discussing the question raised by the Governor as to the proper procedure for testing the authority of an assigned States Attorney.

We now direct our attention to Judge Baker’s order of the 25th of February. This order was entered pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 32.17 (1967), F.S.A., supra. While the statute refers to the appointment of an acting County Solicitor, we hold the statute in this instance is clearly applicable to the appointment of an acting States Attorney, for in Dade County the office of County Solicitor no longer exists- — such duties having been taken over by the States Attorney. Moreover, it is a universally accepted principle of law that such power of appointment is an inherent power of a court possessing criminal jurisdiction. No statute is necessary to the exercise of such *318inherent power. King v. State, 43 Fla. 211, 31 So. 254 (Fla.1901); White v. Polk County, 17 Iowa 413; Dukes v. State, 11 Indiana 557, 71 Am.Dec. 370; Keithler v. State, 10 Smedes & M. 192; Tesh v. Com., 4 Dana 522; State v. Johnson, 12 Tex. 231; State v. Gonzales, 26 Tex. 197.

We see no conflict between the order of Judge Baker of February 25 and the Governor’s Executive Order of March 4. The Governor’s power to transfer a States Attorney is entirely compatible with the Judges power to appoint an acting prosecutor where circumstances exist requiring such appointment. Due regard by the Executive and Judicial Branches of the powers and duties of the other in such instances will effectively preserve the power and authority of both.

The order of Judge Baker of the 25th of February is approved.

As to Judge King.

The Attorney General’s suit is filed pursuant to the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Statute, Chapter 86, F.S.A. The prayer is inter alia, that Judge King “determine the validity of the executive order of March 4, 1969, and Section 27.14 [Fla. Stat, F.S.A.], in the light of the constitutional provisions of Article V of the Constitution * * * and to determine who presently is the proper individual as between the defendants RICHARD E. GER-STEIN and GORDON E. OLDHAM to serve as State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit * *

Our decision here disposes of all material questions presented in the Attorney General’s suit. Passing on the question of our jurisdiction at this time appears to be unnecessary. We presume that upon the presentation of this decision to Judge King he will dissolve his constitutional stay order of March 5th and dismiss the petition. We reserve jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings in this matter if such becomes necessary to fully effectuate this decision.

In conclusion, we have given careful consideration to all pleadings and briefs herein, including the response of Richard Ger-stein which we allowed filed and have considered as a petition to intervene and response.

Time for filing petition for re-hearing is limited to 5 days from the date this decision is filed in the Clerk’s office.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and DREW, THORNAL, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition for Rehearing filed herein by Intervenor Richard Gerstein is denied.

The Petition for Rehearing and for clarification filed herein by Judge James Lawrence King is granted. The decision of this Court to which such petition is addressed is hereby amended, nunc pro tunc, April 3, 1969, by striking the first paragraph on page 6 of the original decision and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

“We conclude, therefore, that subject to the reservations above, the executive order of transfer of March 4 of Governor Kirk is valid, and that such executive order supersedes and renders nugatory and of no effect the previous executive order of January 13, 1969, assigning Russell B. Clarke to said eleventh judicial circuit in connection with a special investigation and the previous executive order of February 24, 1969, assigning Zell Davis, Jr., States Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit and Joel T. Daves, III, Assistant States Attorney of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, to investigate organized crime and the conduct of public officials which may constitute a violation of the criminal laws of this State, and vests exclusively in Old-ham all the powers of the States Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida for the period of time named in such executive order; that the order of Judge Baker of March 4th constitutes an exercise *319of authority not possessed by him and that such order is hereby held null and void, frustrate and of no effect. In view of this holding we deem it unnecessary at this time to enter any coercive order relating to the same. Moreover, in view of this disposition of this question, we find no useful purpose to be served by discussing the question raised by the Governor as to the proper procedure for testing the authority of an assigned States Attorney.”

As so amended and clarified, the decision herein of April 3rd is adhered to and affirmed.

It is so ordered.

DREW, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.

ROBERTS, Acting C. J., concurs specially with opinion.

BOYD, J., concurs specially with opinion and agrees with ROBERTS, J.

ROBERTS, Acting Chief Justice

(concurring specially) :

I concur in the majority opinion. However, it is noteworthy that the legal effect of the Executive Order of transfer of March 4, 1969, was almost immediately stayed by a judgment of the Circuit Court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit suspending the effect of such transfer order and which judgment remains in effect until dissolved by that court pursuant to the opinion of this court in this cause. Therefore, during the period of time that the Executive Order was and is suspended, the authority of the two state attorneys in-' volved in their respective home circuits has remained and will remain intact.

ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.

BOYD, Justice

(concurring specially) :

I agree with the majority view but feel that some further clarification should be made as to the legal effect of actions taken by Richard E. Gerstein, as State Attorney in the 11th Judicial Circuit, and by Gordon G. Oldham, in the 5th Judicial Circuit, subsequent to the entry of the Governor’s transfer order and prior to the final conclusion of this litigation.

We have already held that the Governor’s original transfer order directing the two State Attorneys to exchange places with each other was legally valid and, therefore, any action taken by either State Attorney under authority of said order and in compliance therewith is valid.

Although we have determined that the action of Judge Paul Baker, in attempting to limit the Governor’s action, was ineffective except with respect to the suits relating to Diamond and Edwards, it was nevertheless proper for Richard E. Ger-stein and Gordon G. Oldham, as members of the Florida Bar and as public officials, to respect and comply with said order and it was their further duty to respect and comply with the order of Judge James Lawrence King mentioned in the original proceeding which had the actual effect of enjoining Richard E. Gerstein from acting in the Sth Judicial Circuit as State Attorney and enjoining Gordon G. Oldham as acting as State Attorney in the 11th Judicial Circuit.

Since we have determined that the Governor’s original order was valid, we have now a situation in which Gordon G. Old-ham was claiming the right to act as State Attorney in the 11th Judicial Circuit by Executive Order and Richard E. Gerstein was claiming the right to the same office under the order of Judge James Lawrence King and each was in effect serving and performing the duties of State Attorney in his own circuit wherein he was elected by popular vote. Since each claimed under color of law, and since we have held that the Governor’s transfer order was partially ineffective insofar as the Diamond suit and the Edwards suit, this Court should hold that all action taken by either Richard E. Gerstein or Gordon G. Oldham in either *320Judicial Circuit mentioned above is legal, and the actions taken by either of them between the date of the Governor’s transfer order and the conclusion of this litigation will have full legal effect.