IRENE ELIZABETH MCADAM, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN BROUGHTON MCADAM, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1969-06-19
No. K-389
RAWLS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
225 So. 2d 449 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1969)

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Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a divorce decree, holding that a divorce cannot be granted solely on the uncorroborated testimony of one spouse, even in a contested case.


Holding

Yes, the trial court erred in granting the divorce. Even in contested divorce cases, some corroboration of the grounds for divorce is necessary.


Key Quotes

“It is well settled that corroboration in such cases may be of a lesser degree, or slight, as compared to uncontested divorce cases. However, it is firmly engrained in the jurisprudence of this State that even in contested cases some corroboration is necessary to sustain a final decree of divorce.”

Establishes the legal standard for corroboration in divorce cases, even contested ones.

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Facts & Procedural History

The plaintiff in a divorce action testified to the defendant's extreme mental cruelty as the sole ground for divorce. There was no other evidence pres…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court
CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting Chief Judge.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting Chief Judge.

The defendant in an action for divorce has appealed from a final decree of divorce entered by the Circuit Court for Volusia County.

The basic question presented for our determination in this appeal is whether said court erred in granting the divorce on the ground of extreme mental cruelty where there was no corroborative evidence as to that ground.

The only evidence of the defendant’s extreme mental cruelty was the testimony of the plaintiff himself. There was no corroboration of such testimony.

This proceeding was strenuously contested. It is well settled that corroboration in such cases may be of a lesser degree, or slight, as compared to uncontested di*450vorce cases. However, it is firmly engrained in the jurisprudence of this State that even in contested cases some corroboration is necessary to sustain a final decree of divorce. See Dings v. Dings, 161 So.2d 227 (Fla.App.3d 1964); and 10 Fla. Jur., Divorce, Separation, and Annulment, § 40, p. 453, and the numerous Florida decisions cited therein.

Since there is no testimony in the record corroborating the plaintiff’s testimony of the defendant’s extreme mental cruelty, the sole ground for divorce alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, the court erred in granting the divorce in the final decree appealed from herein, and that decree must be, and it is, reversed and the cause is remanded with directions for further proceedings consistent with the views hereinabove set forth.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

RAWLS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.


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