CLAUDE R. KIRK, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND GERALD MAGER, AS LEGAL COUNSEL TO THE GOVERNOR, PETITIONERS,
v.
PAUL BAKER, JUDGE OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF RECORD OF DADE COUNTY, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1969-07-09
No. 38657
ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
229 So. 2d 250 Florida Supreme Court (1969) Caution
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that a Governor is immune from contempt proceedings brought by an inferior judge for actions taken in furtherance of executive duties. The court prohibited Judge Baker from enforcing a contempt order against Governor Kirk and his legal counsel for their alleged attempts to influence judicial decisions in pending criminal cases.


Holding

The Governor and his subordinate acting under his supervision are completely immune from the contempt jurisdiction of an inferior court for actions taken in furtherance of the Governor's executive duties. A judge subject to removal by the Governor cannot use his contempt power against the Governor for official executive conduct, and the proper forum for such charges is the House of Representatives through impeachment or a grand jury.


Key Quotes

“It is unthinkable that any inferior officer of this state could, in the guise of the exercise of judicial power, thwart the powers of the executive and thereby prevent or interfere with the full, unfettered performance of his official duties.”

Establishes the core principle that executive power cannot be frustrated by judicial processes against the Governor

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Facts & Procedural History

Governor Kirk and his legal counsel Gerald Mager met with Judge Paul Baker in a hotel room regarding two high-profile criminal cases (State v. Diamond…

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Opinion of the Court
DREW, Justice.

DREW, Justice.

We accept jurisdiction of this original proceeding in prohibition pursuant to the provision of the Florida Constitution which authorizes this Court to issue such writs “when questions are involved upon which a direct appeal to the supreme court is allowed as a matter of right.” 1 The case requires that we construe controlling provisions of the Florida Constitution. Hence, an appeal would come here from any final judgment that might be entered by the trial court.

The Respondent Judge has by formal order required the Governor and Gerald Mager, his subordinate and agent, to appear before him on a day certain and show cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt of Respondent’s court for certain conduct set forth in an affidavit filed by Judge Baker. The Judge alleges in his order that the conduct constituted a willful, wanton and contemptuous attempt to influence him to rule in a manner contrary to the Court’s conscience in *251presiding over the cases of State of Florida v. Max Diamond a/k/a Mike Diamond and State of Florida v. Howard C. Edwards.2

The Governor asserts that the contempt order interferes with his ability as Governor to carry out the duties and responsibilities of his office under the constitution of this state and that he, as Governor, and his subordinate Gerald Mager are immune from any jurisdiction or command of said court for contempt.

Before proceeding to a consideration of the case, it is necessary to determine the scope of the inquiry. Judge Baker is Judge of the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County. He is an officer subject to removal by the Governor “for malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform his official duties, or commission of a felony.” 3 The function of courts is historically limited to deciding the particular case under consideration. We are confined in our inquiry here to determining whether a judicial officer who is subject to removal by the Governor can use the processes and power of his court to adjudge the Governor in contempt. In such a determination, we must consider as a necessary implication of the contempt power the court’s authority to forcibly restrain or imprison the Governor as punishment for his contemptuous conduct.

The answer to this inquiry has apparently been obvious to our forefathers, for throughout the history of the republic we find no record of a contempt proceeding ever having taken place under the particular circumstances before us. No case has been cited, and we have found none, in which any court has held a Governor in contempt for any act in furtherance of or connected with his official duties and responsibilities as Governor. In one instance the statement was made that “in extreme cases” courts have the power to restrain the Governor.4 But, even in that case such power was not employed.

Under our constitution the Governor is vested with the “supreme executive power.” 5 He is the commander in chief of all of the state’s military forces. He must see that all laws of the state are faithfully executed, commission all state and' county officers, and transact all necessary business with the officers of government. *252Many other duties are directly given him hy the sovereign people of the state in the constitution. It is unthinkable that any inferior officer of this state could, in the guise of the exercise of judicial power, thwart the powers of the executive and thereby prevent or interfere with the full, unfettered performance of his official du ties. The fact that the order names him as an individual instead of Governor is utterly of no import. To restrain the individual would be to restrain the Governor.6

The discussions and conferences between the Governor and Judge Baker related to two cases pending before the Judge which had evoked great publicity in Dade County and the state at large. The Governor, in discharging his duty as Chief Executive to insure that all laws are faithfully executed, may be under a duty to suspend a judge from office for his conduct in a particular case.7 The Governor may have had in mind the possible exercise of this discretionary power over Judge Baker. It is only proper to assume his conferences were for the legitimate purpose of learning facts upon which to base such an exercise of his discretionary power, for it will generally be presumed that the action of the Chief Executive is in accordance with his official duty. Such an inquiry would assuredly be within the perimeter of his authority as Governor.8

The charges of Judge Baker are serious accusations against the Governor, if true. But we hold that the Governor in such conduct must be cloaked with immunity. The proper forum for such charges is the House of Representatives under the- provisions of Article III, Section 17, of the Constitution of 1968, or a grand jury.9

Our conclusion under the facts here, that the Governor and his subordinate in his presence and under his immediate supervision 10 are completely immune from the processes of the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County, is supported by all relevant authority we have been able to find on the subject.11 Unquestionably *253the dearth of authority is occasioned by the fact that the respective branches of government in our country have throughout our history assiduously avoided any encroachment on one another’s authority.12 In those few instances where difficult cases have arisen, each branch has had enough foresight and respect for the orderly functioning of the governmental processes to avoid a confrontation.13

It was urged upon us at oral argument that a Governor’s immunity from the processes of the judiciary extended even to felonies which might be committed by him. In the narrow posture of this case we do not reach that question, and what we hold here would not be authority should such an unlikely event occur.14 Nor does our conclusion necessarily control a situation which might arise under a contempt order issued by a judicial officer subject only to impeachment for misdemeanors committed in office.15

There has been filed in this cause a Motion for an order directing the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County to make available to Judge Baker for his examination the testimony of Governor Kirk and Gerald Mager before the Dade County Grand Jury and any waivers of immunity executed by them. There is no merit to this Motion and the same is hereby denied.16

*254Honorable Paul Baker, Judge of the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County is hereby prohibited from exercising any jurisdiction to enforce the Order to Show Cause of May 3, 1969, and should forthwith take whatever action is necessary to cancel and dismiss said charges and the Order of Contempt issued thereon.

It is so ordered.

ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Whiley v. Hon. Rick Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011)
    ….1971)); see also Advisory Op. to the Governor — 1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d 278, 280-81 (Fla.1997). This Court has also recognized that that a Governor’s actions are presumptively in accord with his official duties. See Kirk v. Baker, 229 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla.1969). Florida law provides no specific process for carrying out the Governor’s executive duties with respect to holding his executive agencies accountable in their rulemaking functions. Governor Scott has chosen to rely upon an accountab…
  • Dade Cnty. v. Hilton Carr, 231 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
    …hours to such case. “4. At the request of the Court, Hilton R. Carr, Jr. and Herbert A. Warren, Jr. did act as attorneys for the Court in proceedings for writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court of Florida in the case of Kirk v. Baker, No. 38,657 [229 So. 2d 250], did file briefs on behalf of the Court and did appear and argue in the Supreme Court and did devote 50 hours to such case. [*846] “5. Certain, expenses were incurred in connection with the representation of the Court in the matters set forth in pa…
  • …on to act or against which to issue an order to show cause. The judges were therefore [*371] clearly without jurisdiction to require the secretary’s appearance regarding his transfer of monies or his making of budgetary decisions. Cf. Kirk v. Baker, 229 So. 2d 250 (Fla.1969). Appellants’ argument that the courts cannot demand Secretary Coler to transfer funds or to force his hand in making discretionary budgetary decisions is well taken. As was earlier observed by our supreme court in Kirk v. Baker, the res…

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