ELAINE REVELLINO, APPELLANT,
v.
AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEM, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND ROSE KOTLER, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1969-12-16
No. 69-366
Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and SWANN, JJ.
229 So. 2d 896 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1969) Negative Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

In this automobile rear-end collision case, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of liability, dismissing the plaintiff's negligence action. The appellate court reversed, holding that genuine factual disputes regarding negligence and contributory negligence precluded summary judgment as a matter of law.


Holding

Summary judgment on the issue of liability was improper because the circumstances presented genuine disputes of material fact regarding negligence and contributory negligence that could not be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment.


Key Quotes

“In the circumstances presented the issues of negligence and contributory negligence could not properly be resolved by the trial court on motion for summary judgment.”

Establishes the core holding that summary judgment was improper because negligence and contributory negligence issues remained genuinely disputed.

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Facts & Procedural History

Two automobiles were traveling in the same direction at 35-40 miles per hour (within the speed limit) with an interval of three to four car lengths be…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an automobile accident case, in which there was a rear-end collision. The appellant, who was driving the rear automobile, sued the driver and the owner of the other vehicle for personal injuries and property damage, alleging the collision was caused by negligence of the defendant driver. The defendants answered, denying negligence and pleading contributory negligence. Thereafter, with leave of court, the defendant driver joined by her husband filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff, alleging that the negligence of the latter was the cause of the collision.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. In ruling thereon in favor of the defendants, the court ordered “that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability be and the same is hereby granted,” and the court then ordered that the plaintiff take nothing by the action and that the defendants go hence without day. That amounted to a final judgment adverse to the plaintiff on the plaintiff’s case, and a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant-coun-terclaimants, on the issue of liability. The plaintiff appealed from the adverse summary judgment. We find error, and reverse.

At the time of the hearing on the motion of the defendants for summary judgment, the trial court had before it for consideration certain statements of counsel, answers to interrogatories and a deposition of the plaintiff. The facts thereby disclosed, viewed in a light favorable to the party moved against as they were required to be on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, showed the two automobiles were *897proceeding in the same direction at a speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour (within the speed limit), with an interval of three or four car lengths between them, in a lane provided for through traffic, and that the defendant driver made a sudden stop at a place where no such stop was reasonably to be expected.

In the circumstances presented the issues of negligence and contributory negligence could not properly be resolved by the trial court on motion for summary, judgment. See Mansell v. Eidge, Fla.App. 1965, 179 So.2d 624, 627; Pagan v. Holman, Fla.App. 1967, 195 So.2d 606. Cf. Jeskey v. Yellow Cab Company, Inc., Fla.App.1962, 136 So.2d 376.

Accordingly, the summary judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Lynch v. Adel D. Tennyson, 443 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
    …21 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Whitworth v. Cuchens, 397 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Chiles v. Beaudoin, 384 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Lubliner v. Gabrilowitz, 393 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Revellino v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 229 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Pagan v. Holman, 195 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). In respect to the summary judgment entered in favor of the City of Casselberry, no argument has been presented to this court, either in appellant’s written brief or [*1019] or…
  • Lubliner v. Gabrilowitz, 393 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …s to whether the plaintiff stopped his vehicle so suddenly and without notice that the defendant as the operator of the following vehicle was not reasonably able to avoid the ensuing rear end collision. See Revellino v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 229 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Pagan v. Holman, 195 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). The summary judgment under review, accordingly, is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded.…
  • Mamba Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 470 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
    …s estopped to claim that right as to the other party to the contract. Walker v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co., 121 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960); Williams v. Davidson, 179 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965); Revellino v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 229 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Specifically, we note that the certificate of insurance furnished by Mamba does not support an inference that JEA knew the coverage had not been furnished. On the contrary, the certificate expressly refers to the contract by num…

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