CITY OF MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
v.
DIRECT DISTRIBUTORS, INCORPORATED
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The City of Miami enacted an ordinance limiting gasoline storage tank capacity to 5,000 gallons after granting Direct Distributors a permit to install two 8,000-gallon tanks. The Florida Supreme Court upheld a temporary restraining order preventing enforcement of the ordinance against Direct Distributors, finding the ordinance as applied constituted arbitrary and unreasonable deprivation of property rights.
The ordinance as applied to Direct Distributors was arbitrary and unreasonable and violated due process. While the City had authority to regulate gasoline storage in the exercise of police power, enforcement against a party who had obtained a valid permit and substantially performed in reliance on it would amount to deprivation of property rights without due process of law.
“Unquestionably, the matter of regulating the storage of gasoline is one within the police power of the State and may be done in the interest of health, morals, and public welfare.”
Establishes the City's authority to regulate gasoline storage as a valid exercise of police power
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn July 26, 1938, Miami granted Direct Distributors a permit to construct two underground 8,000-gallon gasoline storage tanks on city-controlled land.…
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July 26, 1938, the City of Miami granted Direct Distributors, Incorporated, a permit to construct two underground gasoline storage tanks with a capacity of 8,000 gallons each on lands controlled by it at 3129 North Miami Avenue. On August 10, 1938, the City adopted Ordinance Number 1974 making it unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to construct or install any gasoline storage tank with a capacity of more than 5,000 gallons.
On September 7, 1938, Direct Distributors, Incorporated, filed its bill of complaint in thq Circuit Court praying that the City be enjoined from enforcing the terms of Ordinance Number 1974 against it. A temporary restraining order was granted as prayed for. A motion to dissolve said order and to dismiss the bill of complaint was denied and the City appealed. October 6th, on application of the City, this Court is'sued its writ under Section 5 of Article V of the Constitution to preserve the status quo of the rem. The cause is here for disposition ori a motion to dissolve the latter writ and on the merits.
Several questions have been argued, to-wit: The power of the City to enact the ordinance, whether or not Appellee had an adequate remedy at law, and whether or not the bill of complaint states a cause of action.
Unquestionably ,the matter of regulating the storage of gasoline is one within the police power of the State and may be done in the interest of health, morals, and public welfare. Such power may be delegated to a municipality and we are of the view that the City of Miami was authorized to pass *432such an ordinance. We are also of the view that the bill of complaint states a cause of action.
The real question here is’ whether or not the ordinance as passed and applied to Appellee was arbitrary and unreasonable.
It is shown that Appellee was granted a permit to install the tanks in question before the ordinance was passed, that relying on said permit, it had at the time of the passage of the ordinance purchased its tanks, had employed an architect, and had proceeded with their installation and at the time the bill of complaint was filed, they were almost completely installed. It was also shown that they were placed under ground more than sixty-one feet from the filling or service station of Appellee and that to enforce said ordinance against appellee would amount to depriving it of its property rights without due process of law. As to whether or not Appellee had an effective and adequate remedy at law, thq pleadings' do' not disclose.
It was' on this state of facts that the Chancellot granted the temporary restraining order appealed from and in doing so, we cannot say that he abused his discretion. His decree is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Whitfield, Brown, Buford and Chapman, J. J., concur.
Ellis, C. J., not participating.
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City of Miami Beach v. The Tex. Co., 141 Fla. 616 (Fla. 1940)…ice Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 117 Kan. 514, 231 Pac. 1031, 43 A. L. R. 854; City of Crowley v. Ellsworth, 114 La. 308, 38 So. 199; State ex rel. Oil Service Co. v. Stark, 96 W. Va. 176, 122 S. E. 533; City of Miami v. Direct Distributors, Inc., 134 Fla. 430, 183 So. 841; Lees v. Cohoes Motor Car Co., 203 N. Y. S. 65, 122 Miss. Rep. 373; State v. Moye, 200 N. C. 11, 156 S. E. 130; Town of Wake Forest v. Medlin, 199 N. C. 83, 154 S. E. 29; Bryan v. City of Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 61 Atl. 894; Standard Oil…
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Adams v. Hous. Auth. of City of Daytona Beach, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952)…a zoning ordinance. See City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., supra; City of Miami Beach v. Texas Co., 141 Fla. 616, 194 So. 368, 128 A.L.R. 350; Rowland v. State, 129 Fla. 662, 176 So. 545, 114 A.L.R. 443; City of Miami v. Direct Distributors, 134 Fla. 430, 183 So. 841; and Citizens Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 98 Fla. 933, 124 So. 722. The question in this case is not simply the abatement or discontinuance of a nuisance or a blighted area. This is not simply a case of slum clearance in order to promote…
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State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394 (Fla. 1939)…ion we are called on to answer. The question of power is foreclosed by Section 5, Chapter 14234, Special Acts of 1929, and Section 3, Chapter 10847, Special Acts o£ 1925. A similar ordinance was upheld in City of Miami v. Direct Distributors, Inc., 134 Fla. 430, 183 So. 841 Harz v. Paxton, et al., 97 Fla. 154, 120 So. 3. The question of the City’s power to enact the ordinance being disposed of in the affirmative, the question of whether or not that power was exercised in an arbitrary and unreasonable mann…
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