STATE EX REL. DALLAS INVESTMENT CO.
v.
W. H. PEACE, AS BUILDING INSPECTOR OF THE CITY OF MIAMI
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld Miami's zoning ordinance restricting gasoline and oil filling stations from locating within 350 yards of certain public institutions or within 750 feet of existing filling stations. The court rejected the relator's mandamus challenge, holding that the city had clear statutory authority to enact such regulations and that the ordinance did not constitute an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of legislative power.
The court held that the City possessed clear statutory authority to enact such zoning ordinances under applicable special acts. The ordinance was not arbitrary or unreasonable, as it was enacted in the interest of public welfare and fell well within the broad range of legislative discretion afforded to municipal legislative bodies.
“If the ordinance is enacted in the interest of the public and is designed to correct an evil or evils that are or may affect the public welfare, it should be upheld.”
Establishes the standard for upholding municipal zoning ordinances against constitutional challenge
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn June 1938, Miami enacted Ordinance 1933 prohibiting gasoline and oil filling stations within 350 yards of churches, hospitals, schools, and other p…
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In June, 1938, the City Commission of Miami enacted Ordinance 1933, the pertinent part of which is as follows: “No gasoline and oil filling station and no service station shall be erected or located within 350 yards of any church, hospital, school or other such institution, where large numbers of pedestrians congregate, or within 750 feet of the location of another gasoline and oil filling-station or service station.”
In October, 1938, the relator, Dallas Investment Company applied to the City for a permit to erect a filling station at the corner of Northwest 7th Avenue and Northwest 18th Terrace, the said location being within 750 feet of an existing filling station. The City declined this request because of the ordinance quoted. Alternative writ of mandamus was issued by this Court which the City has moved to quash.
The power of the City to enact the ordinance and, if such power was present, whether or not it was arbitrarily exercised in this case, is the only question we are called on to answer.
The question of power is foreclosed by Section 5, Chapter 14234, Special Acts of 1929, and Section 3, Chapter 10847, Special Acts o£ 1925. A similar ordinance was upheld in City of Miami v. Direct Distributors, Inc., 134 Fla. 430, 183 So. 841 Harz v. Paxton, et al., 97 Fla. 154, 120 So. 3.
The question of the City’s power to enact the ordinance being disposed of in the affirmative, the question of whether or not that power was exercised in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner becomes very narrow, besides being a delicate one for the Courts to treat. Standards of business, social and professional conduct have their variations peculiar *396to every community. These standards such ordinances as that brought in question are designed to regulate and the manner ol their regulation is distinctly a legislative function. If the ordinance is enacted in the interest of the public and is designed to correct an evil or evils that are or may affect the public welfare, it should be upheld. The manner in which these purposes are accomplished is one in which legislative discretion has a very broad range and courts should not attempt to substitute their judgment for that of the legislature, City Commission or other legislaive body created for that purpose.
Measured by this standard, we cannot say that the ordinance is amenable to the assault made on it. Certainly it does not transgress the range of legislative discretion. Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 118 Pac. 80; Magnolia Petroleum Company v. Wright, 124 Okla. 55; 254 Pac. 41; Independent Pennsylvania Oil Co. v. Gloucester, 102 N. J. L. 501, 134 Atl. 554; San Antonio v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. (2d) 868; Kramer v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al., 166 Md. 324, 171 Atl. 70.
The motion to' quash the alternative writ is therefore granted.
It is so ordered.
Whitfield, Buford, Chapman and Ti-iomas, J. J., concur.
Brown, J., dissents.
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The City OF Miami v. Stegemann, 158 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)…declaration of the invalidity of the zoning ordinance in toto. As to the validity vel non of the ordinance, we observe that such question appears to have been placed at rest by the Supreme Court of Florida in State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607. Inasmuch as the chancellor in the case at bar was of the view that the por [*585] tion of the ordinance attacked was “fairly debatable” and on that premise the appellant should prevail but for the decision in the former case, we rever…
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Owen v. Cheney, 238 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)…her series of bonds was validated in 1962, and again affirmed on appeal, in State v. City of Tampa (Fla.1962), 146 So. 2d 100. . See, 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 16.15 (3rd ed. 1969). . Cf. State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace (1939), 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607. See, also, 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §§ 20.04-20.08 (3rd ed. 1969). . Id.…
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The City OF Miami v. Walker, 169 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…afety and building code regulations. On appeal the City of Miami contends that since the validity vel non of the distance provisions of ordinance #6871 was established by the Supreme Court of Florida in State ex rel. Dallas Investment Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607, and followed by this court in City of Miami v. Stegemann, Fla.App.1964, 158 So. 2d 583, the only question to be decided is whether or not there was sufficient evidence before the chancellor to support his conclusion that as applied to…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Harz v. Paxton, 97 Fla. 154 (Fla. 1929)
- City of Miami v. Direct Distribs., 134 Fla. 430 (Fla. 1938)