LENA LITTLE AND ALFRED LITTLE, APPELLANTS,
v.
PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The court held that the jury should have been allowed to infer that the liquid had been on the floor for a sufficient time to charge the store with notice, and thus the directed verdict was improper.
[1] A directed verdict should be granted only when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, could not legally support a verdict for that part…
[2] Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish notice of a dangerous condition in a negligence action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff slipped and fell on a clear liquid in the defendant's supermarket aisle. She had been in the aisle for 15-20 minutes without noticing the li…
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Plaintiffs, Lena Little and Alfred Little, appeal a final judgment upon directed verdict for the defendant. We reverse.
Mrs. Little fractured her ankle while shopping in defendant’s well lit supermarket. She slipped and fell on a clear liquid which was on the floor. During the time she was in the aisle where her fall occurred, she saw or heard no one except a woman with whom she spoke for some 15-20 minutes. She heard nothing drop, break or spill. After her conversation and as she proceeded down the aisle, Mrs. Little did not look straight ahead but glanced at the shelves of groceries to see what she needed. Upon encountering the liquid on the floor, which was not noticed by her, she fell.
The power to direct a verdict should be exercised with caution, and it should never be granted unless the evidence is of such a nature that under no view which the jury might lawfully take of it, favorable to the adverse party, could a verdict for the latter be upheld. The movant admits every reasonable inference that a jury might fairly and reasonably arrive at favorable to the adverse party. Burch v. Strange, Fla.App.1961, 126 So.2d 898.
Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was based on the assertion that there was no evidence to show that the store had actual notice of the condition of the floor or to infer that the liquid had been there long enough that the store should have known of its presence.
The record substantiates that Mrs. Little stood at the entrance of the aisle for 15-20 minutes and neither observed or heard anyone in the aisle nor heard any breaks or spills. A permissible inference to draw from this is that no one was in that aisle and thus the liquid had to have been there at least 15-20 minutes.
An inference is a permissible deduction from the evidence which the jury may reject or accord such probative value as it desires, 53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 186, and it is descriptive of the factual conclusion that *134a jury may draw from sufficient circumstantial evidence. Busbee v. Quarrier, Fla.App.1965, 172 So.2d 17.
Furthermore, an inference may be founded upon an inference when no contrary reasonable inference may be indulged. Fideli v. Colson, Fla.App.1964, 165 So.2d 794.
In Commercial Credit Corporation v. Varn, Fla.App.1959, 108 So.2d 638, our sister court stated:
“Circumstantial evidence certainly may be relied upon as a basis for recovery in civil actions. Tucker Brothers, Inc. v. Menard, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 908. The rule is clear, however, that the inference of the existence of an essential fact to be drawn from circumstantial evidence cannot be made the basis of a further inference of an essential, unless it can be said that the initial inference was established to the exclusion of any other reasonable inference.
“In civil cases if the proved circumstances justify an inference pointing to an essential fact which inference outweighs all reasonable inferences to the contrary, it can then be said that a conclusion as to the existence of the ultimate fact is justified by the circumstantial evidence. Tucker Brothers, Inc. v. Menard, supra. However, the established rule of evidence is that we cannot construct a conclusion upon an inference which has been superimposed upon an initial inference supported by circumstantial evidence unless the initial inference can be elevated to the dignity of an established fact because of the presence of no reasonable inference to the contrary. Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, Fla.1954, 73 So.2d 403. See also Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 1, Sec. 41.” (Emphasis added.)1
In this case, once the inference has been drawn that no one else was in the aisle for 15-20 minutes, (during which nothing dropped, broke or spilt) there is no other reasonable inference to indulge in than that the liquid was on the floor for at least 15-20 minutes prior to the fall. We consider this time could be deemed sufficient for the defendant to be charged with knowledge of the condition and a reasonable time in which to correct it.2
These matters were for the jury to determine, and, accordingly the lower court erred in directing the verdict against plaintiffs.
For these reasons, the final judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.
WALDEN and REED, JJ„ concur.
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Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1973)…and the cause remanded with directions that the verdict of the jury be reinstated and judgment entered accordingly. It is so ordered. CARLTON, C. J., and ERVIN and Mc-CAIN, JJ., concur. DEKLE, J., dissents. . 171 So. 2d 589 (Fla.App.2d 1965). . 234 So. 2d 132 (Fla.App.4th 1970). . 227 So. 2d 745 (Fla.App.2nd 1969). . Id. at 745-746. . 238 So. 2d 561 (Fla.1970). . 79 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1955). . 254 So. 2d 44 (Fla.App.1st 1971). . Id. at 45. . See note 1, supra. . 171 So. 2d at 591. . See note 2, sup…
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Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Williams, 264 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)…e the substance remained on the floor, at least fifteen to twenty minutes, to be sufficient for defendants to be charged with knowledge of the condition and a reasonable time in which to correct it. Little v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., Fla.App.1970, 234 So. 2d 132. In defense of this lawsuit defendants claimed that plaintiff was contrib-utorily negligent in failing to observe the obvious danger that existed in the aisle at the time the accident occurred. The question of contributory negligence is whether pla…
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Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Guenther, 395 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…red may, like any other fact, be established by circumstantial evidence. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Williams, 264 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Viewing the evidence, as we must, most favorably to the appellees, Little v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 234 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), we find that the testimony by appellees’ witnesses created a pri-ma facie case for presentation and consideration by the jury. Montgomery v. Florida Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302 (Fla.1973). [*246] In Montgomery v.…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 73 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1954)
- Tucker Bros., Inc. v. Menard, 90 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1956)
- Commercial Credit Corp. v. Varn, 108 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Goff, 108 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- Beldem v. Lynch, 126 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Burch v. Strange, 126 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 220 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Busbee v. Quarrier, 172 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- Harris v. Hilderbrandt, 172 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
- Pietro Fideli v. Colson, 165 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)