EVERETT IRWIN BUTTLER, III, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Buttler was convicted by jury of unlawful sale of marijuana and appealed on three grounds: constitutional classification of marijuana as a narcotic, denial of speedy trial, and failure to disclose witness names. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no error on any of the three points raised.
The court affirmed the conviction on all three grounds: (1) the marijuana classification issue was previously decided adversely to appellant in Borras v. State; (2) appellant waived his speedy trial right by withdrawing his jury trial waiver after the court had set a trial date pursuant to that waiver; and (3) the trial court properly allowed witness testimony because appellant suffered no prejudice from the procedural error, having acquired knowledge of all witnesses' names at the pretrial suppression hearing more than two months before trial.
[1] A defendant waives the right to be tried within a specific term by withdrawing a waiver of jury trial, thereby necessitating a reset of the trial date.
[2] A procedural error under a rule requiring the disclosure of witness names does not warrant reversal if the record affirmatively shows no prejudice to the defendant.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 1.220(e) is not an end in itself but has the purpose of furnishing a defendant with information that will enable him to better prepare his defense; it eliminates surprise and affords a defendant time to interview witnesses.”
Establishes the purpose of witness disclosure rules and that procedural violations do not require reversal absent prejudice
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceButtler was tried for unlawful sale of marijuana and convicted by jury. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress evidence and sought a hearing on…
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A jury found the appellant guilty of unlawful sale of marijuana. A judgment of conviction and the imposition of sentence followed. Appellant presents us with three points: 1. He was denied due process of law because Chapter 398, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., improperly lists marijuana as a narcotic and because the state did not prove that marijuana is a narcotic; (2) The trial court erred in failing to discharge him pursuant to § 915.01(2), Fla.Stat., F.S.A. (demands for speedy trial); (3) The trial court erred in refusing to preclude the testimony of all state witnesses because their names had not been furnished to appellant pursuant to Rule 1.220(e), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A.
The question raised in appellant’s first point has been decided adversely to appellant’s position. See Borras v. State, Fla.1969, 229 So.2d 244.
Appellant’s second point does not present error because the record reveals that appellant waived his right to be tried in the third term after he had made timely demands for speedy trial within three successive terms of court. Appellant had pleaded not guilty and waived a jury trial at his arraignment. Thereafter the court set a trial date in the second term following appellant’s filing of two motions for speedy trial in successive terms of court. Subsequently appellant withdrew his waiver of jury trial, thereby requiring the court to reset the trial date. The jury trial date was promptly set for an early available date and appellant entered no objection. It is clear that by withdrawing his waiver of jury trial, appellant waived his right to be tried on the date set pursuant to the waiver of jury trial. Cf. Payton v. Edwards, Fla.App.1969, 226 So.2d 822.
The third point presented urges that the state’s failure to furnish appellant with a written list of its witnesses pursuant to Rule 1.220(e), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, deprived appellant of his constitutionally protected right to be faced with his accusers, thereby requiring the court to preclude the state’s witnesses from testifying.
The record shows that the appellant, stating he was proceeding pursuant to Rule 1.220(e), filed an offer to furnish the prosecuting attorney with the names and addresses of all witnesses appellant expected to call as defense witnesses at the trial of the cause and that the prosecuting attorney filed no written response thereto.
The trial was preceded by a hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress as evidence the contraband seized. All of the witnesses who testified at the trial were presented by the state and testified at the hearing on the motion except the chemist who made the identification of the marijuana. The record shows that the report of the chemist was made available to the appellant. This hearing preceded the trial by more than two months. Thus the record affirmatively shows that appellant had knowledge of the names of all the state’s witnesses prior to trial. Appellant does not assert that he was the victim of surprise. Rule 1.220(e) is not an end in itself but has the purpose of furnishing a defendant with information that will enable him to better prepare his defense; it eliminates surprise and affords a defendant time to interview witnesses. Compare People v. Raby, 40 Ill.2d 392, 240 N.E.2d 595 (1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1083, 89 S.Ct. 867, 21 L.Ed.2d 776; State v. Shelby, 1966, 69 Wash.2d 295, 418 P.2d 246. An error in procedure under Rule 1.220(e) does not entitle a defendant to a reversal for new trial *315where it can be affirmatively determined that no prejudice resulted. Compare Mc-Clendon v. State, Fla.1967, 196 So.2d 905; Newman v. State, Fla.1967, 196 So.2d 897; Richardson v. State, Fla.App.1970, 233 So.2d 868. Under the foregoing circumstances the trial court did not err by refusing to preclude the state’s witnesses from testifying.
Affirmed.
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Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971)…e defendant. All of the four District Courts of Appeal have now so held and we now place our stamp of approval upon this principle. See Howard v. State, Fla.App., 239 So. 2d 83; Wilson v. State, Fla.App., 220 So. 2d 426, 427; Buttler v. State, Fla., 238 So. 2d 313; Rhome v. State, Fla., 222 So. 2d 431; Ramirez v. State, Fourth District, Fla., 241 So. 2d 744, Opinion filed October 14, 1970. This is particularly true in view of the purpose of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. As stated in Rule 1.020 of t…
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Ramirez v. State, 241 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)…d with such discretion not only has been recognized by each of the other three district courts of appeal, Howard v. State, First District Court of Appeal, 239 So. 2d 83 opinion filed August 18, 1970; Buttler v. State, Third District Court of Appeal, 238 So. 2d 313, opinion filed August 4, 1970; Richardson v. State, supra; Rhome v. State, Fla.App.1969, 222 So. 2d 431; but also is expressly provided by Rule 1.220(g).2 Appellant’s contention that the state’s noncompliance with the rule entitles defendant, as a…
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Kilpatrick v. State, 376 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1979)…bove, the rule “is not an end in itself but has the purpose of furnishing a defendant with information that will enable him to better prepare his defense; it eliminates surprise and affords a defendant time to interview witnesses.” Buttler v. State, 238 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). A number of decisions rendered by appellate courts of this state have recognized certain circumstances as being relevant to the question of whether discovery noncompliance has caused actual prejudice. When the undisclosed wi…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Newman v. State, 196 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1967)
- Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969)
- Richardson v. State, 233 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- McCLENDON v. State, 196 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1967)
- Hall et ux. v. Bleisch et ux., 393 U.S. 1083 (U.S. 1969)
- LewRon Television, Inc. v. D. H. Overmyer Leasing Co., Inc., 393 U.S. 1083 (U.S. 1969)
- Payton v. Edwards, 226 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)