CHARLIE BROWNLEE, APPELLANT,
v.
I. SUSSMAN, APPELLEE
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A tenant appealed a judgment for possession in a statutory landlord-tenant action for non-payment of rent. The court held that equitable defenses cannot be raised in an action under Florida's statutory Delinquent Tenant Act, though equity courts retain separate authority to relieve against lease forfeiture if rent is tendered with interest.
Equitable defenses cannot be raised in an action instituted pursuant to § 83.05, Florida Statutes. However, a court of equity retains separate authority to relieve against forfeiture of a lease for non-payment of rent if equitable, provided the tenant tenders payment of the rent due plus accrued interest.
[1] A tenant may not interpose equitable defenses in a statutory landlord and tenant action for possession based on non-payment of rent.
[2] Statutory landlord and tenant actions for possession are designed to secure a landlord's right to immediate possession upon a tenant's failure to pay rent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the purpose of the legislative acts is to secure to the landlord the right of immediate possession upon the failure of the tenant to pay rent”
Establishes the legislative intent behind the Delinquent Tenant Act and supports why equitable defenses are precluded in statutory actions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrownlee, a tenant, failed to pay rent due on December 8, 1969. Sussman, the landlord, initiated a complaint under Chapter 83, Florida Statutes to rec…
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The appellant was the tenant of the ap-pellee. The appellant failed to pay the rent due December 8, 1969. The appellee brought a complaint pursuant to Chapter 83, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., to recover possession of the premises.
The appellant filed an answer raising affirmative defenses other than the payment of rent1 and counterclaimed against the appellee landlord. The affirmative defenses were stricken by the trial court upon the ground that a tenant proceeded against under the Delinquent Tenant Act2 (see Crandall, Florida Common Law Practice, § 437 (1928)) may only be defended upon the ground that the rent has been paid. The counterclaim was transferred to the circuit court. This appeal is from the final judgment awarding the landlord possession of the premises after a finding that the tenant had failed to pay the rent and that the appellee had acted in accordance with the procedure set forth in Chapter 83, Fla. Stat.
On this appeal the single issue is whether equitable defenses may be interposed in a statutory landlord and tenant action for possession of non-payment of rent. The trial court correctly held that the purpose of the legislative acts is to secure to the landlord the right of immediate possession upon the failure of the tenant to pay rent. Ex parte Bienville Inv. Co., 102 Fla. 524, 136 So. 328 (1931); State ex rel. Rich v. Ward, 135 Fla. 885, 185 So. 846 (1939).
*319Although equitable defenses may not be raised in an action instituted pursuant to § 83.05, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., it should be noted that a court of equity will relieve against the forfeiture of a lease for the non-payment of rent if it is equitable to do so and if there is a tender of payment of the rent due plus accrued interest. Rader v. Prather, 100 Fla. 591, 130 So. 15 (1930); Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1933).
See State ex rel. Brown v. Sussman, 235 So.2d 46, Third District, filed May 5, 1970, for a possible means of raising the issues the equitable defenses seek to raise.
Affirmed.
(dissenting).
I am impelled to dissent. I regard it as a denial of due process of law, in an action by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant for nonpayment of rent, for the defendant to be denied the right to plead and establish a valid defense he may have (other than the defense of payment).
CHARLES CARROLL, Judge
(dissenting).
I am impelled to dissent. I regard it as a denial of due process of law, in an action by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant for nonpayment of rent, for the defendant to be denied the right to plead and establish a valid defense he may have (other than the defense of payment).
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Herrell v. Seyfarth, 491 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…a. 4th DCA 1970) (e.s.). Accord, Palm Corporation v. 183rd Street Theatre Corporation, 344 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. den., 355 So. 2d 516 (Fla.1978). The latter opinion did not discuss its earlier, contrary holding in Brownlee v. Sussman, 238 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), denying the tenant the right to assert affirmative defenses other than payment of rent to the landlord’s action to recover possession. Although the Third District’s two conflicting opinions could not be rationally distinguished b…
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Calypso Lounge, Inc. v. Spitzer Mgmt., Inc., 362 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…damages for the failure to rebuild. The trial court found that it would be inequitable to grant specific performance. This holding is in accordance with established law. See Schuetz v. Niziolek, 62 So. 2d 704 (Fla.1953); and cf. Brownlee v. Sussman, 238 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). The trial judge correctly held that the covenant to rebuild did not destroy the landlord’s right to forfeit the lease upon the tenant’s previous default in the payment of rent.1 The record does not support plaintiff’s claim…
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Howard v. Hillel Meyers, 525 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…utilize the opportunity accorded him to cure the defaults and preserve his security in the leasehold estate. See Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Rader v. Prather, 100 Fla. 591, 130 So. 15 (1930); Brownlee v. Sussman, 238 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); accord Michigan Trust Co. v. Grand Rapids Hotel Co., 265 Mich. 328, 251 N.W. 414 (1933). The trial judge soundly rejected Howard’s argument that he could not cure the defaults because of the enormous escalation in the rent paymen…
Authorities Cited
- Masser v. The London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474 (Fla. 1932)
- Rader v. Prather, 100 Fla. 591 (Fla. 1930)
- State v. Hon. David Elmer Ward, 135 Fla. 885 (Fla. 1939)
- Beckett v. Beckett, 102 Fla. 524 (Fla. 1931)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Sandra Brown v. Sussman, 235 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Ex parte Bienville Inv. Co., Inc., 102 Fla. 524 (Fla. 1931)