MAYFLOWER INVESTMENT COMPANY
v.
A. BRILL, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME OF BRILL ELECTRIC COMPANY, CONTINENTAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, LONDON OPERATING COMPANY, AND MCDONALD ELECTRIC CO., INC.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Mayflower Investment Company, an intervenor in a lawsuit, sought to vacate a dismissal order entered without notice to it. The Florida Supreme Court held that due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a party's rights are taken away, and reversed its prior affirmance of the lower court's denial of the motion to vacate.
The court held that the lower court erred in denying Mayflower's petition to vacate the dismissal order. Due process guarantees to every party notice and an opportunity to be heard before rights are taken away by court order, and this protects intervenors who have acquired vested interests in the subject matter of the suit.
“It is fundamental that due process guarantees to a party notice and an opportunity to be heard before his rights are taken away from him by order, decree or judgment of any court.”
Establishes the core constitutional principle governing the case—that due process requires notice and hearing before deprivation of rights
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe lower court dismissed a cause on September 5, 1935, on motion of the complainant. Mayflower Investment Company had previously been allowed to inte…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fraud On The Court cases and more on FLexlaw
In an opinion rendered by this Court on January 14, 1938, the order of the lower court denying the motion of the appellant to vacate the final order dismissing the cause and to reinstate the cause was affirmed. Subsequently a petition for rehearing was denied, but the Court upon reconsideration of said petition, granted the rehearing by an order made April 28, 1938.
In this case an order dismissing the cause was entered by the lower court on September 5, 1935.
On March 27, 1936, the appellant, Mayflower Investment Company filed its petition praying the Court to vacate its final order of September 5, 1935, dismissing the cause and to reinstate the cause. It was alleged in said petition that the petitioner, appellant here, had been allowed to intervene in the cause, and had filed its bill of intervention therein, showing that said intervenor had a vital interest in the cause and that s'aid order of dismissal had been entered on motion of the complainant without any notice whatever to said intervenor, who was clearly entitled to such notice. It was also alleged in said petition that by said motion to dismiss a fraud had been practiced upon the court and upon the petitioner.
*289It is true that Section 70 of the 1931 Chancery Act provides that petitions for rehearing shall be filed within 20 days, whereas this petition to vacate the order dismissing the caus'e was not filed until several months elapsed. However, the petition to vacate alleged that the defendant had had no notice and was without knowledge of the decree of dismissal until shortly before the petition to vacate the same was filed.
It is contended by the appellant that inasmuch as it had been allowed to intervene in the cause below, after due notice to all parties, and had been allowed to file its bill of intervention, setting up its interest in the subject matter of the suit, that it had thereby acquired a vested interest in such Subject matter and in said cause, of which it could not be deprived, by an order of dismissal, granted on complainant’s motion, without notice to or knowledge of the intervener appellant, and without any opportunity to be heard thereon; that therefore the said order of the court dismissing the cáuse was void, as to this appellant.
It is fundamental that due process guarantees to a party notice and an opportunity to be heard before his rights are taken away from him by order, decree or judgment of any court. See Windsor v. MaVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 23 L. Ed. 914; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 17 S. C. 841, 42 L. Ed. 215; Glazier v. Rosoff (Conn.) 179 A. 407; Hunter v. May, 25 S. W. 580.
We are here dealing with a direct, and not a collateral attack.
Our conclusion is that the court below erred in denying the petition to vacate said order of dismissal, and to reinstate. the cause. See Lucy v. Deas, 59 Fla. 552; Rice v. Cummings, 51 Fla. 535, 40 So. 889; Kroier v. Kroier, 95 Fla. 865, 116 So. 753; Sawyer v. Gustason, 96 Fla. 6, 118 So. 57.
*290We therefore recede from and set aside our former judgment of affirmance, and now enter a judgment of reversal.
Reversed and remanded for appropriate proceedings.
■ Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Ci-iapman, J. J., concur.
Terrell, C. J., concurs in opinion and judgment.
Justices Buford and Thomas not participating as authorized by Section 4687 Compiled General Laws of 1927 and Rule 21-A of the Rules of this' Court.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (15 total)
-
State of Fla. Dep't OF Transp. v. Plunske, 267 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)…parties affected notice and an opportunity to be heard before a party’s rights are taken away. See, for example, Brooker v. Smith, 101 So. 2d 607 (Fla.App. 1958). “This rule was stated by the Supreme Court of Florida in Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Brill, 137 Fla. 287, 188 So. 205 (1939), as follows: ‘It is fundamental that due process guarantees to a party notice and an opportunity to be heard before his rights are taken away from him by or [*339] der, decree or judgment of any court. See Windsor v. McVeigh, 93…
-
Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. & Robert J. Schmidt v. Art A. Magnuson, 288 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)…quired), nonetheless, when one of the parties to an adversary proceeding files a timely motion for new trial under Rule 1.530, RCP, 31 F.S.A. due process requires a hearing thereon after notice to all parties. Cf., Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Brill, 1939, 137 Fla. 287, 188 So. 205; State Dept. of Transportation v. Plunske, Fla.App.1972, 267 So. 2d 337; Polland v. Visual Graphics Corp., Fla.App.1970, 240 So. 2d 835; Prunty v. State, Fla.App.1969, 226 So. 2d 448. We conclude that the error was harmless in view of t…
-
Brooker v. Smith, 101 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)…s case and leave such to the chancellor on the return of this record to him. We hold that the lower court was in error in hearing the motion without notice to the plaintiff. Due process requires such a notice. See Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Brill, 1939, 137 Fla. 287, 188 So. 205; Town of Lake Hamilton v. Hughes, 1948, 160 Fla. 646, 36 So. 2d 260. Reversed. SCANNER, C. J., and ALLEN and SHANNON, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (U.S. 1897)
- Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1876)
- Kroier v. Kroier, 95 Fla. 865 (Fla. 1928)
- Sawyer v. Gustason, 96 Fla. 6 (Fla. 1928)
- Louisiana v. New Orleans, 167 U.S. 407 (U.S. 1897)
- Lucy v. Deas, 59 Fla. 552 (Fla. 1910)
- Rice v. Theon Cummings and Sallie E. Cummings, 51 Fla. 535 (Fla. 1906)